PUT THE ONUS ON INDIA FOR UNSC SEAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000029 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2028 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO KUNR USUN IN SUBJECT: PUT THE ONUS ON INDIA FOR UNSC SEAT REF: A. 07 STATE 141727 ¶B. 07 NEW DELHI 5053 ¶C. 07 USUN 01225 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Steven J. White for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. As we look to engage with India on greater cooperation within the United Nations (reftels),concurrent with a possible completion of the civil-nuclear deal in sight and inter-governmental negotiations on United Nations Security Council expansion, the time may be near when the USG must consider whether to formally support New Delhi's bid for a permanent UNSC seat. India brings some impressive credentials to the table, but also has a record that leaves a lot to be desired in terms of working constructively with us in New York. This cable presents the view from the field on the pros and cons of supporting India at this time, with a comment that the best approach might be to put the onus on India by giving it an opportunity to demonstrate whether it is capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of a perm member -- as well as working with the United States on important issues. End Summary. Time Appears To Be Nearing -------------- ¶2. (C) The November 28 edition of The Telegraph carried an article saying November 30 talks between Assistant Secretary Silverberg and Additional Secretary K.C. Singh SIPDIS are expected to be "the first ever 'substantial talks' with India on expanding the UN Security Council." While the report may be exaggerated, as UN members do draw closer to final discussions on the issue UNSC expansion, the USG will need to consider India's request for support for a permanent seat. As fellow permanent UNSC members Britain, France, Russia and, to a lesser extent, China have all played their cards in terms of whether they support India's bid for a permanent UNSC seat, the U.S. is currently in a position where it can help lift India to a new level of global influence...or decide not to do so. The following are factors, from our perspective in New Delhi, for Washington policymakers to consider both in favor of and against India's claim that it is qualified to become a permanent member. Good Credentials In A Lot Of Areas... -------------- ¶3. (C) India brings certain significant credentials to its candidacy. India is a nuclear power. It is the second most populous country in the world, on a path to becoming the most populous within the next few decades. India's population is young with both the working age population and number of women in childbearing age expected to peak around 2020. India is also the second largest Muslim country in the world. (Note: In fact, one well known Imam in New Delhi claims by his count India is already the largest Muslim country in the world. End Note.) India is a stable democracy -- in a very unstable neighborhood -- with a fundamental respect for religious tolerance, human rights and the rule of law. India's economy is relatively open and growing at around 9% per annum, and its economic potential has businesses and governments from around the world beating a path to India's vast markets. For better or worse, India has played a leadership role among the G-77 and Non-Aligned Movement and is generally respected as a valid spokesperson for developing countries on north-south and south-south issues. ¶4. (C) On security issues, India has the fourth largest military in the world in terms of number of troops, and was tenth largest in terms of military expenditures in 2006. The military is firmly under civilian political leadership. The Indian military has substantial and growing projection capabilities, and showed during the tsunami an ability to work with others on large-scale SIPDIS NEW DELHI 00000029 002 OF 003 operations. India is a leader in global peacekeeping efforts, at times the largest contributor of troops, and host to an impressive UN peacekeeping training facility. Interestingly, local press has tried to link India's recent election as head of the Commonwealth and to the International Maritime Organization's executive council to UNSC qualifications, noting that "the election of India, Brazil and Germany...with more votes than a permanent UNSC member, France" suggested a balance of power shift toward the southern hemisphere. ¶5. (C) In other areas, such as climate change issues being worked in the Asia-Pacific Partnership or democracy promotion in the UN Democracy Fund, India has demonstrated a degree of leadership on multilateral issues. Indian commentators also point to other factors which make it stand out, such as civilizational legacy, cultural diversity, and India's geostrategic position. Parliamentarian P.K. Patasani seems to represent the Indian feeling when he says that "On the basis of any objective criteria, India is eminently suited to be a permanent UNSC member." ...But Its Record Leaves Unanswered Questions -------------- ¶6. (C) However, other data suggests that India's inclusion in the UNSC could run counter to U.S. interests. In 2006, India had a 15.9% voting coincidence rate with us on non-consensus resolutions, including zero percent on human rights votes, zero on "important" votes, and a mere 4.3% on Middle East votes. These statistics have been consistent for many years. As Acting PermRep Malhotra said before the General Assembly on November 26, India continues to associate itself with the Non-Aligned Movement, and while PM Singh has said the NAM today "must be of moderation, harmony, tolerance and reasons," the voting evidence remains that the NAM regularly works counter to U.S. goals. Indian officials assure us better cooperation between our two great democracies is "inevitable," but the question remains: would India, as a permanent member, work counter to U.S. interests? ¶7. (C) On important regional and global issues, where India has had the ability to positively influence events, it has been generally disappointing. Given the current state of events in neighboring Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, one could make the argument that India lacks either the will or ability -- or both -- to affect its own region, much less global issues which a permanent member would be expected to take on. Similarly, the GOI rationalizes its engagement with such states as Iran, Cuba, Venezuela and Burma by claiming it is better able to influence these regimes while maintaining good relations, yet, with few exceptions, has not demonstrated that it is willing to use that influence to positively affect the situations there. If India were to become a permanent member, would it be able to wield real influence on issues of global importance? ¶8. (C) India's handling of the civil-nuclear initiative, where it is paralyzed by opposition from critics within and outside the government, brings into question its ability to handle the domestic side of its role in major global issues. Additionally, the Ministry of External Affairs is a woefully understaffed and notoriously bureaucratic body, which, for example, has taken nearly a decade to contemplate a Logistics Support Agreement. Indian diplomats are often highly skilled, but MEA's officer intake currently averages 8-15 persons annually, and the entire officer corps is still only around 600, manning 162 missions at home and abroad. And for all its economic potential, the IMF still ranks India thirteenth in terms of nominal GDP, well behind other prospective permanent members such as Japan, Germany and Brazil. While India is big, democratic, and an attractive investment, does it have the capacity to handle the responsibilities of a permanent UNSC member? NEW DELHI 00000029 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) As with India's qualifications above, this is not the full set of unanswered questions over India's bid. One difference is that India seems to believe it is owed a seat, whereas we know UNSC membership is a responsibility, not a right. The Telegraph, quoting an unnamed source in Delhi, reported "The U.S. knows that if it supports Indian aspirations for a permanent Security Council seat, a lot of the anti-U.S. opposition in the Indian elite will melt away." It went on to suggest the U.S. holds guilt feelings over vetoing Shashi Tharoor's candidacy for UN Secretary General in 2006, and should somehow feel compelled to support India's seat out of concern for the broader relationship. While officials such as Patasani try to base India's argument on objective criteria, apparently others believe the U.S. somehow owes India its support. Comment: Put The Onus On India -------------- ¶10. (C) Comment. When the time comes, the decision whether to support India for a permanent UNSC seat will be among the largest issues facing our bilateral relationship, with long-term ramifications. The Telegraph article also mentioned that while the Silverberg-Singh talks are not expected to deliver a decision on a UNSC seat for India, "this is the beginning of a process, and Delhi knows that." While declaring the start of a process now would conveniently dismiss decades of poor behavior by India in New York, Post does believe that it would be in the U.S. interest to, at a time of our choosing, begin a trial period of sorts. Predicated on the idea that the political decision is made to consider India's candidacy, the onus should be put on India -- and not the other way around -- that if it wants our support, it will have to demonstrate that it is to likely to be able to work effectively with the U.S., and not remain obstreperous. We could offer a roadmap for how India can gain our trust, essentially by demonstrating its ability to work with us in three areas where a perm member should have the capability to exert influence: 1) on UN reform; 2) on issues within its region; and 3) on issues of global significance. We should offer India every opportunity to succeed in demonstrating to us that it can become a result-oriented permanent member. By telling India that we are considering its candidacy and basing it on its ability to demonstrate the qualifications it claims, if it were to fail it should be clear to the Indians that the responsibility for their failure rests with them. The bigger picture remains a productive, strategic relationship with the subcontinent; to achieve that, India will need to do its part to make its work in the UN more representative of the excellent relations we are building. WHITE