INDIAN VIEWS ON NAM MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 002141 SIPDIS ISN/RA FOR RMONGIELLO AND RNEPHEW; ALSO FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PARM TRGY KNNP IR IN SUBJECT: INDIAN VIEWS ON NAM MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: UK READOUT REF: A. STATE 79505 ¶B. NEW DELHI 2052 Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. According to the UK High Commission in Delhi, the Indian government is claiming credit for helping to secure a much improved NAM declaration on Iran's nuclear program from the Tehran ministerial conference. Indian officials also report pressure from Iran's Sunni neighbors, who called on Tehran to address the concerns of the region and reassure them that it was not pursuing a military nuclear program. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following up on Refs A and B regarding reinforcing the message on Iran to Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) member states at the 2008 NAM foreign ministers' meeting, PolCouns discussed the NAM ministerial conference with UK High Commission PolCouns Nigel Casey (protect). Casey had met August 1 with Amandeep Singh Gill, Director of the External Affairs Ministry's Disarmament Division and leader of the Indian negotiating team in Tehran, and had twice lobbied with French and German colleagues in advance of the NAM conference. According to Casey, India was claiming credit for helping to secure a declaration that was balanced and not damaging to international efforts to keep pressure on Tehran. Gill claimed that in part due to Indian influence, unacceptable Iranian language calling for the removal of "politically motivated" sanctions or questioning the legality of UNSC actions was removed from the NAM statement. Also removed were claims that all outstanding issues had been resolved. ¶3. (C) Gill told Casey that Chile, Singapore, Panama and then later Jamaica had been the most robust in opposing the original Iranian draft text. India, South Africa and Indonesia had formed a second group which had accepted the principle of a declaration but worked systematically to ensure it was made credible and balanced. A third group made up of Cuba, Syria, Pakistan and Vietnam, had supported Iran, but reluctantly and intermittently. Gill reported that the emergence of a fourth group, of Sunni Arab neighbors, led by Egypt with the UAE, Qatar and Saudis in support, had proposed a text calling on Iran to address the concerns of the region and reassure them that it was not pursuing a military nuclear program -- a move which reportedly "rattled" the Iranians and put them "in a tizzy." ¶4. (C) According to Gill, the move by the Sunni group distracted Iran and allowed the others to get on with the business of cleaning up the text. Through Ghana, India had proposed a new section welcoming the Geneva talks with the P5 1 (or as Casey described it, the E3 3),recognizing the efforts both sides were making (as opposed to just Iran's efforts, as Tehran wanted). In the final text, this section appears to have been scaled back to a simple welcome for the talks, and in place of the Egyptian reference to a military program was a statement which Casey felt the Iranians could regret down the road: "The (Ministers) welcomed Iran's willingness to commence negotiations on various regional and global issues, including nuclear issues with NAM member states, particularly those of the region." ¶5. (C) The outcome of the discussions, according to Gill, was a much more balanced text than the Iranians had proposed. Additionally, the debate over the text presumably left Tehran with a clear sense that the NAM was tired of being taken for granted, and that there was a strong wish among the membership to see Iran clear up the outstanding questions around its nuclear program. WHITE