FOREIGN MINISTER CITES CHADIAN DIPLOMATIC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000546

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2012
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER CITES CHADIAN DIPLOMATIC AND
POLITICAL PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY IMPROVED REGIONAL SECURITY

REF: NDJAMENA 532

NDJAMENA 00000546 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM REGribbin for reasons 1.4 b&d



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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Chadian Foreign Minister Faki told Ambassador and DCM
November 19 that he attributed last week's Dakar Contact
Group meeting's success to incremental steps taken during the
past six months to repair Chad's relations with Sudan, but
cautioned that more needed to be done, especially de-fanging
respective rebels and resolving issues in the troubled border
regions, plus continuing to build trust with Khartoum. Faki
said Chad would agree to a MINURCAT II military element of
4,000 to 4,500. He noted that internal electoral reform was
progressing with the adoption by cabinet of the proper
legislation and that elections would be held as scheduled in

2009. The Minister was confident that relations with the
World Bank/IMF were back on track and that PM Abbas would
visit Washington in due course. Faki welcomed Burkina Faso's
adhesion to the TSCTP and the projected visit of Mrs. Cindy
McCain to eastern Chad. Finally, he was pleased with progress
regarding the NEC.


2. (C) Ambassador Nigro cited four strategic policy fields in
which Chad had made significant progress since February;
which we have been flagging to Washington; and which we would
emphasize to the incoming administration. These were:
improved regional security as evidenced by resumed diplomatic
ties to Sudan; Chadian agreement for MINURCAT II and its
force composition; progress in implementing internal
political reforms, especially electoral preparations; and
renewed cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions. The
Ambassador recommended that Chad continue to make headway in
all four areas, because they were complementary and
interdependent.


3. (C) Faki appeared relaxed and confident regarding Chad's
security situation vis-a-vis Sudan and the Chad rebels there.
He has performed well since joining the new government as
FORMIN: Chad is stronger diplomatically than before February
and the GOC has been persistent and patient in pursuing its
key diplomatic goals over the past six months. Faki has
managed the proliferation of "initiatives" regarding the
Chad-Sudan situation and the closely related one in Darfur.
We believe that Faki understands that Chad's international
image and the willingness of key partners to make efforts in
its behalf depends on continued progress domestic political
reform and putting its public-financial house in better order
in collaboration with the IFIs. END SUMMARY.


4. (C) Ambassador accompanied by DCM called on Foreign
Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat on November 19. Ambassador
congratulated the minister for the success of the recent
Dakar Agreement Contact Group meeting and for Chad's
persistence in maintaining momentum in moving forward to
defuse tensions in the region. Cooperation with Khartoum
boded well for further progress. The achievement of stability
in the east was essential for effective humanitarian
operations, for economic recovery, and for continued internal
political reconciliation.


5. (C) Faki said that the recent meeting was the culmination
of a process that began in Dakar and carried on through
meetings in Tripoli and Asmara. He noted it had been an
uneven process, citing events like the June attacks that
stalled forward movement. Yet, based on Sudan's perceived
"good faith" displayed in Asmara, Chad felt it could move
ahead with the exchange of ambassadors. The next step would
be placement of border monitors. He agreed that the bilateral
climate was indeed better and that an additional gesture of
reassurances would likely be a summit meeting of the Chad,
Sudan, and Libya chiefs of state. He recalled that Chad had
often been accused as a "belligerent" by Khartoum and charged
with manipulating Darfurian rebels. He admitted that many
rebels have familial ties that transcend the border, but
denied any nefarious actions on the part of Chad to undermine
the Sudanese regime. Instead, he said that "as a neighbor"
Chad could help resolve the conflict, which he reflected was

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in Chad's interest to do. The minister wondered if -- given
the amount of arms in circulation -- the various armed groups
in Darfur, especially the Janjaweed militias created by the
GOS, could ever be disarmed. Regarding Chad's own rebels,
the minister said that the Syrte Accord that provides a
mechanism for them to return remains valid, and that his
government was thinking of ways to reinvigorate this process.



6. (C) Faki said he had received the Qatari deputy minister
of foreign affairs just that morning. He understood that JEM
representatives will go to Doha. The minister reported that
Qatar would not agitate individually for article 16 action
deferring the ICC indictment, but that would do that on
behalf of the Arab League. The minister noted and the
ambassador agreed that there were many initiatives out there,
perhaps too many - Libyan, Qatari, AU/UN (Bassole),internal
Sudanese ones. Nonetheless, Faki asked that the international
community, i.e. the U.S., press the GOS and the rebels
directly. Citing multiple divisions within Sudan, Faki said
that despite past problems and current difficulties, if the
GOS was now sincere and serious, progress towards peace in
Darfur could be achieved.


7. (C) Turning to other issues, the Foreign Minister said
that discussions with the UN on a followon force to EUFOR
were proceeding normally; that Chad would agree to a MINURCAT
II with a military element of 4,000 to 4,500; and that the
force should have a mandate similar to EUFOR's. If Darfur
could be solved soon, he said refugees could go home.


8. (C) Regarding the August 13 Process, the minister admitted
delays, but reported that Chad's electoral reforms were now
back on track. The cabinet had recently approved the
necessary draft legislation and forwarded it to the National
Assembly. The adoption of texts for the electoral commission,
the electoral code, and the judicial process would allow the
census to proceed, to be followed by voter registration and
the long-expected communal and legislative elections in 2009.


9. (C) Ambassador Nigro welcomed the minister's extensive
overview. He said at this time of transition in Washington it
was useful to sum up developments in Chad. On the positive
side Chad had indeed moved ahead in several important areas:
regional cooperation as evidenced by the exchange of
ambassadors and growing dialogue with Khartoum; the success
of EUFOR and Chad's agreement for MINURCAT II; resumed
progress on internal political reforms, especially the
electoral schedule; and renewed efforts to regularize
relations with the World bank and the IMF. In particular,
Chad's friends wanted to see an end to the Chad-Sudan "proxy
war" between rebels based on iopposite sides of the border.


10. (C) Since the Minister had not mentioned Chad-SPLM
contacts on Darfur, the ambassador asked about it. Faki said
indeed the SPLM mission had been useful. They came to learn
and listen, which not all of Chad's Sudanese interlocutors
were always so willing to do. Faki felt their role as
participants in the Khartoum government gave them leverage
and he hoped they would use all their weight to work for
peace.


11. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's points on the World
Bank and IMF, Faki said that the current dialogue was
positive; that PM Abbas would travel to Washington to meet
leaders there in due course; and that reopening of the Bank's
Chad office would be welcome.


12. (C) The Minister volunteered that Chad posed no
objections to the inclusion of Burkina Faso in the Trans
Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership. In fact, he added that
bringing Ouagadougou in made good sense as the range of
issues to be addressed regionally certainly affected Burkina
Faso as well.


13. (U) The ambassador advised that Mrs. Cindy McCain planned
to visit in early December. This would be a private visit
geared to her interest in humanitarian issues. The minister
said she would be most welcome.


14. (U) In closing the minister asked about the status of the
New Embassy Complex. We advised satisfactory progress and
that the next step would be agreement on a memorandum of

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understanding relating to the legal swap of properties.

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COMMENT
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15. (C) Faki appeared relaxed and confident regarding Chad's
security situation vis-a-vis Sudan and the Chad rebels there.
He has performed well since joining the new government as
FORMIN. Chad is stronger diplomatically than before February
and the GOC has been persistent and patient in pursuing its
key diplomatic goals over the past six months. Faki has
managed the proliferation of "initiatives" regarding the
Chad-Sudan situation and the closely related one in Darfur.
We believe that Faki understands that Chad's international
image and the willingness of key partners to make efforts in
its behalf depends on continued progress domestic political
reform and putting its public-financial house in better order
in collaboration with the IFIs.


16. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
NIGRO