NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000228

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, DEPT FOR AF/C,
AF/RSA, S/CRS AND PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MARR EAID UN EU SU CD
SUBJECT: NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR
PROGRESS REPORT, REQUESTS U.S. LIAISON OFFICER

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ADCM SAMUEL RUBINO FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND
(D).

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Summary
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1. (C) The PRM Chad Program Officer met with UN Mission to
the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) Police
Commissioner Antero Lopes to discuss the status of
MINURCAT,s deployment. The deployment has been delayed
several months but seems to be finally picking up speed under
the current leadership. Still, significant challenges are
hampering efforts to deploy as rapidly as desired.
Meanwhile, the delay has allowed MINURCAT to observe the
developing situation in eastern Chad, leading to some
discussion with Chadian authorities on possibly adjusting the
UN mission,s mandate to one that would greatly expand its
geographical coverage as well as its capacity building
activities with Chadian gendarmes. End summary.

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Current Deployment Status
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2. (C) The PRM Chad Program Officer met with MINURCAT
Police Commissioner Antero Lopes to discuss the status of
MINURCAT,s deployment. (Note: PRM is financing the MINURCAT
trust fund in the amount of $2,000,000 for Chadian police
stipends. End Note.) Lopes admitted that MINURCAT,s
deployment had been delayed for several reasons ) most of
which were related to internal issues. The delayed
deployment of the European Force (EUFOR) naturally meant
pushing back that of MINURCAT. But the MINURCAT had been
unnecessarily slow in finding solutions to such logistical
challenges as fuel acquisition and base construction. Lopes
feels certain staff were too resigned to the fact that
operating in Chad was difficult and that delays were accepted
as unavoidable. He hopes to inject a sense of urgency in
getting the UN mission fully deployed to the East.


3. (C) Lopes described the deployment sequence as EUFOR,
logistics, MINURCAT. In other words, MINURCAT,s deployment
was dependent on the establishment of security and logistics
channels. Meanwhile, to make up for delays, Lopes has had
almost all his authorized UN Police (UNPOL) staff deploy to
N,Djamena, where they are given various planning tasks
according to where they will deploy in the East. When the
Farchana base is built, for example, the entire Farchana
UNPOL element will be able to deploy together immediately
having already built professional relationships and hopefully
a strong team spirit. (Note: MINURCAT will now be deploying
to Farchana before Goz-Beida since the former already has a
EUFOR battalion in place. End Note.)

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Coordination with EUFOR
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4. (C) Lopes is still not confident that EUFOR will deploy
to the towns of Guereda and Bahai, from where humanitarians
assist some 65,000 refugees in three camps. Since the
beginning of its deployment, MINURCAT staff have stated that
they would not deploy to areas where EUFOR would not be able
to provide adequate force protection. With a Polish EUFOR
battalion planned for the town of Iriba, EUFOR might not be
able to offer better than a two-hour quick reaction force for
Guereda and Bahai. It is therefore possible that MINURCAT
will decide not to send gendarmes to these towns and camps.


5. (C) In separate conversations with the PRM Program
Officer, however, EUFOR stated that the most likely scenario
for this part of eastern Chad would be to deploy the Polish
battalion HQ to Iriba and have two of its companies
permanently occupy locations near Guereda and Bahai on a
rotational basis. It seems, therefore, that MINURCAT,s
fears might be unfounded. Still, in a somewhat confusing
reversal of policy, Lopes stated that if after their one-year
deployment EUFOR withdraws and MINURCAT is left unprotected
in areas like Farchana and Goz-Beida, then the UN mission
might as well deploy to Guereda and Bahai since the entire
operation would be exposed anyway.

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The Integrated Security Detachment
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6. (C) Training of the Chadian component of MINURCAT, the
Detachement Integre de Securite (DIS),continues. Some 77
DIS commanders are expected to graduate from training on June
3, at which time the monthly trainings of 200 gendarmes will
commence. Lopes described the commanders as a mixed batch,
but noted that the overall quality has been higher than
expected. MINURCAT has made efforts to vet the gendarme
candidates proposed by the Chadian authorities. Gendarmes
already working in the refugee camps, for example, were
vetted with help of the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) and checked for information regarding abuse of
refugees or other gendarmes, accountability, and overall
professional behavior.


7. (C) Lopes hopes to have all UNPOL staff deployed to the
East by October and the DIS by the end of the year.
MINURCAT,s ability to deploy even at this extended rate will
depend heavily on the GOC,s ability to nominate hundreds of
suitable DIS candidates every month that can be easily vetted
by the UN. Too few candidates or too many questionable
candidates will slow MINURCAT,s projected throughput of 200
new DIS gendarmes per month.


8. (C) The GOC is currently drafting a legal decree that
would place all policing authorities in the hands of the DIS
and eliminate the roles of any other gendarmes currently
located in DIS deployment areas. Lopes believes this to be
necessary to avoid the confusion of parallel chains of
command as well as jealousy between normal gendarme forces
and what will inevitably be a much better-equipped DIS.


9. (C) The DIS will have arrest authority both inside
refugee camps as well as 10 km surrounding the camps and
major towns of the East. Coincidently, in the Goz-Beida
area, this will place six major IDP sites under DIS
jurisdiction. The GOC is in fact requesting that MINURCAT,s
presence be increased to assume jurisdiction over all IDP
sites. Doing this would naturally require additional
resources ) estimated by Lopes at 80 UNPOL and 200 DIS -
though any eventual non-deployment of DIS to areas like Bahai
or Guereda would free up personnel within the currently
authorized levels. (Note: This would not be an acceptable
course of action for PRM since the three camps around Bahai
and Guereda are those most exposed to the threats of
recruitment, armed conflict, and banditry. End Note.)


10. (C) Though only verbally at this point, Chadian
authorities have agreed to the established DIS base salaries
of $220, $250, and $280 depending on rank, plus a daily $8
per diem and $7 lodging allowance. The salaries will be paid
directly to the individual gendarmes. Chadian authorities
have been warned that any hint of gendarmes having to give up
a portion of their salaries for questionable reasons will be
addressed at political levels.

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New Roles for MINURCAT
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11. (C) Lopes ) and coincidently the GOC ) feel that
MINURCAT,s delayed deployment could have certain advantages.
While EUFOR has been executing its deployment under rather
trying circumstances with regards to security and logistics,
MINURCAT has been far enough from the fray to begin
reassessing how its mandate may best be implemented or even
adjusted given the developing realities in eastern Chad. The
Chadian authorities in particular are hoping to increase the
benefits of having MINURCAT,s and its policing expertise on
hand.


12. (C) According to Lopes, the GOC sees the current DIS
training as only the beginning of a larger, longer-term
restructuring of the Chadian Gendarmerie. The ideal
post-EUFOR solution for the GOC might not necessarily be a
follow-on UN mission, but rather a similarly capable Chadian
gendarme force that would ensure security across the East.
To get to this point, however, would require a much greater
output than the 200 DIS gendarmes MINURCAT plans to assemble
from across Chad and train each month. Chad is therefore
hoping to get MINURCAT to bring in formed police units (FPUs)
to enhance the capacity building aspect of the UN mission.


13. (C) The Special Representative of the Secretary General
in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR),SRSG Victor
Angelo, seems to be in favor of this idea, though it would

NDJAMENA 00000228 003 OF 003


undoubtedly require approval at the UN Security Council.
FPUs could foreseeably play three key roles: 1) protect UN
staff; 2) clone Chadian units, i.e. training similarly
structured, already existing Chadian police units rather than
piecing units together with personnel from various locations;
and 3) fill in the gap between police and military units,
allowing authorities to direct a more calibrated response to
such events as demonstrations in the camps or towns.


14. (C) Similarly in the CAR, the CARG would like
MINURCAT,s very small presence in Bangui and the
northeastern Vakaga Province to expand and to become involved
in ongoing security sector reform (SSR) activities. Lopes
says MINURCAT will likely shy away from this increased
mandate in the CAR, preferring to let other UN agencies (UNDP
and BONUCA) to continue this role instead. MINURCAT should
at most be integrated into UNDP,s program, though he felt
UNDP should be more focused on the justice sector rather than
SSR.


15. (C) Meanwhile, it seems that the SRSG,s previous
comments on an eventual border monitoring mission for
MINURCAT were not properly understood. According to Lopes,
the SRSG is not looking to assume this role, but rather wants
to make MINURCAT,s expertise available to any contingent of
the Chad-Sudan Contact Group that deploys on such a mission
to eastern Chad.
NIGRO