INDIAN COMMUNIST LEADER URGING CEREMONIAL ROLE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001330 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NP IN SUBJECT: INDIAN COMMUNIST LEADER URGING CEREMONIAL ROLE FOR PM KOIRALA Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a May 13 meeting with PolCouns, Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) leader Sitaram Yechury: -- said the Maoists won the Nepalese election because they turned out to be the most pragmatic, mature and best organized of any of the competing parties; -- reported that he has advised Pushpa Dahal ("Prachanda") to give PM Koirala a ceremonial role in the new government, which Dahal supported to the extent it would not create two centers of power; -- predicted the King would leave Nepal, initially for India but eventually for Western Europe; -- felt that the three most prestigious positions in the government - Prime Minister, President (albeit as a titular figurehead) and Speaker of the National Assembly - would go to the Maoists, a Nepalese Congress party leader, and a UML leader, respectively, with the Deputy Speaker job going to a Madhesi leader; and -- urged Dahal to resolve the arms issue prior to June 23, in order to justify the argument that the UN Mission in Nepal had no reason to remain beyond its mandate. End Summary. --- Maoists were most attractive option --- ¶2. (C) Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) leader Sitaram Yechury provided PolCouns with a readout of his trip the week of May 5 to Nepal, where he met with Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPN-M) Chairman Pushpa Dahal ("Prachanda"), Prime Minister Koirala, and other Nepalese politicians. Yechury provided his assessment of the Maoist victory in Nepal, saying that recently, the Maoists had emerged as the most pragmatic and mature party, who used postponement in election dates to become best organized for an election campaign. While the Nepalese Congress and UML were engaged in political rhetoric, he reasoned, the Maoists were working hard at the grassroots level. However, the margin of victory surprised even the Maoists. Yechury added that in his discussions with Dahal, Dahal referred to meeting with Ambassador Powell and indicated that the Maoists have come to realize that they now have to conduct relations with the U.S. --- What to do with Koirala? --- ¶3. (C) PM Koirala indicated to Yechury that he was interested in being the President and Commander-in-Chief in a new government, but Yechury reported that Dahal and his �00A;colleagues will not agree to that, as they believe "the old man" would be able to use the army to consolidate power. Dahal does not see any scope for dual centers of power, according to Yechury, but would allow for Koirala to become a titular head. Yechury said he suggested to Dahal a possibility for a face-saving compromise, whereby Koirala would be made interim President, drawing from the history lesson in India where Raj Gopalachari became Governor-General between the time of Indian independence in 1947 and the seating of India's parliament in 1952. Yechury noted that Koirala had not accepted that the election was a mandate for change and against the Nepal Congress party, only admitting that the vote indicated support for the Maoists for the Constituent Assembly. --- What to do with the King? --- ¶4. (C) Dahal was "very clear" that the King cannot be allowed to remain in the palace, Yechury stated, but could live in Nepal like any other private citizen. Yechury believed the King will choose to leave Nepal, probably initially to live in India, where he has property, but eventually ending up in Western Europe. --- Split the prestige seats for the sake of stability --- ¶5. (C) Yechury said that during his discussions with Dahal, NEW DELHI 00001330 002 OF 002 he had proposed that the interim President as titular head should go to Nepalese Congress, the Prime Minister's position to the Maoists (although perhaps Baburam Bhattarai instead of Dahal),and the Speaker of the Assembly's position should go to the UML. Additionally, Yechury suggested that the Deputy Speaker of the Assembly slot be given to a Madhesi, as they were historically denied a share in power structure. Such a formula for the top positions would provide the new government stability and a broad base of support, Yechury reasoned. --- No hurry for UNMIN to leave, for Dahal --- ¶6. (C) Although the Indian government wanted the United Nations Mission in Nepal to depart when its mandate ended on June 23, Dahal told Yechury that he would not be opposed to a constructive UN role, and even had lauded the role UNMIN had played in assisting credible elections to take place. Yechury said that he had urged Dahal to resolve the issue of arms availability for the Maoists prior to June 23, thereby taking away any justification for the UNMIN mission to continue, but didn't believe Dahal saw the issue with the same urgency. Yechury added that he believed the Indian government's reason for wanting UNMIN to disband was that it diminished India's influence in Kathmandu. --- Expect greater, more equal India-Nepal cooperation --- ¶7. (C) Yechury said he foresaw greater engagement between India and Nepal under a Maoist government, beginning with a re-working of the Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950, which was written when Nepal was practically a vassal state of India, he opined, and continuing with bilateral investment, particularly in energy. He noted that at this time more Nepalese were employed in India than in Nepal, suggesting that India would support the new government's efforts to improve economic conditions on the Nepalese side of the border. MULFORD