INDIA CAREFULLY CONSIDERING ANTI-PIRACY PLANS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003032

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PHSA MARR PTER EWWT KPKO IN
SUBJECT: INDIA CAREFULLY CONSIDERING ANTI-PIRACY PLANS,
LOOKING FOR UN COVER AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

REF: A. DAO NEW DELHI - NAVCENT EMAIL 10/25/08 (NOTAL)

B. STATE 102911

C. NEW DELHI 2740

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary. While media reports begin to surface that
the INS Tabar sunk a pirated fishing boat with hostages --
and not a pirate "mothership," as the Indian Navy had first
claimed -- Indian officials are struggling to come up with a
policy for Indian involvement in anti-piracy operations in
the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. Post has been
consulting with the Indian Navy and External Affairs Ministry
on what India is willing to do, however the GOI seems to be
struggling to decide on the extent its involvement. External
Affairs Ministry Joint Secretary (UN-Political) Bhattacharjee
told PolCouns India is hoping for a UN Security Council
Resolution that would provide political cover for India and
other countries not interested in working under a U.S. or
NATO command, combined with an international coordination
center to allow the various groups to share data and
collaborate on operations. The INS Tabar incident is likely
to severely limit India's willingness to conduct operations,
although contacts maintain that India will participate in an
international effort. Post believes these anti-piracy
operations offer an excellent opportunity for U.S.-India
military cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and suggests the
USG support Indian efforts to be involved. End Summary.


2. (C) PolCouns called on Indian Ministry of External Affairs
Joint Secretary (United Nations-Political) Asith
Bhattacharjee on November 24 and followed up on November 28
to discuss possible greater U.S.-India coordination on
anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of
Africa. (Note: Ref A describes DAO New Delhi's discussions
with the Indian Navy on operational issues related to these
efforts. End Note.) Bhattacharjee, a veteran of the United
Nations Peacebuilding Commission, said India is indeed
interested in a UN mandate to provide a political umbrella
for countries, such as India, that wish to contribute but do
not want to fall under U.S., EU or NATO command, nor be seen
as taking orders from another country. Bhattacharjee said
India seeks an arrangement similar to a peacekeeping
operation, but not called a PKO, which he felt was
politically charged. The mandate would need to be clear on
the authorities granted to participants and the rules of
engagement. India would seek to combine elements of Law of
the Seas Articles 100 and 105 with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter to allow for seizure and arrest, which according to
Bhattacharjee provide "all the tools we need." Referring
back to Ref B demarche on escorts for World Food Program
ships entering Somalia, Bhattacharjee said the problem was
now larger than just the Somali coast, and that a resolution
broader than UNSCRs 1816 and 1838 was needed for the Gulf of
Aden and Horn of Africa region.


3. (C) Bhattacharjee envisioned the UNSCR would also set up
an "international coordination center" mechanism between
those operating under the UN mandate and U.S., NATO or other
forces operating under their own command. "It would not take
command away from anyone," he maintained, but could serve as
a force multiplier facilitating the sharing of data and real
time collaboration on operations. Bhattacharjee speculated
that should such a UN mandate be secured, other countries --

NEW DELHI 00003032 002 OF 002


he specifically cited Egypt -- would be motivated to join
operations. He added that India did not want to be a "lone
ranger" operating outside the U.S.-EU-NATO rubric in the
region. He recounted that UN Security Council committees had
been formed on many issues, such as the Somalia arms embargo,
and suggested that this may be another such issue where the
navies of several countries could be included with the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) providing a
coordinating role, or perhaps a IMO subcommittee established
to give the grouping a UN stamp. Bhattacharjee spoke
enthusiastically about this proposal, but did not explicitly
say India would be willing to help lobby other UNSC members
to pass a resolution for these operations. Bhattacharjee
noted to PolCouns that the Indian Mission in New York had
provided him with a quick readout of a U.S. draft resolution
(sic),which he characterized as promising. In terms of
India's participation, Bhattacharjee said that India "might
offer assets, depending no the structure." He asked whether
a there is a model that would include all the involved
countries at the same table, as with the IMO.


4. (C) Comment. While all indications are that the Indian
Navy is prepared to act when ordered, Indian policy makers
and politicians have moved slowly to respond to the
international community's call for greater engagement on this
issue, and no doubt the INS Tabar incident will further
restrain forward leaning by the External Affairs Ministry.
Still, anti-piracy cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and
western Indian Ocean offer an ideal opportunity for the U.S.
and India to begin building on several aspects of the global
partnership we are seeking, including military-to-military
cooperation, maritime security (as called for in our Maritime
Cooperation Framework),expanded information sharing, and
greater cooperation in international fora such as the United
Nations. Collaboration on these operations could also help
fill lingering gaps in our defense cooperation, such as the
lack of a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and
Communications and Information Security Memorandum of
Agreement (CISMOA). Additionally, a successful campaign with
India working comfortably under the UN umbrella but
side-by-side with the U.S., NATO and others partners, could
help break down biases against the U.S. which persist within
the Indian bureaucracy and facilitate our collaboration on
future operations, particularly in the Indian Ocean. Post is
hopeful that we can help India find the political cover it
needs to work with us on these vital operations.

MULFORD