INDIAN GOVERNMENT UNWILLING TO AGREE TO END-USE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002905 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 TAGS: MARR PREL PROV MASS KOMC IN SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT UNWILLING TO AGREE TO END-USE MONITORING, FOR NOW Classified By: AMB David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: While Indian National Security Advisor M. ¶K. Narayanan and Defense Secretary Vijay Singh stated their urgent interest on reaching agreement on end-use monitoring, talks led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Asian and Pacific Security Affairs) Mitchell Shivers failed to make any significant progress. Defense Secretary Singh concluded his final meeting with PDASD Shivers with a promise to take the matter to the Prime Minister's Office and Defense Minister to seek political clearance of the language, which bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of External Affairs were clearly unwilling to approve at their level. In a November 10 meeting, the Ambassador and Foreign Secretary Menon looked for ways to move forward in advance of Menon's plans to go to Washington before the end of the month. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On November 6, PDASD Shivers and CDA White received a meeting with National Security Advisor Narayanan late in the day and provided Narayanan the U.S. end-use monitoring (EUM) text. While Narayanan was cordial and explicitly stated that the Government of India (GOI) was eager to do business with the United States, it was apparent that he had not been fully briefed on developments. He seemed most concerned with mischievous uses of the EUM text to enable the United States to probe into Siachen glacier bases or Indian forward bunkers. PDASD Shivers assured him that was not the intent of the program. Narayanan told PDASD Shivers that the GOI sought to conclude the EUM agreement during this U.S. administration. PDASD Shivers stressed that the U.S. government had little flexibility beyond the draft text, which was drafted to be as flexible as possible while still fulfilling U.S. law. Narayanan directed MEA Americas Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar and Ministry of Defense Director-General for Acquisitions Shashi Kant Sharma to meet with the U.S. team and finalize the text on the following day. ¶3. (C) PDASD Shivers and CDA White had a courtesy call with Defense Secretary Singh prior to the beginning of talks on November 7, where Singh reiterated the GOI,s desire to agree to EUM text. Once talks begin, chaired on the Indian side by MoD Joint Secretary for Air Acquisitions Ghose and MEA Americas Joint Secretary Kumar, it became apparent that the Indian side had concerns with every alteration of their October 4 text. The Indian side had three primary concerns, all of which directly conflicted with U.S. requirements under the Arms Export Control Act. First, the GOI objected to language that would guarantee U.S. access to transferred defense articles in order to conduct end-use monitoring. The GOI sought to use vague language, which had the effect of making U.S. access optional rather than mandatory. Second, the GOI opposed the U.S. delineation of a broad number of authorized end-uses (internal security, self-defense, civic action, etc.) detailed in the Arms Export Control Act. The GOI argued that defense articles once purchased by India should be useable in any operation of the Indian Armed Forces without restrictions. PDASD Shivers stressed that it was almost inconceivable that the GOI would use articles in a way not permitted under the broad U.S. text. Finally, the GOI objected to language that the U.S. would "retain the right to verify credible reports" of unauthorized uses of transferred defense articles. The GOI side proposed a variety of means to condition the U.S. right, but none of them could satisfy the strict requirements of U.S. law in this area. ¶4. (C) PDASD Shivers concluded the session as it became clear that no additional progress could be made at that level. In his outcall with Defense Secretary Singh, PDASD Shivers indicated his disappointment in not resolving the issue and that as a consequence the U.S. could not move forward with several defense transfers to India. After inquiring as to the areas of greatest contention, Defense Secretary Singh expressed optimism that approval might be achievable at the political level. He promised to take the matter to the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister's Office. He said he would discuss the matter with National Security Advisor Narayanan over the weekend, when they would travel together for the Prime Minister's visit to Oman. He thought the Indian political leadership might be able to NEW DELHI 00002905 002 OF 002 bridge the current divide (implicitly indicating the political leaders would be willing to accept text unacceptable to lower-levels in the government) and the GOI would respond in seven-to-eight days. The U.S. side noted that Foreign Secretary Menon, who was noticeably absent from Delhi despite having provided the dates for these talks, was scheduled to travel to Washington, D.C. for the G-20 summit on November 15, which might provide a possible opportunity to resolve the matter. ¶5. (C) On November 10, Ambassador Mulford met with Foreign Secretary Menon to see whether there was a way ahead following the Shivers, discussions. Menon acknowledged that he had not had a chance yet to get a full debrief on the talks, but said he feared that the issue was becoming potentially unsolvable because positions were hardening in such a way as to make further discussions unhelpful. Instead of being a "language" problem, it was now looking like EUM had raised "substantive" problems. Menon said the GOI,s perception was that the USG-suggested draft language had become "harder" over the course of the negotiations and that language in existing agreements had not been as restricted. He asked why the language had changed over the past three or four years. The Ambassador reviewed the issues raised by the USG suggested language on use and stressed that the U.S. already had agreements on EUM with over 80 other countries. Menon responded that India continued to be interested in resolving the issue as soon as possible and said New Delhi did not want to wait until the next Administration takes office to get this done. Menon said he was planning to go to Washington in the near future to discuss transition issues and would like to be able to bring a resolution to this issue. The Ambassador acknowledged that India needed to find a politically palatable way of addressing our language and agreed that we should make the effort to resolve this issue now to enable strong defense cooperation in the future. ¶6. (U) PDASD Shivers has not cleared this message. MULFORD