SRSG BRIEFS ON MINURCAT II AND GROWING INSTABILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000501

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2118
TAGS: PREL PREF MARR KPKO PINR PGOV UN SU CD
SUBJECT: SRSG BRIEFS ON MINURCAT II AND GROWING INSTABILITY
IN EASTERN CHAD CAUSED BY ZAGHAWA &DEPREDATIONS8

REF: A. A) NDJAMENA 500

B. B) NDJAMENA 491

NDJAMENA 00000501 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4(B)
AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) SRSG Victor Angelo told AMB and DCM Oct 28 that his
negotiations with the GOC regarding the composition and
mandate for a reinforced MINURCAT II were progressing
satisfactorily, but that he still needed to convince some in
UN HQ in New York regarding his own conception of the
reconfigured PKO, especially a tripartite security wing
composed of police trainer element; a traditional military
element; and gendarmerie-like element. SRSG reported that
UNDPKO wants a military element of 6,000 troops, but that the
GOC has balked at agreeing to more than 3,000 UN military.
Angelo said he could live with a military element of
4,500-4,750, which he believes he can convince the GOC to
agree to.


2. (C) The SRSG indicated concern over developments in
Eastern Chad, saying that the refugee camps were "deeply
politicized," especially those with sizeable Zaghawa
populations, where JEM combatants and recruiters are located.
The SRSG also discerned negative Chadian Zaghawa influence
growing in eastern Chad, where ethnic Zaghawa
&depredations8 disaffect other ethnic groups and drive many
into Sudan and rebel activity there. The SRSG said that
tensions are rising between neighboring communities over
scarce resources and that within many communities ethnic
differences could explode into conflict, again over scarce
resources. The SRSG also expressed concern over Libya,s
strenuous diplomatic activity regarding the Chad-Sudan
conflict, saying that he thought much of the urgency with
which Libya was acting could be explained by Tripoli,s
desire to keep the reinforced MINURCAT II as small as
possible, especially regarding its military component. SRSG
speculated on President Deby,s health, saying that he had
noticed in meetings that Deby often spoke "haltingly and
laboriously," but that he seemed to summon strength for
infrequent, but highly orchestrated public appearances, he
appears normal, if not energetic. END SUMMARY.

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MINURCAT II
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3. (C) SRSG Victor Angelo told AMB and DCM Oct 28 that his
negotiations with the GOC regarding the composition and
mandate for a reinforced MINURCAT II were progressing
satisfactorily, but that he still needed to convince some in
UN HQ in New York regarding his own conception of the
reconfigured PKO. SRSG repeated that he wanted a tripartite
security wing composed of a police trainer element to
continue to train and mentor Chadian police and gendarmes who
form the integrated security detachments (DIS) to provide
internal security to the refugee camps; a traditional
military element to provide security outside the camps; and a
gendarmerie-like element to provide security to zones where
humanitarian workers live and to and from those zones.

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GOC HESITANCY
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4. (C) SRSG reported that the GOC says that a traditional
military element is "indispensable" and wants the operational
capacity of those UN military increased but has balked at
agreeing to more than 3,000 UN military, which does not
conduce to increased capacity. UNDPKO in New York, according
to SRSG, wants 6,000 UN military, which Angelo believes is
excessive. Angelo would be happy with a military element of
4,500 to 4,750, which he believes he can convince the GOC to
agree to.

5.(C) The GOC has also indicated that it will not look
favorably on inclusion of military and gendarmes from "Arab
countries" in MINURCAT II and has hinted at a request to see
a list of force-contributing countries, which Angelo finds
disquieting and far too reminiscent of the Sudan government's
approach to UNAMID in Darfur. The SRSG, however, believes
that the GOC has displayed some flexibility and con be
convinced to do the right thing.

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EASTERN CHAD: THE ZAGHAWA PROBLEM
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NDJAMENA 00000501 002.2 OF 002




6. (C) Regarding the situation in eastern Chad, the SRSG was
less upbeat. He sees many of the refugee camps as "deeply
politicized," especially those with sizeable Zaghawa
populations, where JEM combatants take their &rest and
recreation8, and where JEM recruiters are active. Parallel
to this mostly negative Sudanese Zaghawa influence in the
camps, SRSG sees negative Chadian Zaghawa influence growing
in eastern Chad, as members of President Deby's ethnic group
take advantage of official and non-official positions and
connections to make economic gains at the expense of other
ethnic groups. This feeds the Chad rebel groups in Sudan. As
an example, SRSG said that the Guereda secondary school was
almost empty, as younger non-Zaghawa locals have crossed over
to Sudan to escape Zaghawa depredations.

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ETHNIC AND COMMUNITARIAN TENSIONS
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7. (C) SRSG said that tensions are rising between
neighboring communities over scarce resources and that within
many communities ethnic differences could explode into
conflict, again over scarce resources. SRSG said that
Zaghawa "predatory practices" were apparent in the south of
Chad as well as in the capital and eastern Chad, as Zaghawas
with official civil and military positions use their clout
for economic gain for themselves and their families. SRSG
said he doubted that the recent wholesale replacement of
governors, prefects and other local administrative officials
was designed to actually improve delivery of administrative
services and reduce corruption and other buses.

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LIBYA AND MINURCAT II
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8. (C) The SRSG noted the Libyan-inspired &tripartite8
meeting in Tripoli that brought Chadian and Sudanese
diplomats together and promised reestablishment of relations
between N,Djamena and Khartoum. Angelo mentioned that Libya
was planning to fly a Chadian Ambassador to Khartoum and a
Sudanese Ambassador to N,Djamena and was strongly pushing
the idea of a border observation force to reduce tensions
between Chad and Sudan. The SRSG also expressed concern over
Libya,s strenuous diplomatic activity regarding the
Chad-Sudan conflict, saying that he thought much of the
urgency with which Libya was acting could be explained by
Tripoli,s desire to keep the reinforced MINURCAT II as small
as possible, especially regarding its military component.
The border observation force idea, even if it never
materialized, was useful to Tripoli in its effort to keep UN
PKO troop numbers in Chad as low as possible.

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PRES DEBY,S HEALTH
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9. (C) SRSG speculated on the health of President Deby,
saying that he had noticed in meetings that Deby often spoke
"haltingly and laboriously," indicating a lack of strength.
Even so, he seemed to summon strength for highly orchestrated
public appearances )- once a week or so -- where he appears
normal, if not energetic.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) We continue to think that Angelo,s vision for
MINURCAT II is the right one. We will take his concerns over
the situation in eastern Chad into account as we look at
prospects for future progress there. Chadian monkeying with
UN PKO proposals is not unexpected. The UN presence will be
massive and the GOC leadership wants to ensure that it does
not thwart its political objectives, i.e., resistance to
Chadian rebels and continued support for JEM. Regarding the
size of the projected force, Chadians have little
appreciation for the required logistic tail. Also, the ANT
has its eyes on some of the EUFOR infrastructure, and
believes that the time to get it is during the changeover. In
the end, however, we share the SRSG's view that the GOC will
come around to endorse mutually accepted force structure and
mandate.

NIGRO