C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000571

SIPDIS

KINSHASHA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR LY SU PREF CD
SUBJECT: CHAD AMB UPBEAT ON REBEL THREAT AND CHAD-SUDAN
RELATIONS, WILL SEEK OBAMA-DEBY MTG

REF: A. A. NDJAMENA 557

B. B. NDJAMENA 546

C. C. NDJAMENA 531

NDJAMENA 00000571 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMB LOUIS NIGRO, FOR 1.4 b and d.

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Chad Ambassador to the U.S. Adam Bachir told
Ambassador and DCM December 1 that he would carry a letter
from President Deby to President-Elect Obama's Chicago
Transition Office proposing a meeting in DC between the two
Presidents after January 20, 2009, to discuss regional
security issues. Bachir was relatively optimistic regarding
the Chadian rebel threat to the GOC, citing the regime's
robust and continuing rearmament program and the possibility
of reconciliation with some of the rebel chieftains even
after 5 years of warfare. Bachir said he might try himself
to reach out to the rebels in parallel to similar USG efforts
in the past and that he try to discuss this with Acting DAS
Wyckoff. Bachir expressed confidence that another of his
"personal initiatives", i.e., bringing the Sudanese SPLM into
the equation to reduce tensions between Chad and Sudan, and
bring peace to Darfur, was developing satisfactorily. Bachir
denied that Daoussa Deby's recent appointment as Ambassador
to Tripoli (REF A) meant nor signaled a reduction of GOC
support for JEM and attributed to the need in dealing with
Libya to send positive signals that sustained viable
relations with Qadhafi by respecting The Guide's dignity and
recognizing his regional role.


2. (C) Bachir has apparently been busy lately minding his
various diplomatic initiatives (REF C). Other reporting
indicates that there may be some significant SPLM interest in
reducing Chad-Sudan tensions. Bachir's optimism probably
reflects thinking inside the Presidential Palace, as did the
FORMIN's similar postive take on things recently (REF B). The
Libyan Ambassador here continues to claim that the GOS has

"promised" the GOC that there would be no new rebel attack on
Chad "during the next six months," which would be a rosy
scenario indeed. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) LETTER TO PRES-ELECT OBAMA. Bachir gave us a copy of
the letter from President Deby to President-Elect Obama that
Bachir had drafted and that he intended to deliver personally
to the President-Elect's Chicago Transition Office. (We
faxed a copy to AF/C on December 2.) The letter proposed a
meeting in DC between the two Presidents after January 20,
2009, to discuss regional security issues.


4. (C) REBEL THREAT. Bachir was generally optimistic about
the diminished threat to the regime posed by Chad rebels
based in Sudan. Bachir cited the GOC's robust military
rearmament effort since February, which had altered the
balance of power between rebels and the GOC in the latter's
favor. He said that the rebels were well aware of the GOC's
reinforced military capability, noting the August military
parade in N'Djamena Bachir said that the next public
demonstration of the GOC's continued rearmament would be the
December 10 National Day event. Bachir indicated that the
differences between the GOC and most of the rebel chieftains
were not unbridgeable. He said that leaders like Mahamat
Nouri and Ahmat Soubiane could conceivably be reconciled to
the GOC and return home, while the grievances of the
Ouaddaian rebels led by Adouma Hassaballah had less reason to
be disaffected than before, because many Easterners were now
represented in the government in senior positions, starting
with Prime Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbas, and including the
Interior and Health ministers and others. Zaghawa rebel
leader Timan Erdimi was another story -- With Erdimi there
could be no reconciliation.


5. (C) TALKING TO CHAD REBELS. Bachir noted that the U.S.
had been in contact with the Chad rebels and said that he
himself would try to do likewise. He admitted that he had
not been able to convince Pres Deby to take a more active
role in reaching out to Chad rebels, and said that Deby had
demurred at his (Bachir's) proposal, and that Deby had argued
that if he reached out to rebels while the USG was doing so,
it might give the impression that he was acting at USG
behest, which he wanted to avoid. Bachir said he might try
himself to reach out to the rebels in parallel to similar USG
efforts in the past. He said that this would be on his own
initiative and that he might bring this matter up to Acting
DAS Wyckoff.

NDJAMENA 00000571 002.2 OF 002




6. (C) PEACE EFFORTS AND THE SPLM. Bachir expressed
confidence that another of his "personal initiatives", i.e.,
bringing the Sudanese SPLM into the equation to reduce
tensions between Chad and Sudan, and bring peace to Darfur,
was developing satisfactorily. (REF C). Bachir said that the
SPLM did not want to see a pro-NCP regime in Chad, which was
its motivation for action in this regard. He said that he
was continuing contacts with SPLM figures and with Sudan
rebels as well -- he mentioned vaguely a possible meeting
with Abdelwahid al-Nur in Paris.


7. (C) AMBASSADOR DAOUSSA DEBY. We asked Bachir about the
significance of the appointment of the President's brother
Daoussa Deby as ambassador to Libya and if this signaled
intent to reduce GOC support for JEM (REF A). Bachir laughed
at the latter supposition and denied any such intent, saying
that Daoussa had not been very active with JEM. Bachir
postulated instead that in dealing with Libya Chad had to be
extremely cautious and periodically needed to add something
new to the relationship, not to string Libya long, but to
ensure that its focus remained on positive events. Naming
someone as close to Deby as ambassador was exactly the sort
of positive signal that sustained viable relations with
Qadhafi by respecting Qadhafi's dignity, and recognizing his
regional prominence.


8. (C) PM ABBAS TO TRIPOLI? We learned after the meeting
with Bachir that Prime Minister Abbas might be traveling to
Libya early next week, indicating that Libyan diplomacy is
still active.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Bachir has apparently been busy lately minding his
many personal initiatives (REF C). Other reporting indicates
that there may be some significant SPLM interest in reducing
Chad-Sudan tensions. Bachir's optimism probably reflects
thinking inside the Presidential Palace, as did the FORMIN's
similar postive take on things recently (REF B). The Libyan
Ambassador here continues to claim that the GOS has
"promised" the GOC that there would be no new rebel attack on
Chad "during the next six months," which would be a rosy
scenario indeed.

NIGRO