FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON CHAD-SUDAN, POWS, CHILD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000062

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU CD UNSC
SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON CHAD-SUDAN, POWS, CHILD
SOLDIERS, AND EUFOR-MINURCAT

REF: NDJAMENA 0055

Classified By: AMBASSADOR LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: French Ambassador Foucher told Ambassador
January 28 that France regretted that President Deby did not
take stronger action or speak out more clearly against
mistreatment of POWs and recruitment of child soldiers. He
expressed the strong French view that Sudan was far more to
blame for bilateral tensions than Chad, which sought a
peaceful border with its stronger neighbor, and that
Khartoum's support for Chadian rebels in Sudan was far more
substantial and purposeful than Chad's grudging support for
Sudanese JEM rebels in Chad. He said that France had
strongly warned President Deby against cross-border attacks
into Sudan and had warned President Bechir even more strongly
that there were limits beyond which it should not try to go
in its squabble with Chad. Foucher said France sought not
only security for camps and humanitarian efforts from the
EUFOR and MINURCAT deployment but also "concrete results,"
and cited assistance for the return of 20,000-30,000 Chadian
displaced persons to their homes. Foucher welcomed any U.S.
support for the deployment, especially in the area of
reconstruction.


2. (C) Foucher was clear that France still retains great
influence with Deby and is not reticent about using it; that
France considers Sudan the clear offending party and Chad the
offended party in the Chad-Sudan dispute; and that France has
conveyed to Khartoum the limits Paris has set to Sudanese
threats to Chadian security, including regime change in
N,Djamena. END COMMENT.


3. (U) Ambassador and French Ambassador Bruno Foucher had a
working lunch January 28 to discus a variety of issues. We
report Foucher,s views on salient ones.

CHILD SOLDIERS
--------------


4. (C) Foucher said that he had gone to President Deby
repeatedly on the issue of recruitment of child soldiers and
that Deby,s position was that it was the rebels, not the
Chad military, who were recruiting the underaged. Foucher
conceded that Deby was correct insofar as it was true that
the practice was not a matter of government policy, but of
lack of government authority over military subordinates.
Deby did speak out on the issue at French insistence, but
took no effective action to correct the situation and punish
offenders. Foucher added that it was the line commanders who
were recruiting youthful soldiers partly because military
service by the underaged carries "no taboo" in Chadian
society. Even so, Foucher said, President Deby was missing
an opportunity to legitimize his rule and avoid international
censure by not speaking and acting more straightforwardly on
child soldiers.

TREATMENT OF POWS
--------------


5. (C) Foucher said much the same was true of the
mistreatment of POWS, which was occurring in Chad, not as a
matter of government policy but as a result of lack of
government control of its own military, especially outside
N,Djamena. Foucher said he had protested vigorously in
favor of full access by the International Red Cross (ICRC) to
POWS, which the government conceded in principal but had
difficulty enforcing on recalcitrant field commanders. In
the end, according to Foucher, the ICRC got access.

EUFOR/MINURCAT
--------------


6. (C) Foucher said that it was France,s goal not only that
EUFOR and MINURCAT provide security to the camps and
humanitarian workers in their areas of operations, but that
there be concrete and measurable results of their efforts.
He said that France expected that 20,000 to 30,000 internally
displaced Chadians would return to their homes by the end of
this year.


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7. (U) Foucher said that France and the EU welcomed U.S.
support to EUFOR and MINURCAT, especially to assist in
reconstruction efforts. Leaving behind tangible
improvements were the real objectives of stability and
reconstruction operations which the EU and the UN expected to
mount in the wake of the peacekeeping operations.

CHAD-SUDAN
--------------


8. (C) Foucher said that France had repeatedly and sternly
warned Chad about cross-border operations into Sudan and had
similarly warned Sudan about its actions vis--vis Chad. But
even so, Foucher allowed, the situations were fundamentally
different. Chad's support for the JEM rebels was tepid and
passive compared to Sudan's active and robust support for
Chadian rebel groups. The JEM, he claimed, had ample sources
of financial and assistance besides Deby,s rather grudging
support. The JEM's "Turabist" nature ensured it important
support from many sympathizers, including in the Gulf states
and Libya, while the Sudanese government was the sole source
of assistance for Chad rebel groups on its soil. President
Deby, according to Foucher, wanted to avoid confrontation
with Sudan because he understood his military and political
weakness vis--vis Khartoum. But Deby did a poor job of
public diplomacy and of making his government's policy
understood - partly a result of his own distaste for public
speaking and pronouncements - which meant he missed
opportunities to win international support and understanding,
even in comparison with the Sudanese regime,s actions.


9. (C) Foucher said that nothing had come of the January 27
Tripoli meeting but that more might be forthcoming from a
follow-up meeting there February 5. Foucher said that the
border was very unstable; that Sudan had been generous in
recent assistance to Chad rebel groups; and that those groups
were mounted in some 200 vehicles and were indeed restless
and evidently intent on moving towards the Chad border. At
the moment, he said, Sudan might well be biding its time,
waiting until after the Addis Summit to push the rebels
groups forward into Chad.

DOMESTIC POLITICS
--------------


10. (C) Foucher said that Deby was understandably focused on
the security situation in eastern Chad and related
multilateral diplomacy. This included a meeting with
Presidents Bongo and Sassou Nguesso in Libreville last week,
with the Presidents of Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea in
Tripoli yesterday, and a follow-on to the latter meeting
scheduled for next week. Even so, he said, Deby,s refusal
to take advantage of the August 13 agreement with opposition
parties on electoral reform was another missed opportunity.
Deby could count on at least some of the opposition parties
to rally to his support if he approached them seriously and
offered something in return. This would not only earn him
additional internal support but win him favor with the
international community, which was interested in the future
of electoral reform and good governance in Chad.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Foucher was clear that France retains great influence
with Deby and is not reticent about using it; that France
considers Sudan the clear offending party and Chad the
offended party in the Chad-Sudan dispute; and that France has
conveyed to Khartoum the limits Paris has set to Sudanese
threats to Chadian security, including regime change in
N,Djamena.
NIGRO