EUFOR FINDS A FOLLOW-ON FORCE: UNPKO PLANNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000382 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2010 TAGS: CD KPKO PREL CT PGOV SU LY SUBJECT: EUFOR FINDS A FOLLOW-ON FORCE: UNPKO PLANNING MINURCAT II REF: NDJAMENA 299 Classified By: ADCM: RGribbin for reasons 1.4 b & d ¶1. (SBU) Summary. UN Peace Keeping chief Edmond Mulet told Chad-based diplomats that President Deby had endorsed an expanded MINURCAT designed to replace EUFOR in Chad next March. A 6,000 strong Chapter Seven PKO would be 25 percent larger than the total strength of EUFOR plus MINURCAT I, and would have a larger territorial mandate, including northwestern CAR and a bigger chunk of eastern Chad. Mulet envisaged a smooth transition to a blue-helmet operation and implied that France might remain as the lead contributor nation to MINURCAT II. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On September 1 the UN's director of Peace Keeping operations Edmond Mulet briefed UNSC member diplomats on plans for Chad. First, he recounted the gist of his meetings with President Deby and Prime Minister Abbas. Both men, he said, were fully on board with expanding MINURCAT to encompass EUFOR's duties and more when EUFOR's mandate expires in March 2009. Mulet anticipated few difficulties in gaining Chadian approval of details as they will be developed. For example, the new force might take on humanitarian convoy escort duties, if needed, and perhaps security responsibility for CAR refugees in Chad's south. Chadian leaders insisted that the new force not involve itself in internal Chadian politics and issues, i.e. the rebels, a position that Mulet agreed fully reflected UN practice. ¶3. (SBU) Mulet said that in addition to the police MINURCAT function already underway, the replacement force would number about 6,000 troops (EUFOR at full strength has 3700, 3200 in Chad, the rest in Europe). It would be more widely dispersed in several new camps. The territory to be covered would extend to the north of Bahai along the Sudanese border as well as to the southeast to include the Salamat region. Finally, the area around Birao in northeast Central African Republic would remain an area of responsibility for PKO. Mulet said that PM Abbas underlined the necessity of including the CAR in the mandate. MINURCAT II would require 18 helicopters and several small fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft. Mulet advised that much of MINURCAT II's equipment would come overland from Libya. ¶4. (SBU) Mulet said that he envisaged an easy transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT II. Several EUFOR participants - he nodded in the French charge's direction - would stay on, perhaps as the lead nation. Mulet said he would stop in Europe for consultations with General Nash (the overall EUFOR commander) on hand-over arrangements. ¶5. (C) The PKO chief cautioned that a potential disruptive event for Chad might occur if President Bashir carried through on his threat to toss UNAMID out. In such an eventuality, UN troops and assets would likely exit via Chad. That plus potentially large arrivals of new refugees at the same time would certainly complicate matters in the east. ¶6. (C) Comment: Mulet's brief and the GOC's agreement means that SRSG Angelo's ambitious plans for a renewed and reinforced mandate for a follow-on force have been realized. The SYG's report to the UNSC in mid-September on this topic will surely reflect Mulet's observations and proposals. From an embassy perspective, this is just what the situation requires -- a MINURCAT II with expanded scope and responsibilities; addition of a formed police unit capability to supplement the military and police training tasks performed by EUFOR and MINURCAT I, respectively; and retention of NE CAR as an area of responsibility. That Chad is an open, willing partner in the process bodes well for a smooth hand over and a cooperative working environment. we found it interesting that Mulet is thinking of and planning contingencies should the situation in Sudan deteriorate dramatically. End comment. NIGRO