JEM REBELS: DEBY'S SAVIOUR AND BUDDING NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000081 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958 OADR:DECL: 03/07/18 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF SU CD SUBJECT: JEM REBELS: DEBY'S SAVIOUR AND BUDDING NATIONAL MOVEMENT? CLASSIFIED BY DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Representatives of the Sudanese rebel group JEM told N'Djamena Emboffs on March 7 that JEM was well on the way to becoming an inclusive Sudanese national movement. They acknowledged that JEM forces had come to the aid of President Deby during the February 2-3 rebel attacks on N'Djamena, and said they would come again if needed. They laughed at charges that Chad was supporting JEM -- it's the other way around, they explained. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) DCM and Poloffs met with representatives of the Darfur rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on March 7, 2008 at their request. Led by Adam Togod Lissan (Chief Negotiator),the other five members included: Seif Koko, Deputy Secretary for Foreign offices, Gamali Hassan Galaleddin, Treasurer, Ahmed Hussain Adam, JEM spokesperson, Ousman Ahmed Fadul, Deputy Secretary for Foreign Relations and Mohammed Bahar. UN/AU PROCESS STUCK -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Lissan explained that the group had been in N'djamena for the last eight days. They had met with the UN/AU negotiating team to outline their views on the way forward (noting that this was the first time in three months that they had had contact with the UN/AU team). That being said, they had nothing positive to report. They felt that the negotiations were stuck and doubted there would be any direct engagement in the near future. They did not think that the UN/AU had a strategy. The (self- admitted) lack of coordination between the AU and UN was obvious. In the meantime, the Government of Sudan had taken advantage of the situation to renew a "military and security solution" on the ground. ¶4. (SBU) DCM asked whether the movement was still divided (Note: our last JEM visitor, field commander Adam Bakhit, was from a splinter wing. End note.) Lissan dismissed this group, saying that there were no other JEM groups on the ground. Some individuals might have left, but they had no military presence. JEM AS A NATIONAL MOVEMENT -------------- ¶5. (SBU) JEM Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs Fadul took the floor to explain that JEM was no longer a fighting movement - it had become a "popular revolution." JEM had evolved over the last six months to become a national movement with representation all over Sudan - Kordofan, North, East and even in Khartoum. As proof of this new national character, the JEM representatives in the meeting noted that they represented all regions of Sudan - from Arab to Nuba - the only Zaghawa present was Lissan. JEM controlled large areas and even had a civil administration in these areas. Furthermore, JEM did not support any kind of partition of the country as a solution. Fadul went on to say that China was "killing us directly" by supplying weapons to the Government of Sudan and supporting it politically. "We want to see China leave our area," he stated, adding that American oil companies (Chevron was named) by contrast showed interest in the communities in the oil producing region. JEM SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT DEBY -------------- ¶4. (C) Queried as to JEM support for President Deby, Lissan was direct and unhesitant. "President Bechir was bringing Darfur to Ndjamena", and sought to make Chad an Islamic State. In response, the JEM "came to President Deby's rescue with 300 landcruisers." As for future attacks, the Government of Sudan was certainly continuing to arm and supply the Chadian rebels. Lissan explained that Erdimi's forces were near Guereda; Nouri's forces and those of the RFC were closer to the Goz Beida area. He did not believe that these groups numbered over 2,000. He had heard that there was movement of 19 tanks towards El Geneina; he didn't know if this was for the Chadians or not. ¶5. (C) Lissan said that while Sudan certainly was gearing up for another attack, the Chadian rebels were divided and Erdimi's forces were weakened by defection back to the Government side. In the absence of a strong Zaghawa component, he doubted that the rebels could triumph - not only because the Zaghawa brought fighting men, but also because they had sources in N'Djamena who provided valuable information. According to Lissan, Erdimi's Zaghawa forces NDJAMENA 00000081 002 OF 002 had seen evidence during the February 2-3 attacks of Nouri's troops targeting Zaghawas; they were concerned that once in power Nouri would "become another Habre." Lisson referred to "Zaghawa community pressure" that was being brought to bear on the Erdimi forces to persuade them that it was better to stick with clan solidarity rather than be divided by the Sudanese Government. He also alluded to negotiations going on as well between the Government of Chad and rebel groups that might be bearing fruit. Nonetheless, were there to be another Chadian rebel attack, the JEM would be there to continue to protect the Chadian regime. ¶6. (C) DCM explained that the United States had told Chad to stop supporting Sudanese rebels in the same way that we told Sudan to stop supporting Chadian rebels. The JEM members looked surprised: "Chad, support us? We are supporting Chad" they responded. Negotiator Lissan concluded by explaining that the group hoped to visit the United States and speak with Assistant Secretary Frazer to explain the movement's objectives. COMMENT: ¶7. (C) JEM forces see preservation of the Deby regime as necessary to their survival. Always a cross-border matter, the Darfur crisis has clearly spread to a much larger canvas than the Darfur region. The arrival of the Secretary General's Special Representative for Eastern Chad may galvanize the AU/UN political process by putting the focus on the deepening regional instability. NIGRO