JEM REBELS: DEBY'S SAVIOUR AND BUDDING NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000081

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958 OADR:DECL: 03/07/18
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF SU CD
SUBJECT: JEM REBELS: DEBY'S SAVIOUR AND BUDDING NATIONAL
MOVEMENT?

CLASSIFIED BY DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Representatives of the Sudanese rebel
group JEM told N'Djamena Emboffs on March 7 that JEM was
well on the way to becoming an inclusive Sudanese national
movement. They acknowledged that JEM forces had come to the
aid of President Deby during the February 2-3 rebel attacks
on N'Djamena, and said they would come again if needed.
They laughed at charges that Chad was supporting JEM --
it's the other way around, they explained. End Summary.


2. (SBU) DCM and Poloffs met with representatives of the
Darfur rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on
March 7, 2008 at their request. Led by Adam Togod Lissan
(Chief Negotiator),the other five members included: Seif
Koko, Deputy Secretary for Foreign offices, Gamali Hassan
Galaleddin, Treasurer, Ahmed Hussain Adam, JEM
spokesperson, Ousman Ahmed Fadul, Deputy Secretary for
Foreign Relations and Mohammed Bahar.

UN/AU PROCESS STUCK
--------------


3. (SBU) Lissan explained that the group had been in
N'djamena for the last eight days. They had met with the
UN/AU negotiating team to outline their views on the way
forward (noting that this was the first time in three
months that they had had contact with the UN/AU team).
That being said, they had nothing positive to report. They
felt that the negotiations were stuck and doubted there
would be any direct engagement in the near future. They
did not think that the UN/AU had a strategy. The (self-
admitted) lack of coordination between the AU and UN was
obvious. In the meantime, the Government of Sudan had
taken advantage of the situation to renew a "military and
security solution" on the ground.


4. (SBU) DCM asked whether the movement was still divided
(Note: our last JEM visitor, field commander Adam Bakhit,
was from a splinter wing. End note.) Lissan dismissed this
group, saying that there were no other JEM groups on the
ground. Some individuals might have left, but they had no
military presence.

JEM AS A NATIONAL MOVEMENT
--------------


5. (SBU) JEM Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs Fadul
took the floor to explain that JEM was no longer a fighting
movement - it had become a "popular revolution." JEM had
evolved over the last six months to become a national
movement with representation all over Sudan - Kordofan,
North, East and even in Khartoum. As proof of this new
national character, the JEM representatives in the meeting
noted that they represented all regions of Sudan - from
Arab to Nuba - the only Zaghawa present was Lissan. JEM
controlled large areas and even had a civil administration
in these areas. Furthermore, JEM did not support any kind
of partition of the country as a solution. Fadul went on
to say that China was "killing us directly" by supplying
weapons to the Government of Sudan and supporting it
politically. "We want to see China leave our area," he
stated, adding that American oil companies (Chevron was
named) by contrast showed interest in the communities in
the oil producing region.

JEM SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT DEBY
--------------


4. (C) Queried as to JEM support for President Deby, Lissan
was direct and unhesitant. "President Bechir was bringing
Darfur to Ndjamena", and sought to make Chad an Islamic
State. In response, the JEM "came to President Deby's
rescue with 300 landcruisers." As for future attacks, the
Government of Sudan was certainly continuing to arm and
supply the Chadian rebels. Lissan explained that Erdimi's
forces were near Guereda; Nouri's forces and those of the
RFC were closer to the Goz Beida area. He did not believe
that these groups numbered over 2,000. He had heard that
there was movement of 19 tanks towards El Geneina; he
didn't know if this was for the Chadians or not.


5. (C) Lissan said that while Sudan certainly was gearing
up for another attack, the Chadian rebels were divided and
Erdimi's forces were weakened by defection back to the
Government side. In the absence of a strong Zaghawa
component, he doubted that the rebels could triumph - not
only because the Zaghawa brought fighting men, but also
because they had sources in N'Djamena who provided valuable
information. According to Lissan, Erdimi's Zaghawa forces

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had seen evidence during the February 2-3 attacks of
Nouri's troops targeting Zaghawas; they were concerned that
once in power Nouri would "become another Habre." Lisson
referred to "Zaghawa community pressure" that was being
brought to bear on the Erdimi forces to persuade them that
it was better to stick with clan solidarity rather than be
divided by the Sudanese Government. He also alluded to
negotiations going on as well between the Government of
Chad and rebel groups that might be bearing fruit.
Nonetheless, were there to be another Chadian rebel attack,
the JEM would be there to continue to protect the Chadian
regime.


6. (C) DCM explained that the United States had told Chad
to stop supporting Sudanese rebels in the same way that we
told Sudan to stop supporting Chadian rebels. The JEM
members looked surprised: "Chad, support us? We are
supporting Chad" they responded. Negotiator Lissan
concluded by explaining that the group hoped to visit the
United States and speak with Assistant Secretary Frazer to
explain the movement's objectives.

COMMENT:


7. (C) JEM forces see preservation of the Deby regime as
necessary to their survival. Always a cross-border matter,
the Darfur crisis has clearly spread to a much larger
canvas than the Darfur region. The arrival of the Secretary
General's Special Representative for Eastern Chad may
galvanize the AU/UN political process by putting the focus
on the deepening regional instability.

NIGRO