GORDON BROWN IN INDIA: "PARTNERSHIP OF EQUALS"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000289 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON UNSC IN SUBJECT: GORDON BROWN IN INDIA: "PARTNERSHIP OF EQUALS" MESSAGE WINS HEARTS AND MINDS, BUT THIN ON SUBSTANCE REF: A. 06 NEW DELHI 4924 ¶B. 06 MOSCOW 5435 ¶C. NEW DELHI 181 ¶D. NEW DELHI 277 Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Gordon Brown's first trip to India as Prime Minister brought nearly unanimous positive public reaction, despite "deliverables" being mostly reiterations of previous policy declarations and confirmations of the potential for a more prosperous future. The UK High Commission emphasized the positive reception to Brown's message of transforming the relationship into a partnership of equals. While numerous other major power suitors have tried to seduce the Indian public in recent months, the "equal partners" message Brown delivered seems to have resonated with the Indian public, which seems to be shedding its colonial baggage. End Summary. Theme of a "Partnership of Equals" -------------- ¶2. (C) Citing Gordon Brown's keynote speech at the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) entitled "Building a New Global Society: the Renewal of the International Institutions" as the backbone of the visit, the UK High Commission described the highlight of the Prime Minister's January 20-21 trip as "speeding up the process" of transforming Britain-India relations. In the CII speech, as well as in Brown's private meeting with PM Singh, Brown pushed for a greater global role for India built on a "partnership of equals" in the bilateral relationship. Specifically, Brown reaffirmed Britain's support for a permanent UNSC seat for India, called for greater Indian representation in international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, and urged a bigger role for India in global debates on climate change, nuclear nonproliferation and trade issues such as the Doha Round. Joint Statement Robust But Short on Major Deliverables -------------- ¶3. (C) The Joint Statement issued on the January 21 India-UK summit was well-focused in comparison to recent similar summit statements with China, Russia and Japan. While acknowledging that there were no major deliverables from this visit, UK High Commission Poloff Victoria Whitford (protect) said the visit was significant for the positive atmosphere it created, both with PM Singh and the Indian public. The two sides committed to deepening the strategic partnership which had been declared at previous meetings, and highlighted the economic and commercial linkages between the India and UK, the third largest cumulative investor in India. Here too, however, there were no major announcements of new economic initiatives, but rather more general references to "potential for greater collaboration," (taking) "note of the large opportunities," and "acknowledging the considerable potential" for trade, investment and services. While the Joint Statement briefly mentioned mutual support for an early outcome of the Doha Round, Whitford told Poloff that the summit was used to narrow down differences, with PM Brown urging PM Singh to be a positive force in negotiations. Singh reportedly pushed for more rapid progress in the India-EU Free Trade Agreement. Climate Change -------------- ¶4. (C) Climate change was a major issue discussed at the summit, with the two sides agreeing that India could play an important role in bridging the gap between developed and developing countries. The UK agreed to specific language supporting "long-term convergence," but not specifically agreeing to, PM Singh's position on per capita emission rates -- a move which Whitford said the UK agreed to in return for what for it felt was India's helpful stance at the recent Bali conference on climate change. Foreign Affairs NEW DELHI 00000289 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (C) In addition to the reaffirmation of the UK's support for a permanent seat on the UNSC for India, the two sides also discussed other international issues, including a commitment to support Afghan reconstruction; a call for Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and fulfill UNSC resolutions -- while stressing the importance of continued dialogue with Iran; support for a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; African development, including the resolution of the conflict between North and South Sudan; national reconciliation and political reform in Burma; and hopes for peace and stability in troubled neighbors Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. What the Joint Statement does not show, Whitford pointed out, was that India had insisted on removing any reference to the Nepalese government and Maoists to live up to "commitments already made," as India felt the emphasis should be on leaving both sides with the flexibility to proceed through April elections. The Joint Statement also left out the word "security" -- which the UK had hoped for -- from the clause on Afghanistan's reconstruction calling for "coherent international efforts to address the development (removed "and security") needs." This latter omission was based on Indian concerns for being too closely associated with NATO and ISAF efforts. Particular Interest in Burma -------------- ¶6. (C) Whitford said PM Brown made a particularly strong pitch for India to do more on Burma, to which PM Singh replied that India had privately been pushing the junta, and that while regime change is not the answer, further international pressure could yield results. Singh confirmed for Brown that India is not providing arms assistance to Burma. Counter-Terrorism and Other -------------- ¶7. (C) PM Brown also made a pitch for greater counter-terrorism cooperation. According to Whitford, Brown pressed for two initiatives not reported in the Joint Statement or to the public: for India to become a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) by the end of 2008 (note: India is pushing for expedited membership in the FATF; end note.); and for a counter-radicalization dialogue. The counter-radicalization dialogue is to take place outside of the existing counter-terrorism working group, which is seen as ineffectual. ¶8. (C) Other discussions noted in the joint statement included initiatives in education, discussion on the potential for collaboration in science/technology, and efforts to reach Millennium Development Goals. (Note: full text of Joint Statement is available at http://meaindia.nic.in. End Note.) ¶9. (U) Discussions on civil nuclear cooperation were reported in Ref D. Comment: "Equals" Message Strikes a Chord with Indian Public -------------- ¶10. (C) Comment. In contrast to PM Singh's recent visits to Beijing and Moscow (Refs A-C),and the visit of President Sarkozy (being reported septel),which all drew criticisms from predictable corners, public reaction to PM Brown's visit to New Delhi was remarkable for the near unanimity of its approval in India. (Note: Post has noted that some in the British press have been more critical. End Note.) Brown, who last visited New Delhi in January 2007 as Chancellor of the Exchequer, struck a chord with broader India with the well-focused, feel-good message of a "partnership of equals." India's recent emergence as the second largest investor in the UK may add to the resonance of such a message. Brown seemed to tap into the Indian psyche with populist claims: the support for an Indian permanent UNSC seat was not new, but was still the singular most widely reported aspect of the visit here. It was usually found NEW DELHI 00000289 003 OF 003 alongside comments by Brown that India has an "equally important role" as that of the U.S. or Europe in Doha Round negotiations, or "I support changes to the IMF, World Bank and the G8 that reflect the rise of India." The UK's rhetorical support for IMF and World Bank reforms that increase India's influence, along with support for FATF membership and a UNSC seat, appear targeted to gratify senior Indian ministers who have called for such changes, and may strike the Indians as stronger than the US' more qualified support for eventual reforms that would benefit India. ¶11. (C) In a bow to sports diplomacy, Brown seemed to hit one to the boundary by congratulating India on its recent famous cricket victory over Australia, and he drew approving gasps from the Indian media for suggesting that beloved Indian cricket batsman Sachin Tendulkar should be knighted. In an era when world leaders are beating a path to the door to try to win India's favor, where the perfunctory joint statements (including this one) seem to have become boilerplate reproductions, and where media reaction has routinely become ho-hum, Brown deserves full credit for a visit which stands out as relatively substantive and receiving broad approval from the Indian public. The fact that India's considerable colonial baggage was nowhere in sight made the feat that much more remarkable. MULFORD