PM SINGH TO FOCUS ON SECURITY COOPERATION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002744 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2018 TAGS: PROV PREL JA IN SUBJECT: PM SINGH TO FOCUS ON SECURITY COOPERATION, ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IN JAPAN VISIT Classified By: A/PolCouns Pushpinder Dhillon for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will focus on enhancing Indo-Japan security cooperation and economic cooperation during his October 21-23 visit to Japan. He will have an audience with the Emperor, and meet with Prime Minister Aso and Energy Minister Nikai. PM Singh will be accompanied by a business delegation, which will hold a forum with Japanese counterparts on areas for two-way investment. Nuclear cooperation and an Economic Partnership Agreement are conspicuously absent from the draft Joint Statement. End Summary. The Summit -------------- ¶2. (C) Japanese Embassy New Delhi Political Officer Yuji Suzuki briefed PolOffs that during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,s October 21-23 visit to Tokyo, Singh will meet the Emperor and Empress, Prime Minister Taro Aso, and Energy Minister Toshihiro Nikai. Singh will also bring with him a delegation of Indian business leaders who will meet with Japanese counterparts to discuss bilateral investment opportunities, with a goal of preparing proposals to present to the prime ministers. The summit will release two joint statements signed by the leaders: one on a bilateral cooperation framework and another on security cooperation, according to Suzuki. Business leaders will sign a non-binding economic cooperation document. The Security Cooperation Framework -------------- ¶3. (U) The Joint Statement on Security Cooperation Framework will consist of three parts: elements of existing cooperation, mechanisms of cooperation, and -- importantly, according to Suzuki -- an implementation plan. Elements of existing cooperation will cite the continuing dialogue of Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries and defense exchanges. Under the mechanisms of cooperation, Suzuki noted disaster relief, combating terrorism and terrorist financing, maritime security, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI -- of which India has expressed interest in joining) as areas in which new mechanisms of cooperation might be set up. He told PolOffs that the action plan for implementation is a work in progress, to be completed before the expected visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to India early in 2009. It will focus on institutionalizing mechanisms in the framework. He also noted that Japan sees this security framework pact as a complement to its regional strategy, specifically mentioning similarities between this agreement and the one Japan has with Australia. On an interesting side note, during a Track II U.S.-India-Japan conference taking place in Delhi October 18, several of Japan's private industry participants noted the possibility of Japan in the near future revising Article 9 of the constitution, as well as its three export principles. These businessmen called for defense cooperation to be a vehicle for broader bilateral economic growth. Contents (and Not) of the Joint Statement on Cooperation -------------- ¶4. (C) The Joint Statement on Cooperation will focus on economic cooperation, according to Suzuki, while touching on many other issues. The Dedicated Freight Corridor agreement will be featured, as Japan will announce a $4.5 billion investment for it, but a final project proposal will remain pending as Japan feels it needs a concrete commitment from the Indians on many of the technical requirements that are required to determine the exact cost. Japan will announce its assistance for the establishment of a new Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in Hyderabad, with Tokyo offering technological expertise and faculty exchanges. The Joint Statement will also call for closer cooperation between India and Japan in several multilateral fora and on transnational issues, such as addressing the global financial NEW DELHI 00002744 002 OF 002 crisis, working to advance the Doha Round, cooperating on counter-terrorism, strengthening the East Asia Community, and promoting UN reform, including permanent seats on the UN Security Council for Japan and India as called for by the Group of Four (G4). While climate change will be one paragraph in the statement, it is noteworthy that such a diminutive mention is in stark contrast to the multi-page, separate statement made during PM SHINZO Abe's visit to New Delhi in August of 2007. ¶5. (C) Japanese Ambassador Hideki Domichi told PolOff that this joint statement can be looked at also for what is not in it, specifically the lack of an agreement on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and no mention of civilian nuclear cooperation. Despite Tokyo's efforts to resolve what Domichi described as only minor remaining differences, India would not agree to the EPA, so the announcement during Singh's visit will merely note "substantial progress" toward concluding an EPA, as opposed to the "agreement in principal" Tokyo had been aiming for. Suzuki admitted to PolOffs that one sticking point is Japan's reluctance to recognize Indian pharmaceutical approval procedures. Also missing from the statement will be substantive mention of nuclear cooperation. Suzuki related that India would like to include a section on nuclear cooperation, but Japan,s domestic sensitivities make it difficult to accept. Pressed on whether Japanese companies like Mitsubishi are interested in building nuclear plants in India, Suzuki said the Japanese people's sensitivities to nuclear issues will necessitate it remains on the sidelines as other countries, such as the U.S. and France, take the lead on opening the Indian market. Comment: Friendship Checkup on the Way to ASEM -------------- ¶6. (C) Comment. PM Singh's visit is a stop which was planned prior to Taro Aso becoming prime minister, on Singh's way to Beijing for the October 24-25 Asia-Europe Meeting. As such, Indian analysts, such as C. Raja Mohan in his comments to PolOff, believe Delhi had few expectations of major deliverables or policy initiatives, and Suzuki's preview of the joint statements confirmed this visit will primarily be an affirmation of the growing, warm relations between the two countries. Indians are curious as to how long Aso's government will remain intact, and with India facing its own general elections within the next seven months, we are unlikely to see any major initiatives before Summer 2009. Still, this visit could portend a giant leap forward soon, particularly if new administrations in Tokyo and Delhi are willing/able to capitalize on the security cooperation goals being put forward during this visit. Should the security framework being laid out on this visit materialize as hoped, Japan and India could, down the road, be seen in operations together ranging from providing maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz to supporting Japanese ships involved in Operation Enduring Freedom to Japan providing much-desired advanced technology in defense equipment. The economic cooperation markers being laid during this visit, too, while perhaps not immensely significant themselves, should pave the way for the eventual EPA and much greater economic cooperation down the road. Generally speaking, greater Japan-India relations support U.S. interests in the region, so while this visit won't offer much in concrete terms, it is more good news for the ties between our two large Asian strategic partners. WHITE