AMB BECHIR SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT FOR "HIS"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000531

SIPDIS

KINSHASA FOR EMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2010
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU LY US CD
SUBJECT: AMB BECHIR SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT FOR "HIS"
GOC-SPLM-JEM INITIATIVE AND DENG ALOR COMMENTS

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Classified By: DCM REGribbin for reasons 1.4 b&d

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Chadian Ambassador to the U.S. Bechir told AMB and DCM
November 14 that the opportunity was ripe for the incoming
Obama administration to engage President Deby at a senior
level to craft an end to the Darfur/Chad crisis. Bechir
described his own role as Chad interlocutor for dialogue with
SPLM leader and GOS VP Salva Kiir in a common effort to
"solve Darfur through Chad." Bechir said that process was the
most credible because, unlike other interlocutors, the SPLM
had a vested interested in success. Bechir repeated standard
GOC line that denied any equivalency between Chadian and
Sudanese situations, noting that Chadian rebels were
political opportunists supported by Sudan, whereas there were
real roots to the Darfur conflict. Bechir reluctantly agreed
that Chad could burnish its standing with continued internal
political reform, especially holding credible elections in
2009, asserted that President Deby was intent on staying in
power only as long as it took to restore Chad's security
against external threat; and repeated his plea for President
Deby to be received in Washington in a visit that would
permit a meeting there with the U.S. president.


2. (C) When on the margins of Dakar Accord CG meeting here,
we asked Deng Alor to comment on Bechir's project, Deng
agreed that it had some merit, especially that Deby could
trust the SPLM to work honestly for a peaceful resolution,
and noted that "we have known Deby since the eighties." He
volunteered that there is deep animosity between Deby and
Bashir. Alor thought the "five-hour" meeting between Pagan
and Khalil was important as it represented the first real
substantive contact between the two movements in a long time.


3. (C) Ambassador Bechir clearly intends to capitalize on
his position in DC to advance an issue of great moment to
him, i.e., furthering the GOC-SPLM-JEM dialogue that he
helped nurture and seeking dramatic improvement in relations
with the United States. His partisanship aside, his points
merit some consideration. The should have SPLM a vital
interest in resolving Darfur and the coming change of
administration in the U.S. does open opportunities for new
players to engage in new ways. Leaving the latter issue for
the new team to consider, we do endorse U.S. encouragement of
the SPLM initiative. Like the other ones out there, it too
may not go very far. But if it could become a mechanism to
build trust between N'Djamena and Khartoum, then for that
reason alone it merits support. END SUMMARY.


4. (C) Ambassador Mahamoud Adam Bechir, who is home for
several days, breakfasted with Ambassador and DCM November

14. Bechir began by describing the status of the SPLM/Chad
dialogue, noting that it began in the US on the margins of
the Democratic Convention between himself and SPLM party
chief Pagan Amum. Subsequently, an SPLM delegation visited
N'Djamena, talked to the government, including Deby, and met
for five hours with JEM representative Khalil Ibrahim in the
East. Bechir stated that the SPLM process was quite credible
because, unlike other initiatives underway - Bassole, Dakar
Group, Qatar, etc. - the SPLM had a vested interest in
peace. He explained that the SPLM's objective is
implementation of the CPA and that continued strife in Sudan
risks undermining progress. In both hats -- representing the
South as well as participating in the central government in
Khartoum -- the SPLM, especially Salva Kiir, needs to foster
conditions conducive to success. Bechir said that Kiir was a
man Chad could trust to speak forthrightly and deal directly,
while President Bashir's team did not generate such
confidence. Chad felt that Kiir could deliver and that he was
well placed to convince Bashir to take realistic steps to end
the crisis. Ambassador Bechir reported that he had just
returned from a trip to Juba to plan next steps. Next would
be a visit to Chad by Kiir. He asked for strong US support
for the SPLM/Chad undertaking. He said that US endorsement
would go far to convince all the parties of the seriousness
and viability of the initiative.


5. (C) On the wider issue of Darfur, Bechir said that the
road to resolution ran through Chad. He stated that Deby was
ready to be more active, but needed to be cultivated and
encouraged by the U.S. Recalling Obama's pledge to entertain
more contact with states not in the best of favor, he said
that Chad would respond to new initiatives. He attributed

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Deby's reticence heretofore to being treated as a second rate
player. Noting that Obama's last African stop was Chad,
Bechir said that an early invitation to the White House or a
first overseas trip by a new Secretary of State to N'Djamena
would work wonders. He added that unlike other global crises
- Iraq, Afghanistan or the Middle East - Darfur was solvable,
if America wanted to put new weight towards it. Bechir
recalled that both candidates regularly reiterated that
Darfur was a foreign policy priority. He concluded that it
was now time to move ahead. That meant, Bechir said, securing
U.S. support for joint GOC-SPLM pressure on JEM and the GOS
to bring peace to Darfur.


6. (C) We engaged Bechir in discussion of how more visible
and real progress towards democracy would rebound to Chad's
advantage. Credible legislative and communal elections in
2009 would demonstrate real commitment to inclusiveness and
would diminish rebel claims to be legitimate political
players. Chad had some favorable developments to build on,
especially the August 13 process, but also its ready
engagement with the UN and EU on peacekeeping, not to mention
openness to humanitarian operations. Bechir took the point,
asserting that President Deby was intent on staying in power
only as long as it took to restore Chad's security against
external threat. He countered that all the Chadian rebel
leaders were also veteran Chadian "politicos" whose personal
ambitions had been thwarted. He said they existed as a rebel
menace only because Khartoum wanted them to. He rejected the
equation of Chad and Sudan rebels as equivalent problems,
noting again, however, that were Chadian issues resolved,
Darfur would follow.

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ENGAGING ALOR
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7. (C) On margins of Dakar Contact Group meeting November
15, DCM spoke with Sudanese FM Deng Alor regarding the SPLM
initiative. DCM recounted Bechir's enthusiasm, Deby's
approval, and noting the Chadians position that the GOC could
trust the SPLM to work honestly for resolution and for peace,
i.e., reining in Chadian rebels. Alor agreed, stating that
"we have known Deby since the eighties." He volunteered that
there is deep animosity between Deby and Bashir. Alor thought
the "five-hour" meeting between Pagan and Khalil was
important as it represented the first real substantive
contact between the two movements in a long time. DCM asked
Alor how he thought Obama's election might impact in Sudan.
Alor recounted a November 3 meeting between himself and
Bashir when Bashir asked who might win? Alor said polls
indicated it would be Obama. Bashir seemed puzzled and said
that would be bad for Sudan because Clinton had shot missiles
at Khartoum.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) Regarding Ambassador Bechir's "SPLM Initiative," it
was clear that he sought to capitalize on his position in DC
to advance an issue of great moment to him, i.e., furthering
the GOC-SPLM-JEM dialogue that he helped nurture and seeking
dramatic improvement in relations with the United States.
His partisanship aside, his points merit some consideration.
The SPLM does have a vital interest in resolving Darfur and
the coming change of administration in the U.S. does open
opportunities for new players to engage in new ways. Leaving
the latter issue for the new team to consider, we do endorse
American encouragement of the SPLM initiative. Like the other
ones out there, it too may not go very far, but then again,
if it can become a mechanism to build trust between N'Djamena
and Khartoum, then for that alone it merits support.


9. (C) Regarding DCM's chat with Alor, we leave it to
analysts to figure out if Bashir was being deliberately
disingenuous or whether he was just oblivious to American
events. If the latter, he is the only political leader in
Africa who was not following our election pretty closely.
END COMMENT.
NIGRO