Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NEWDELHI3067
2008-12-04 15:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS: INDIA REELS UNDER STRAIN

Tags:  PGOV PTER PHUM PREL PINR KDEM KISL PK IN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003067 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PREL PINR KDEM KISL PK IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS: INDIA REELS UNDER STRAIN

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3025

B. NEW DELHI 3024

C. NEW DELHI 3018

D. MUMBAI 550

Classified By: D/Polcouns Les Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003067 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PREL PINR KDEM KISL PK IN SUBJECT: MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS: INDIA REELS UNDER STRAIN REF: A. NEW DELHI 3025 ¶B. NEW DELHI 3024 ¶C. NEW DELHI 3018 ¶D. MUMBAI 550 Classified By: D/Polcouns Les Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: A week after the Mumbai attacks, the Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, the Indian security bureaucracy and the Indian public continued to struggle to make sense of how the attacks occurred and what form a proper response should take, both internally and externally. India's intelligence, military and law enforcement agencies began blame-shifting and finger-pointing almost immediately after the shooting stopped. India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW),fired the first salvo when it leaked to the press that it provided specific intelligence in the weeks before the attack, but there was no follow-up from the line agencies. Other agencies then jumped in aggressively. The UPA, under heavy criticism from political foes, announced that Cabinet Secretary K.M. Chandrashekar will lead an investigation into the roles of all security agencies prior to and during the attacks. On the external front, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) both stated they favored seeking a United Nations Security Council mandate for possible action against Pakistan. Meanwhile, thousands of Indian citizens staged candlelight vigils and peaceful protests in Mumbai and other cities to demonstrate their solidarity with the victims. End Summary Passing the Buck -------------- ¶2. (U) Allegations started Monday, December 1 - the day after the siege ended - with a report in the Hindustan Times that RAW provided four alerts about possible attacks on Mumbai to a centralized intelligence group under NSA Narayanan. Seeking to deflect blame, RAW reiterated that as an external agency RAW cannot operate within India, and once information is passed, RAW's responsibility ends. Then on December 2, Navy Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta told the press, "I am not aware of any intercepts passed on to the Indian Navy." He also claimed that an unidentified Coast Guard boat stopped the fishing trawler Kuber the terrorists hijacked, but that Coast Guard sailors released the trawler when the terrorists flashed Fisherman Identity Cards issued by the Gujarat state
;government. The Coast Guard denies it ever encountered the trawler, according to a December 4 press report. ¶3. (U) The Hindustan Times also reported that according to "sources" a Special Protection Group (SPG) advance team which was scouting the Mumbai Oberoi in the days before the attack for a possible PM visit on November 29, did not know about the alerts supposedly provided by RAW. In yet another anonymously sourced article, former Home Minister Shivraj Patil is said in September to have provided now former Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh information from intelligence agencies that sea-front hotels in Mumbai could be attacked. According to Taj Hotel owner, Ratan Tata, a security alert was issued in early November and extra precautions were taken, but the measures were relaxed just days before the attacks. The Mumbai police, however, claimed on December 1 not to have received any "specific inputs" from intelligence agencies. Since the initial claims by RAW, the Indian media have reported numerous stories about the dysfunctional relationship between RAW and its internal counterpart, the Intelligence Bureau (IB). UPA Searches for Answers -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Hoping to quell the public's frustration with the bickering bureaucracies, the UPA government on December 3 NEW DELHI 00003067 002 OF 002 charged Cabinet Secretary K.M. Chandrashekar with investigating the roles and inputs of the various security organizations prior to the attacks. Thankful for not getting sacked, NSA Narayanan announced his own action plan to address the lack of coordination amongst security organizations. Media reported that Narayanan may be planning a "100 day revamp" of the Indian security apparatus. An International Solution -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Both the BJP and CPM called for India to pursue a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate for action against Pakistan. Ravi Shankar Prasad, the BJP spokesman, explicitly called for UNSC sanctioned air strikes to "destroy the edifice of terrorism in Pakistan." In a somewhat less hostile tone, CPM General Secretary Prakash Karat told the press, "After links of terrorists in Pakistan are established, the government should take up the matter with the UNSC." A Public Grieves -------------- ¶6. (U) On December 3, one week after the attacks, 10,000 plus people gathered at the Gateway of India in Mumbai for a peaceful protest march. Similar candlelight vigils took place across India. The mourners protested against terrorist violence to be sure, but also against a government unable to protect its citizens or adequately respond to a crisis. Comment: Difficult Times Lay Ahead for UPA -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The recriminations have come fast and furious from all of India's security agencies. The papers are filled with leaked information which shifts the blame from one agency to another. The public, despite the peace rallies, wants action, but is not clamoring for war. It does not appear, however, that a simple reorganization of the security bureaucracy will suffice. The country is unified against terrorism, but it is not particularly unified behind the ruling UPA government. ¶8. (C) The BJP leaders know full well UNSC action against Pakistan remains highly unlikely due to China's veto. But for the BJP, "taking the issue to the UN" is code for military action against Pakistan. They also know that the GOI is unlikely to do so because at the same time Pakistan would take the Kashmir issue to the UN, something that India has fought for decades. For the GOI, and most Indians, calls to "internationalize" the situation will remain focused on the U.S., which they feel is the only country able to secure an adequate response from Pakistan. There will be heightened expectations about what the U.S. can or will do. ¶9. (C) Domestically, the results of recent state elections will be announced on December 8 - including Delhi and Madhya Pradesh, which went to the polls during the attack, and Rajasthan, which held elections on December 4. These contests will give us the first indications of the public's attitude. Given the public's anger at the government's failure - not just in Mumbai, but with a series of bombings over the last several months - as well the bureaucratic infighting, the Congress Party's prospects look dim. End Comment. MULFORD

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