FORMIN FAKI SAYS GOC SEEKS BIGGER UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000292

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RSA, S/CRS AND PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR KPKO PREF UN EU
SU, CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN FAKI SAYS GOC SEEKS BIGGER UN
ROLE IN CHAD TO SUPPLEMENT DAKAR ACCORD PROCESS
AND CONTROL BORDER

REF: NDJAMENA 276

CLASSIFIED BY AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS
1.4(B) AND (D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) FORMIN Faki told Ambassador July 14 that
although Chad was committed to the Dakar Accord
process, the GOC was becoming less confident in
the "practicability" of implementation of the
process's key piece -- military observers along
the Chad-Sudan borders to identify violations by
government forces or rebel groups of that
frontier. Faki described current Contact Group
(CG) planning as "unrealistic" because it would
require too many personnel, could lead to
violence between Chad and Sudan armed forces,
lacked a reasonable deployment calendar, and was
far too costly for the CG to manage.


2. (C) Faki said that given the limitations of
the Dakar Process, Chad now sought a broader
mandate for the UN and EU PKOs in eastern Chad
and in Darfur, as Chad had advocated at the
recent CEMAC summit, which had called for
expansion of the mandates of EUFOR, MINURCAT and
UNAMID. The GOC was in favor of an expansion of
MINURCAT's mandate to give it more responsibility
for "securing" the Chad-Sudan border, including
by mounting border observation and "controle."
Faki confirmed that the GOC was not opposed "a
priori" to MINURCAT "becoming" the follow-on
force to EUFOR and offered that expansion of
MINURCAT's mandate could be sold to CG member
states by giving them the opportunity to
contribute personnel to the modified UN mission.


3. (C) It appears that the GOC is prepared in
principle to embrace the kind of expansion of
MINURCAT's mandate that SRSG Angelo advocates
(RFTEL) and that would provide a follow-on UN PKO
to replace EUFOR. Faki's description of the GOC's
willingness to deal with rebels does not include
the distinction between chiefs and foot soldiers
that other senior GOC officials have drawn. END
SUMMARY.


4. (C) New FORMIN Faki. Ambassador called on
FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat July 14. They
discussed Chad-Sudan relations, the Dakar Accord
Process, the expansion of MINURCAT's mandate and
the GOC's position on dealing with Chadian rebels
still in the field in Sudan. Ambassador
congratulated Faki on GOC decision to name Ahmet
Allam-Mi as its new Permanent Representative to
the UN.


5. (C) Dakar Process. Faki said that although
Chad was committed to the Dakar Accord process,
the GOC was less confident of the practicability
of implementation of the key piece o the process
- military observers along the Chad-Sudan borders
to identify violations by rebel groups of that
frontier. Faki said he had recently completed a
15-country round of visits to capitals to counter
Sudanese propaganda and explain Chad's position.
Faki said he would leave July 15 for Dakar for
the next meeting of the Contact Group to
implement the March Dakar Accord.


6. (C) Defects in the Dakar Process. Faki said
that Chad had been pushing for Sudan to be
represented at the FORMIN level and that the
Senegalese Government had joined in urging
Khartoum to raise the level of its representative
above the MFS Secretary General level, at which
level Sudan had been represented at previous
Contact Group meetings. Faki said that the
Experts Group had met and made some progress.
But the GOC was afraid that the Contact Group
lacked both the financial resources and the
technical expertise to mount a successful border

NDJAMENA 00000292 002 OF 003


observation operation as ambitious as the one
foreseen at Dakar.


7. (C) The Dakar Process "Unrealistic." Faki
said that the idea currently being worked on was
"unrealistic" because it would require ten border
posts with two observers each, protected by 1,000
Chadian and 1,000 Sudanese soldiers in mixed
contingents. He said Chad was suggesting
reducing the numbers of the "protection forces"
to 150-200 on each side, to lessen the chances of
possible fighting between the two sides. The
Contact Group did not yet have a calendar for the
deployment of the border observers, although
deployment must be made no later than the end of
October/beginning of November, when the rainy
season ended in eastern Chad. Money was another
issue. He estimated that the operation, complete
with three aircraft and basing and housing of
personnel, would cost usdols 30 million per year.
Only Libya was ready to spend money and even
Tripoli was talking of contributing usdols two
million of that total.


8. (C) Broader Mandates for EUFOR and MINURCAT.
Faki said that the limitations of the Dakar
Process had led the Chadians to seek a broader
mandate for the UN and EU PKOs in eastern Chad
and in Darfur. Faki said that Chad's initiative
at the recent CEMAC summit had resulted in that
body's call for an expansion of the mandates of
EUFOR, MINURCAT and UNAMID. Faki said that the
GOC was in favor of an expansion of MINURCAT's
mandate to give it more responsibility for
"securing" the Chad-Sudan border, including by
mounting border observation and "controle." In
response to a direct question, Faki said that the
GOC was not opposed "a priori" to MINURCAT
"becoming" the follow-on force to EUFOR after the
latter's mandate expires in March 2009. Faki
noted that the idea of a follow-on force has
always been part of the PKO mission in eastern
Chad and figures in the UNSC resolution. Faki
said that expansion of MINURCAT's mandate could
be made more palatable to CG member states by
giving them the opportunity to contribute troops,
observers, police and cadre to the expanded UN
mission.


9. (C) GOC Policy Toward Rebels. Faki said that
as far as the GOC was concerned the 2007 Sirte
Accord was still in effect. That meant that any
Chadian rebel who laid down arms and renounced
violence as a political means could return to
Chad. In response to a direct question, he said
that this applied to all rebels - leaders and
followers alike, with no exceptions. Faki said
that the GOC would try to pay some expenses of
returned rebels, would try to find them jobs, and
would certainly permit them to enter the
political field in Chad, as long as they did so
peacefully and in accordance with the electoral
reform process now being implemented under the
August 13, 2007 N'Djamena Accord.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) It appears increasingly likely that the
GOC is prepared in principle to embrace the kind
of expansion of MINURCAT's mandate that SRSG
Angelo advocates (REFTEL) and that would supply a
follow-on UN PKO to replace EUFOR. Faki's remarks
fit a pattern. Former FORMIN Allam-Mi told me
two weeks ago that there was no fixed position in
the GOC opposing a follow-on force. The GOC
organ Le Progres yesterday front-paged Chad's
agreement with the CEMAC call for "enlarging" the
mandates of MMINURCAT, EUFOR and UNAMID. It is
unlikely that SRSG Angelo would have retailed his
plan for a beefed up, semi-military MINURCAT able
to do EUFOR's job if he did not have some
confidence in GOC acceptance of his ideas.
Faki's description of the GOC's willingness to

NDJAMENA 00000292 003 OF 003


deal with rebels does not include the distinction
between chiefs and foot soldiers that other
senior GOC officials have drawn.



NIGRO