GOVERNMENT OF CHAD EASTERN RELIEF EFFORTS - SMOKE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000438 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2010 TAGS: PHUM PREL KPKO REFPAN PGOV UN CD SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF CHAD EASTERN RELIEF EFFORTS - SMOKE, LITTLE FIRE, BUT SOME PROMISE REF: A. STATE 95572 B. KHARTOUM 1438 Classified By: CDA RGribbin for reasons 1.4 b&c ¶1. (C) The head of Chadian relief and multinational force coordination for the east advised that his priorities included smoothing the way for MINURCAT and EUFOR, plus helping IDPs return home. He thought that rebel recruitment in the camps would diminish as MINURCAT and Chadian policemen deployed. He attributed eastern woes to Chadian rebels in the first instance and Sudanese janjaweed in the second. If/when tensions eased in Chad, more IDPs would leave the camps, even though Sudanese refugees would be long term residents. He accused Sudanese thieves of spiriting vehicles to Darfur for re-sale. End summary. ¶2. (C) On September 23 Charge Gribbin called on Dr. Moctar Moussa Mahamat, the President's Special Representative for MINURCAT and EUFOR and chief of the Committee for the National Coordination of Support for the Deployment International Forces to Eastern Chad (CONAFIT). The mouthful of a title notwithstanding, Dr. Mahamat said his principle responsibility was to act as liasion between European and UN forces and government officials, specifically with the objective of easing the way and solving problems before/as they arise. He said he established a solid working relationship with the SRSG, EUFOR and MINURCAT force commanders. CONAFIT had about seventy employees and anticipated more, once the committee became regularly inscribed in the national budget during the next fiscal year. Mahamat said that CONAFIT was most helpful in meeting with IDPs, local communities and traditional authorities in order to improve communications and the flow of information about safety in IDP producing regions. He added that CONAFIT never urged IDPs to go home, but did assist in their assessments and facilitated travel as it could for spontaneous returns. He said that few people moved during the rainy season, but feelers and envoys would go out after the rains. He opined that people were anxious to go home when conditions would permit. ¶3. (C) Asked about police deployments and efforts to restrict rebel recruiting in refugee camps, Mahamat was firm in stating that recruiting, particularly by JEM, was an ongoing problem. He outlined the security plan for the camps, which will have MINURCAT/Chadian police inside the camps and in a 10 kilometer perimeter around them. EUFOR had security responsibilities beyond that zone. Once the police were present, Dr. Mahamat expressed the conviction that recruitment efforts could be curtailed. In turn, we reiterated that illegal recruitment was an issue of USG concern. We noted the necessity for the GOC to promulgate the decree that would enable police deployments to occur. Mahamat nodded. ¶4. (C) Discussing general insecurity in the east, Dr. Mahamat blamed Chadian rebels for unrest and banditry, particularly that which produced IDPs. He added that Sudanese janjaweed raiding also contributed mightily to insecurity. Asked about vehicle theft (arising from Khartoum reftel),Mahamat replied angrily that Sudanese always accused Chadians of thefts in Darfur whereas thefts in Chad, and resale with impunity in Darfur, was a truer picture. He lamented that in olden days, people only stole cattle. ¶5. (C) In closing Dr. Mahamat asked for USG aid in helping to rebuild or develop anew the local infrastructure such as wells, schools, clinics, etc. that would help induce IDPs to return to their home villages. ¶6. (C) Comment. Dr. Mahamat and his committee are high profile, especially in Ndjamena and Abeche. Their performance in the field, however, does not yet match the rhetoric, planning and understanding of the crucial issues evidenced by headquarters personnel. SRSG Angelo characterized the committee as "able to block, but not unblock," indicating little real clout with GOC officials in the east as well as the lethargic pace of moving the police decree through the presidency. Even so, we judge that beyond being an Ndjamena clearing house for multi-ministerial issues from the international forces, Mahamat's focus on IDPs is well merited and clearly an issue where Chadian leadership is essential. GRIBBIN