NSA NARAYANAN TELLS AMBASSADOR INDIA HAS NO INTENTION OF ACTING MILITARILY AGAINST PAKISTAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003037



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2018

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, PK, IN

SUBJECT: NSA NARAYANAN TELLS AMBASSADOR INDIA HAS NO

INTENTION OF ACTING MILITARILY AGAINST PAKISTAN



REF: A. NEW DELHI 3025

B. NEW DELHI 3024

C. NEW DELHI 3018



Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).



1. (S) Summary: In a December 1 meeting, Indian National

Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan assured the Ambassador that

India did not intend to take military action against Pakistan

following the Mumbai terror attacks. Narayanan acknowledged

India's anger over the attack, but said that any military

action against Islamabad would "let Pakistanis off the hook."

Narayanan welcomed the Secretary's upcoming visit and agreed

with the Ambassador that the attacks provided India and the

U.S. with an opportunity to work closely together to fight

terrorism. Narayanan provided details about the

"militaristic attack," stressing its difference from prior

episodes, and warning that there may be more attacks to come

from a much more highly trained cadre of terrorists. End

Summary.



Ambassador Discusses Attacks, Flags Secretary's Visit

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2. (S) In a 45-minute-long meeting, the Ambassador,

accompanied by COS, met with National Security Advisor

Narayanan to discuss India's reaction to the suspected

involvement of Pakistan-based terrorists in the deadly

attacks on Mumbai and to preview the Secretary's December 3

visit. The Ambassador explained that the Secretary's visit

would be followed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Mullen's visit the next day. The U.S. wanted to get

to the bottom of these attacks; American lives had been lost

and that added a new dimension and urgency to the need to

work closely together with India. The Ambassador noted that

both the U.S. and India had substantial information regarding

the source of the attack. The U.S. was ready to press

Pakistan hard. The Ambassador also thanked Narayanan for the

access granted U.S. law enforcement officials to the attack

sites by the GOI on December 1 and hoped this good

cooperation would continue.



Narayanan: We Have No Intention of Military Action

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3. (S) Narayanan welcomed the visit as a positive follow up

to the President's conversation with Prime Minister Singh on

November 30. He went out of his way to reassure the

Ambassador that India did not intend to take military action

against Pakistan, observing that the Secretary "should not

waste time by asking us not to do anything" when "we have no

intention of taking such (military) steps." Narayanan

asserted that taking military action against Pakistan "would

let the Pakistanis off the hook." At the same time, he

acknowledged the Indian people's anger over the attacks and

asked rhetorically what India should do.



4. (C) Narayanan did note caustically that "the Pakistani

propaganda machine" was in overdrive. He said India was

aware that Islamabad had already been reaching out to

Beijing, Ankara and Berlin to tell its side of the story. He

stressed the importance of the U.S. putting "heavy pressure"

on Pakistan over the attacks. At the same time, he noted

India's qualified but positive assessment of Pakistan's

civilian leadership while relaying concern about the

stability of Zardari's government, stating that India did not

want to see its collapse and a return to military rule.



"Militaristic Attack"

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5. (C) Narayanan underlined that the Mumbai attacks were

different from "normal" jihadi attacks or even previous



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attacks by LeT. He was struck by the "militaristic" approach

and said it indicated the terrorists had undergone extensive

training, likening the attack to one that would be conducted

by the UK's Special Air Service. He said that the

terrorists' coordinated approach and ability to set up

communications links suggested that they had received

substantial training. He warned that "there would be more to

come," concluding that the sort of terrorism infrastructure

that had produced the Mumbai attackers would be of sufficient

scale to produce "hundreds" of trained terrorists.



6. (S) In analyzing the attack, Narayanan said, it would be

easy to see the attacks as solely designed to hit foreigners

in India's commercial capital or to kill Israelis and create

a firestorm. However, he said, what is obvious is not always

accurate. There were many unanswered questions he had about

the attack, such as why the attackers did not kill more

people in the street. Narayanan believed further attacks

along the same lines were possible. He worried that threat

information passed to India in September that included some

of the targets hit in Mumbai was not time limited and

included targets in Delhi. Narayanan also expressed disquiet

about how heavily armed the terrorists had been, claiming

that each had been carrying 180 rounds of ammunition and

numerous hand grenades. These attackers, in his view, were

not simply jihadis wildly spraying the area with machine

guns; in many cases, they used only single shots, had a high

degree of accuracy, and husbanded their ammunition.



7. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern about safety of

American citizens in India in general and touched on the

protection of the Embassy in particular, noting that the

Delhi Police had not been as forthcoming as he would like

about what specific steps they would take if the Embassy were

attacked. He had found the Delhi Police Chief unhelpful and

ineffectual and asked Narayanan for assistance. Narayanan

pledged he would look into this now, noting that the time was

ripe to review this issue.



Mukherjee-Zardari Telephone Call

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8. (C) Narayanan denied Mukherjee had called Zardari on

Friday night. He said that under government protocol, if the

External Affairs Minister planned to call the President of

Pakistan, then the Prime Minister would have to be informed,

as would the National Security Advisor. There was no such

request or notice. In any case, had there been such a call,

Narayanan would have known it.

MULFORD