Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08NDJAMENA571 | 2008-12-04 15:26:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ndjamena |
VZCZCXRO8571 OO RUEHROV DE RUEHNJ #0571/01 3391526 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041526Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0530 INFO RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 1420 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0171 RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE PRIORITY 1085 |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000571 |
1. (C) Chad Ambassador to the U.S. Adam Bachir told Ambassador and DCM December 1 that he would carry a letter from President Deby to President-Elect Obama's Chicago Transition Office proposing a meeting in DC between the two Presidents after January 20, 2009, to discuss regional security issues. Bachir was relatively optimistic regarding the Chadian rebel threat to the GOC, citing the regime's robust and continuing rearmament program and the possibility of reconciliation with some of the rebel chieftains even after 5 years of warfare. Bachir said he might try himself to reach out to the rebels in parallel to similar USG efforts in the past and that he try to discuss this with Acting DAS Wyckoff. Bachir expressed confidence that another of his "personal initiatives", i.e., bringing the Sudanese SPLM into the equation to reduce tensions between Chad and Sudan, and bring peace to Darfur, was developing satisfactorily. Bachir denied that Daoussa Deby's recent appointment as Ambassador to Tripoli (REF A) meant nor signaled a reduction of GOC support for JEM and attributed to the need in dealing with Libya to send positive signals that sustained viable relations with Qadhafi by respecting The Guide's dignity and recognizing his regional role. 2. (C) Bachir has apparently been busy lately minding his various diplomatic initiatives (REF C). Other reporting indicates that there may be some significant SPLM interest in reducing Chad-Sudan tensions. Bachir's optimism probably reflects thinking inside the Presidential Palace, as did the FORMIN's similar postive take on things recently (REF B). The Libyan Ambassador here continues to claim that the GOS has "promised" the GOC that there would be no new rebel attack on Chad "during the next six months," which would be a rosy scenario indeed. END SUMMARY. 3. (C) LETTER TO PRES-ELECT OBAMA. Bachir gave us a copy of the letter from President Deby to President-Elect Obama that Bachir had drafted and that he intended to deliver personally to the President-Elect's Chicago Transition Office. (We faxed a copy to AF/C on December 2.) The letter proposed a meeting in DC between the two Presidents after January 20, 2009, to discuss regional security issues. 4. (C) REBEL THREAT. Bachir was generally optimistic about the diminished threat to the regime posed by Chad rebels based in Sudan. Bachir cited the GOC's robust military rearmament effort since February, which had altered the balance of power between rebels and the GOC in the latter's favor. He said that the rebels were well aware of the GOC's reinforced military capability, noting the August military parade in N'Djamena Bachir said that the next public demonstration of the GOC's continued rearmament would be the December 10 National Day event. Bachir indicated that the differences between the GOC and most of the rebel chieftains were not unbridgeable. He said that leaders like Mahamat Nouri and Ahmat Soubiane could conceivably be reconciled to the GOC and return home, while the grievances of the Ouaddaian rebels led by Adouma Hassaballah had less reason to be disaffected than before, because many Easterners were now represented in the government in senior positions, starting with Prime Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbas, and including the Interior and Health ministers and others. Zaghawa rebel leader Timan Erdimi was another story -- With Erdimi there could be no reconciliation. 5. (C) TALKING TO CHAD REBELS. Bachir noted that the U.S. had been in contact with the Chad rebels and said that he himself would try to do likewise. He admitted that he had not been able to convince Pres Deby to take a more active role in reaching out to Chad rebels, and said that Deby had demurred at his (Bachir's) proposal, and that Deby had argued that if he reached out to rebels while the USG was doing so, it might give the impression that he was acting at USG behest, which he wanted to avoid. Bachir said he might try himself to reach out to the rebels in parallel to similar USG efforts in the past. He said that this would be on his own initiative and that he might bring this matter up to Acting DAS Wyckoff. NDJAMENA 00000571 002.2 OF 002 6. (C) PEACE EFFORTS AND THE SPLM. Bachir expressed confidence that another of his "personal initiatives", i.e., bringing the Sudanese SPLM into the equation to reduce tensions between Chad and Sudan, and bring peace to Darfur, was developing satisfactorily. (REF C). Bachir said that the SPLM did not want to see a pro-NCP regime in Chad, which was its motivation for action in this regard. He said that he was continuing contacts with SPLM figures and with Sudan rebels as well -- he mentioned vaguely a possible meeting with Abdelwahid al-Nur in Paris. 7. (C) AMBASSADOR DAOUSSA DEBY. We asked Bachir about the significance of the appointment of the President's brother Daoussa Deby as ambassador to Libya and if this signaled intent to reduce GOC support for JEM (REF A). Bachir laughed at the latter supposition and denied any such intent, saying that Daoussa had not been very active with JEM. Bachir postulated instead that in dealing with Libya Chad had to be extremely cautious and periodically needed to add something new to the relationship, not to string Libya long, but to ensure that its focus remained on positive events. Naming someone as close to Deby as ambassador was exactly the sort of positive signal that sustained viable relations with Qadhafi by respecting Qadhafi's dignity, and recognizing his regional prominence. 8. (C) PM ABBAS TO TRIPOLI? We learned after the meeting with Bachir that Prime Minister Abbas might be traveling to Libya early next week, indicating that Libyan diplomacy is still active. -------------------------- COMMENT -------------------------- 9. (C) Bachir has apparently been busy lately minding his many personal initiatives (REF C). Other reporting indicates that there may be some significant SPLM interest in reducing Chad-Sudan tensions. Bachir's optimism probably reflects thinking inside the Presidential Palace, as did the FORMIN's similar postive take on things recently (REF B). The Libyan Ambassador here continues to claim that the GOS has "promised" the GOC that there would be no new rebel attack on Chad "during the next six months," which would be a rosy scenario indeed. NIGRO |