PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD: MINURCAT UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000477 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2010 TAGS: PREL KPKO CD SU UN SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD: MINURCAT UPDATE REF: NDJAMENA Classified By: cda RGribbin for reasons 1.4 b&d 1.(C) Chief of UN PKO Alain Le Roy obtained renewed assurances from President Deby and other senior leaders that Chad was fully on board with evolving UN plans for a post-EUFOR operation, especially the near doubling of force size. ¶2. (C) UN PKO General Five elaborated on the force structure for diplomats representing UNSC members saying that the UN force would cover a larger area, do more patrolling (this oblique criticism of EUFOR went un-commented upon) and would have a full battalion in reserve for contingencies. Five was surprised with a question about inclusion of formed gendarme police units in the force, but others in the delegation, except Le Roy, seemed to know the issue. ¶3. (C) In a private aside, Five told the charge that Irish, Finnish and Polish contingents would re-hat, especially if French logistics continued, but he cautioned, the French were being cagey. He said that France is pushing for greater African participation in Chad. However, Francophone stalwarts Senegal and Mali are committed elsewhere, so France suggested Togo. The general added that he is looking at hopefully getting battalions from Namibia, maybe Malawi, and Nepal. He did not mention Norway. He said that depending on who stays from EUFOR, the planned six month transition to full MINURCAT II stand up was quite doable. ¶4. (C) Charge also asked Five how the issue of internal Chadian reconciliation ought to be handled. He said that a PKO mandate resolution should not explicitly rule out any political role for the SRSG, but ought carefully to leave a door open with some general wording about working to achieve national harmony or some such. Comment: This would be a useful approach, but needs to be done quietly and carefully. Chad is adamantly opposed to having a UN official being granted the responsibility for meddling in its internal affairs. Therefore, some subtlety and not much public discussion needs to go into ensuring that such activity remains possible. End Comment. ¶5. (C) In a separate meeting the Dutch Minister of Defense confirmed that the 60 person Dutch marine contingent attached to EUFOR's southern battalion would not be extended, even into the transition period. They would leave definitively on March 15, 2009. The minister said that there was little enthusiam in Parliament for the Chad deployment, which was seen only as a limited one year engagement. The Netherlands would intensify its focus on committments for Afganistan. ¶6. (C) Following the Dutch dinner, the director of MSF-Holland, who pulled MSF medical personnel out of Ade and Goz Bedia last week on account of insecurity, especially criminal attacks aimed at MSF peronnel, advised that operations resumed in Goz Bedia on October 14 and that personnel would return to Ade on the 15th. She said authorities had arrested several persons in connection with the crimes. That positive response coupled with recognition of ongoing unmet medical needs convinced her organiztion to resume operations. GRIBBIN