INDIAN VIEWS ON NAM MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 002141

SIPDIS

ISN/RA FOR RMONGIELLO AND RNEPHEW; ALSO FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PARM TRGY KNNP IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN VIEWS ON NAM MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON
IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: UK READOUT

REF: A. STATE 79505

B. NEW DELHI 2052

Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary. According to the UK High Commission in
Delhi, the Indian government is claiming credit for helping
to secure a much improved NAM declaration on Iran's nuclear
program from the Tehran ministerial conference. Indian
officials also report pressure from Iran's Sunni neighbors,
who called on Tehran to address the concerns of the region
and reassure them that it was not pursuing a military nuclear
program. End Summary.


2. (C) Following up on Refs A and B regarding reinforcing the
message on Iran to Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) member states
at the 2008 NAM foreign ministers' meeting, PolCouns
discussed the NAM ministerial conference with UK High
Commission PolCouns Nigel Casey (protect). Casey had met
August 1 with Amandeep Singh Gill, Director of the External
Affairs Ministry's Disarmament Division and leader of the
Indian negotiating team in Tehran, and had twice lobbied with
French and German colleagues in advance of the NAM
conference. According to Casey, India was claiming credit
for helping to secure a declaration that was balanced and not
damaging to international efforts to keep pressure on Tehran.
Gill claimed that in part due to Indian influence,
unacceptable Iranian language calling for the removal of
"politically motivated" sanctions or questioning the legality
of UNSC actions was removed from the NAM statement. Also
removed were claims that all outstanding issues had been
resolved.


3. (C) Gill told Casey that Chile, Singapore, Panama and then
later Jamaica had been the most robust in opposing the
original Iranian draft text. India, South Africa and
Indonesia had formed a second group which had accepted the
principle of a declaration but worked systematically to
ensure it was made credible and balanced. A third group made
up of Cuba, Syria, Pakistan and Vietnam, had supported Iran,
but reluctantly and intermittently. Gill reported that the
emergence of a fourth group, of Sunni Arab neighbors, led by
Egypt with the UAE, Qatar and Saudis in support, had proposed
a text calling on Iran to address the concerns of the region
and reassure them that it was not pursuing a military nuclear
program -- a move which reportedly "rattled" the Iranians and
put them "in a tizzy."


4. (C) According to Gill, the move by the Sunni group
distracted Iran and allowed the others to get on with the
business of cleaning up the text. Through Ghana, India had
proposed a new section welcoming the Geneva talks with the
P5 1 (or as Casey described it, the E3 3),recognizing the
efforts both sides were making (as opposed to just Iran's
efforts, as Tehran wanted). In the final text, this section
appears to have been scaled back to a simple welcome for the
talks, and in place of the Egyptian reference to a military
program was a statement which Casey felt the Iranians could
regret down the road: "The (Ministers) welcomed Iran's
willingness to commence negotiations on various regional and
global issues, including nuclear issues with NAM member
states, particularly those of the region."


5. (C) The outcome of the discussions, according to Gill, was
a much more balanced text than the Iranians had proposed.
Additionally, the debate over the text presumably left Tehran
with a clear sense that the NAM was tired of being taken for
granted, and that there was a strong wish among the
membership to see Iran clear up the outstanding questions
around its nuclear program.
WHITE