PM DEPARTS FOR G-8 WITH GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001875 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN SUBJECT: PM DEPARTS FOR G-8 WITH GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR DEAL REF: NEW DELHI 1847 Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Prime Minister Singh departed on July 7 for the G-8 Summit in Japan where he plans to ask world leaders to support the Indian government following its decision on July 4 to advance the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative to the IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Unwilling to bow to the Left Front's shifting ultimatum nor to spook its new supporters before deals are finalized, the government has elected to wait until Singh's return on July 10 to announce publicly its decision to proceed with the initiative and has quietly conveyed this plan to the IAEA. The Indian government appears to have the number of votes it needs to prevail in a confidence vote if it were called today, but the margin is thin and the political situation fluid. Embassy sources expect a withdrawal by the Left between July 10-13, and a routine Monsoon or a Special Parliamentary Session may be called beginning July 21. If the BJP or Left Front were to call for a confidence vote, it could take place as early as that same week, but it looks increasingly unlikely that they would command the votes to prevail. The Ambassador pressed his Japanese counterpart to encourage Japanese officials to highlight as much as possible India's nonproliferation efforts in the statements emerging from the G-8 Summit, and the Japanese Ambassador later responded that Japanese officials had agreed with Deputy Secretary Negroponte to include the proposed language in the Chair's Statement. The Australian High Commissioner said that India could count on his country not to obstruct its campaign for a NSG exception; several other reluctant NSG members may require political engagement at the highest levels to agree to a clean NSG exception for India. END SUMMARY. PM Departs for G-8 to Lobby Privately for Nuclear Deal - - - ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh departed on July 7 for the G-8 Summit in Hokkaido, Japan and his July 9 meeting there with President Bush, where he plans to lobby G-8 leaders to support his country's efforts to achieve rapid IAEA Board of Governors approval of the draft safeguards agreement and a India-specific exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). His refusal to attend the G-8 without his government's prior backing to advance the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative led to a week of hard political bargaining that culminated in confirmation from the Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government that it has secured sufficient support in the Lok Sabha -- with the Samajwadi Party and others -- to win a confidence motion that the threatened withdrawal of Left could trigger. Timing of Announcement: An Issue of Political Management - - - ¶3. (C) Foreign Secretary Menon shared with the Ambassador the government's evolving decision-making on advancing the nuclear initiative in recent days. Menon told the Ambassador on July 5 that the government came to the decision on the evening of July 4 to seek approval from the IAEA Board of Governors for its safeguards agreement. According to Menon, IAEA Director General Mohammad El Baradei indicated he would call a Board of Governors meeting on July 28, and circulate the draft safeguards agreement in English by July 7 and the other official languages by July 11. Menon indicated the government initially planned to announce publicly its intention to move forward with the nuclear initiative on July ¶14. When the Ambassador cautioned that this would not be early enough for the July 28 meeting, the government decided to announce its decision immediately after Prime Minister Singh's return from the G-8 on July 10. Menon explained that while the Indian Government understood the importance of engaging the IAEA Board of Governors immediately, the government could not act sooner to avoid alienating new parliamentary supporters until agreements with each were sewn up and so as not to be seen caving in to the Left's dictate to announce its intention on its timeline (reftel). ¶4. (C) The government responded on July 7 to the Left's deadline via a brief letter, saying that a formal decision NEW DELHI 00001875 002 OF 003 and announcement of the government's plans to go to the IAEA will be discussed in the UPA-Left committee after Prime Minister Singh returns from Japan, most likely on July 10. Embassy sources expect a withdraw by the Left between July 10-13, and possibly a routine Monsoon or a Special Parliamentary Session may be called beginning July 21. If the Left Front or BJP were to call for a confidence vote, it could take place as early as that same week, but they would be unlikely to do so unless they were certain of a majority. ¶5. (C) Prime Minister Singh's July 6 press statement issued on the eve of his departure was consistent with the strategy outlined by Menon. It mentioned climate change, development, trade, technology transfer, energy security, and food security -- but not the nuclear initiative. The statement included a robust list of planned bilateral meetings with the leaders of Japan, Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, in addition to President Bush. Making the Most of the G-8 - - - ¶6. (C) The Ambassador offered to Menon to press for the incorporation of specific language supporting the nuclear initiative in the statements emerging from the G-8, but the government's desire to withhold the announcement until after the G-8 meant that the language could not be more than a generic statement of support for India's nonproliferation efforts. On July 7, the Ambassador pressed Japan's Ambassador to India Hideaki Domichi to encourage officials in Japan to include to the extent possible supportive language on India's nonproliferation efforts in the statements emerging from the G-8 Summit. Japanese PolCouns Takio Yamada told PolCouns that he had spoken over the phone with the director in charge of the nuclear deal in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that he is "fully aware of the importance" of the proposal and "ready to come into discussions" on specific language for this year's G-8 document. The Japanese Ambassador later responded that Japanese officials had agreed with Deputy Secretary Negroponte to include the India language in the Chair's Statement. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador reached out to several local representatives of skeptical NSG member states in recent days. On July 6, the Ambassador phoned Canadian High Commissioner David Malone (on vacation in France),who strongly recommended a call from the Secretary to her Ottawa counterpart to urge the Canadians not to insist on the normal 45-day waiting period prior to Board of Governors approval of the safeguards agreement. ¶8. (C) Australian High Commissioner John McCarthy told the Ambassador on July 7 that Prime Minister Kevin Rudd assured Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee during his visit to Canberra in June that Australia would not obstruct a NSG exemption for India. McCarthy said, "I'd be astonished if Australia did anything other than sit quietly in the NSG." McCarthy speculated that additional conditions that could be proposed, such as language opposing further testing, would cause "angst" among some within the Australian government, but that PM Rudd's position was clear. He said Australia's public position prior to the NSG decision would be to "take into account Australia's relationship with India and the U.S. in coming to its decision." McCarthy indicated that Australia's position on India's NSG exception was often mistaken for its strict opposition to the sale of uranium to India. McCarthy described the uranium sales ban as an entrenched Labour Party platform, rather than a cabinet decision, that would take some time to change despite PM Rudd's private desire for it to do so. Shoring Up A Thin Majority - - - ¶9. (C) Embassy contacts and media reports indicated that the government made the clear decision to advance the nuclear initiative, but commentators continued to describe the political situation as fluid as the government attempted to reinforce its wafer-thin majority (reftel). Congress Party Spokesman Manish Tiwari confirmed that the government decided to proceed with the IAEA, but cautioned that the politics of NEW DELHI 00001875 003 OF 003 maintaining the government's majority in the event of a confidence vote was tricky because Muslim members of the Samajwadi Party (SP) could be induced to defect to Mayawati's Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP),the ruling party and primary SP regional rival in Uttar Pradesh. Congress Party insider Saifuddin Soz -- Minister for Water Resources, Congress Working Committee Member, UPA-Left Committee Member, and Congress Party President in Jammu and Kashmir -- told the Embassy on July 7 that "the deal has to go through, there is no other way." He said he was confident the Muslim members of the Samajwadi Party would abide by their party's decision to support the government. Two Samajwadi Party members of parliament, Shahid Siddiqui (a Muslim) and Kirti Bardhan Singh, expressed confidence to the Embassy on July 6 that the party remained united behind its leadership and would back the government in a confidence vote. Embassy sources in Lucknow speculated that the SP may not join the government immediately so as not to appear opportunist, but that they would be interested in a more formal alliance after the current crisis passes. ¶10. (C) In a new development, Embassy contacts confirmed that the eight Lok Sabha representatives of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) Party -- part of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) -- decided on July 7 to back the government in the event of a confidence vote over the nuclear deal. On July 6 following meetings with Sonia Gandhi, the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (DSGMC) led by Parmjit Singh Sarna had called on Sikh members of parliament to support the nuclear initiative, citing former President A.P.J. Kalam's support as evidence that the deal was in the "larger interest" of the country. Sarna said it would be a "black day" in Sikh history if the SAD failed to support the deal and Prime Minister Singh personally as a positive image for the Sikh community. The SAD's eight votes and unequivocal support for the government over the issue not only provides a solid margin of support for the initiative and delivers a slap in the face to their BJP allies. ¶11. (C) COMMENT. By the Embassy's best count, the addition of the SAD Party (eight votes) plus the Samajwadi Party (39 votes if they remain a block, but without its UNPA allies) would give the government at least 277 votes, or a clear majority of at least five votes. In the event of a confidence vote, the unlikely partnership of the BJP's NDA supporters (173 votes),the Left Front (59 votes),and Mayawati's BSP (17 votes, but which remains undeclared) would total 249 votes, or 23 votes short of a majority. Another 25 members of parliament remain publicly undeclared, several of which have historically supported the government. It is difficult to see a scenario by which the government's opponents could prevail in a confidence vote under these circumstances, and thus they would have little reason to call such a vote, but Indian politics holds many surprises. END COMMENT. MULFORD