CHAD OPPOSITION, PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000530

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
KINSHASA PASS BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF UN EU SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD OPPOSITION, PESSIMISTIC ABOUT ELECTION
PROSPECTS, BLAME PRESIDENT DEBY AND REJECT AMENDED DRAFT
LAWS

REF: A. NDJAMENA 517

B. NDJAMENA 510

C. NDJAMENA 200

D. 07 NDJAMENA 675

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The leaders of the main opposition parties told AMB
November 12 that they are increasingly pessimistic that
legislative and communal elections will be held in 2009,
primarily because, absent external pressure, they say that
President Deby has no real interest in electoral reform or
the holding of fair elections. Four key draft electoral
laws that had languished with the GOC were to be passed to
the National Assembly November 13, but even if these were
passed swiftly, it would still be difficult to assemble
electoral machinery and conduct the two censuses --
demographic and electoral -- that needed to be completed
before "scheduled" communal and legislative elections could
take place before the end of 2009. The electoral reform
process, they say, is less and less seen by President Deby
as a personal priority, and the GOC and the ruling MPS party
follow his lead obediently. The CPDC leaders said that Deby
had shrewdly used the August 13 process "to buy time," and
they pointed to a linkage between President Deby's enthusiasm
for domestic political reform and his sense of security from
external threat and vulnerability to external pressure. Deby
responded to the near-destruction of his regime by rebels and
his international partners' calls for change in February 2008
by naming a new PM and reenergizing the August 13 process.
Now, with the military balance turning in his favor and with
diplomatic efforts to end the Chad/Sudan "proxy war"
proliferating (even as Sudan is distracted by the ICC issue,
South Sudan issues, etc.),the leaders expressed some
puzzlement at Deby's evident lack of enthusiasm for communal
and local elections, as the well-financed and GOC-supported
MPS was sure to do well in any such polling. On Thursday,
November 13, the CPDC rejected the changes made to the draft
laws by the GOC and the National Assembly.


2. (C) The CPDC's rejection of the changed draft laws will
set back progress toward the elections, but we do not know
for how long. The EU Ambassador, who is the architect of the
August 13 Accord and who has been supporting the
implementation process financially and operationally (Ref B),
continues to predict that there will be elections in 2009,
as does the French Ambassador. It is difficult to discern
which side is more responsible for the lack of progress on
the election calendar, whether the Deby regime is delaying
the process and "playing for time" until it resolved its
external security problems, or whether the Opposition's
internal weakness and disunity contribute to its inability to
push electoral events forward. We will continue to press the
GOC and the MPS (as well as the CPDC) to work as hard as they
can to ensure that these elections are held. END SUMMARY.

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WORKING LUNCH, NOV 12
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3. (U) The Ambassador hosted a lunch November 12 for the
leaders of the coalition of opposition partners, the
Coalition for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC): Former
President of the Republic Lol Mahamat Choua, Saleh Kebzabo,
and Salibou Garba, both leaders of parties adhering to the
CPDC. POLMIL and POLECON officers also attended.

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OPPOSITION INCREASINGLY PESSIMISTIC
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4. (C) The CPDC leaders expressed increasing pessimism
about the progress of the electoral reform process set forth
in the August 13 (2007) Accord agreed by the Deby Government,
the ruling MPS party and the opposition CPDC and the
prospects for credible communal and legislative elections in
2009 and for credible presidential polling in 2011. They
said that the four main draft electoral laws had been
submitted months ago to the Government, which had now
indicated that it would send them on to the National Assembly
for final approval on Thursday, November 13. Besides the
GOC's delay in acting on the drafts, the CPDC chiefs
expressed fear that both the Government and the National

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Assembly would make changes to key elements of the drafts.
"If the GOC doesn't gut the laws, the National Assembly
will," they charged. If either of them did, the CPDC would
denounce the changed drafts publicly. They explained that
the drafts had been approved earlier by the Comite de Suivi,
the Implementing Committee of the August 13 Accord, in which
both the Government and MPS had participated and in which
they enjoy two-thirds of the votes.


5. (C) The CPDC chiefs agreed it is now "practically
impossible" to hold legislative and communal elections in

2009. Besides the issue of the four draft electoral laws
still to be resolved, there were two different censuses to be
conducted -- a demographic census followed by an electoral
census. The former would take six months (it is now
scheduled to be completed in May),the latter at least as
long. Looking out from November 2008, that would make
elections impossible before this time next year -- even
without factoring in contingencies like another rebel attack,
an early and wetter 2009 rainy season, etc.

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POLITICAL WILL IS LACKING
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6. (C) The CPDC chiefs regretfully ascribed the
difficulties in the August 13 process to lack of political
will on the part of their "partners" in the enterprise -- the
GOC and the MPS. This was just another way of saying that
the process was less and less seen by President Deby as a
personal priority and the GOC and the MPS followed his lead
obediently. the CPDC leaders said that they doubted that
Deby was ever fully committed to domestic political reform:
he "used the August 13 process to buy time," in the words of
Choua. The leaders speculated that the various delays that
have plagued the reform process and election preparations are
stalling tactics intended to push the legislative and
communal elections so far into the future that it will not
make sense to hold them before the presidential election,
scheduledfor 2011.


7. (C) The CPDC leaders pointed to linkage between
President Deby's enthusiasm fordomestic political reform and
his sense of securiy from external threat and vulnerability
to extenal pressure. Deby responded to the near-destructon
of his regime by rebels and his internationalpartners' calls
for change in February 2008 by naming a new PM and
reenergizing the August 13 process. Now, with the military
balance turning in his favor and with diplomatic efforts to
end the Chad/Sudan "proxy war" proliferating (even as Sudan
is distracted by the ICC issue, South Sudan issues, etc.),
the leaders expressed some puzzlement at Deby's evident lack
of enthusiasm for communal and local elections, as the
well-financed and GOC-supported MPS was sure to do well in
any such polling.


8. (C) Besides the electoral process, the CPDC alleged that
the GOC is not living up to the rest of the August 13 Accord,
citing the continued "militarization" of territorial
administration (which was supposed to be reformed and
"recivilianized" the persistent politicization of the country
in general, the appointment of unqualified personnel to GOC
positions, and "nomadization," i.e., the constant reshuffling
of bureaucrats. They also suggested that the GOC intends to
take legislative action to prevent the opposition from
boycotting the election, and expressed outrage at the idea,
noting that voting is not mandatory in Chad.


9. (C) Choua alleged that the "Government of Political
Opening" (Ref C) does not represent an opening at all, but
rather "un gouvernement ordinaire." The four CPDC members
who accepted ministerial posts in the government did so
independently of the coalition, and could no longer be
considered opposition members. He likewise disavowed support
for armed rebellion. However, he suggested that both those
who support the GOC and those that support the rebels should
pressure the two camps to sit down and resolve their problems
peacefully. They suggested as well that MINURCAT (the UN
peacekeeping force) play an active role in helping resolve
the internal political conflict.


10. (U) On Thursday, November 13, the CPDC rejected the
changes made to the draft laws by the GOC and the National
Assembly.


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COMMENT
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11. (C) The CPDC's rejection of the changed draft laws will
set back progress toward the elections, but we do not know
for how long. The EU Ambassador, who is the architect of the
August 13 Accord and who has been supporting the
implementation process financially and operationally (Ref B),
continues to predict that there will be elections in 2009,
as does the French Ambassador. It is difficult to discern
which side is more responsible for the lack of progress on
the election calendar, whether the Deby regime is delaying
the process and "playing for time" until it resolved its
external security problems, or whether the Opposition's
internal weakness and disunity contribute to its inability to
push electoral events forward. We will continue to press the
GOC and the MPS (as well as the CPDC) to work as hard as they
can to ensure that these elections are held.


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