CHADIAN INSIDER CONFIRMS RIFT WITH JEM, UNITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000126

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
PARIS FOR KANEDA
LONDON FOR SUSSMAN

E.O. 12958: 03/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU CD
SUBJECT: CHADIAN INSIDER CONFIRMS RIFT WITH JEM, UNITY
TALKS BETWEEN SLA/UNITY, URF

CLASSIFIED BY CDA LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

REF: NDJAMENA 117
NDJAMENA 122

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Summary
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1. (C) A rift has emerged between the Chadian Government
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),a businessman
with close ties to President Deby and a prominent SLA/Unity
commander, told Poloff. Verifying previous reports that
SLA/Unity's leadership has ceased its infighting and
coalesced around Abdullah Yehia (reftel),both the
businessman and the commander were optimistic that
discussions between SLA/Unity and the URF will yield to
their consolidation and suggested that the international
community sponsor a "conference" to finalize these efforts
toward unity. While neither Abdulwahid al Nur nor Khalil
Ibrahim are likely to attend such a meeting, according to
both men, greater cohesion between SLA/Unity, the URF, and
other factions could draw support away from Ibrahim and al
Nur and weaken their ability to influence events. End
summary.

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Chad-JEM Rift
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2. (C) A rift has emerged between the Chadian Government
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),Musa Ahmet
Oumar, a businessman with close ties to both the Chadian
Government and the Darfur rebel movements, and Kadu, a
prominent Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity commander, told
Poloff on March 29. Chad shifted its support from JEM to
the United Revolutionary Front (URF),led by former JEM
Secretary General Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda. According to

SIPDIS
Oumar, a close associate of President Deby's brother Dausa
(a frequent interlocutor with Darfur's rebel movements),
President Deby was angered by JEM's public boasting of its
support for the Chadian Government during the February
rebel offensive on N'djamena.


3. (S) Oumar's account, however, is one of many similar
reports in recent days. In a separate conversation with
Poloff on March 30, SLA/Unity leader Suleiman Jamous
explained that Deby ordered JEM to remain in Chad after he
signed the Dakar agreement with Sudanese President Bashir.
Deby intended to test whether Sudan would restrain the
Chadian militias and did not want JEM activity to provide a
pretext for another Chadian rebel incursion. JEM Chairman
Khalil Ibrahim ignored Deby's instructions, however.
Sensitive reporting also indicates that a visiting
delegation of the Sudanese Umma Party is brokering a deal
between Deby and the National Congress Party (NCP),one
condition of which is that Deby move to isolate JEM.


4. (C) Despite the cooling in Chad-JEM relations, it will
be difficult for Deby to cripple Ibrahim entirely given his
enduring support within the Kobe clan of the Zaghawa tribe,
said Oumar. He suggested that Poloff meet with Dousa Deby
to discuss how Chad and the U.S. could cooperate in
mitigating Ibrahim's influence, characterizing him as an
"obstruction to peace." Oumar intimated that, in spite of
Ibrahim's clan ties, President Deby can foment a split
within JEM that will cripple the movement. (Note: Oumar
subsequently arranged this meeting with Dausa Deby, which
will be reported septel. End note.) Oumar and Kadu
confirmed numerous other reports, including from the United
Nations in Sudan, that JEM now has more vehicles and
weapons than fighters as a result of mass defections and a
Sudanese military offensive in West Darfur.

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Rebel Consolidation?
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5. (SBU) Verifying previous reports that SLA/Unity's
leadership has ceased its infighting and coalesced around
Abdullah Yehia (reftel),Oumar and Kadu were also
optimistic that discussions between SLA/Unity and the URF
will yield agreement on consolidation of the two movements,
including the establishment of a common negotiating team to
participate in the UN/AU peace process. They underscored
that no substantive policy differences existed between the
two movements--in contrast to JEM, which seeks regime

NDJAMENA 00000126 002 OF 002


change in Khartoum rather than focusing on securing greater
rights for Darfur. Once SLA/Unity and the URF have formed
a negotiating team, Oumar and Kadu predicted that SLA
faction leader Ahmed Abdulshafie, a Fur, would be under
pressure to join as well. While Shafie's weak military and
political position limits his influence, said Kadu, there
is still value in consolidating as many of the SLA factions
as possible ahead of negotiations with Khartoum.

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Rebels Again Request Unity Meeting
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6. (SBU) Asked what role the international community can
play in support of the peace process, Oumar and Kadu
suggested a "conference" to bring SLA/Unity, the URF, and
any other interested factions together for discussions.
They mentioned the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's
abortive attempt to organize a meeting in Mombasa, Kenya in
the summer of 2007 as a model for such an event. (Note:
Jamous endorsed this idea in a later meeting with Poloff,
saying that a unity conference should begin with
discussions among field commanders and then draw in the
political leaders of the rebel factions. End note.)


7. (SBU) Skeptical that Ibrahim or demagogic SLA leader
Abdulwahid al Nur would attend such a unity conference,
Oumar and Kadu nonetheless explained that great cohesion
between SLA/Unity, the URF, and other smaller factions
could draw support away from Ibrahim and al Nur and weaken
their ability to influence events. The people of Darfur
will gravitate toward a united movement with the power to
gain concessions from Khartoum on issues like security,
compensation and development, they predicted. Oumar and
Kadu alleged that the UN/AU mediation is not neutral,
spending hours with NCP officials in Khartoum but only
visiting rebel leaders on an intermittent basis--and then
only for hour-long meetings. The lack of confidence in the
UN/AU mediation makes it even more necessary for the
movements to present a united front in order to extract
compromises from Khartoum.


8. (SBU) (Note: The senior leadership of SLA/Unity and the
URF will be traveling outside Sudan for the next several
weeks. Jamous is seeking medical treatment in Paris (using
a passport issued by Chad). Sharif Harir returned to
Norway. Yehia is in Tripoli waiting to travel to Brussels.
While URF insider Tajedinne Niam and soon-to-be announced
URF deputy president Khamis Abdullah are in Juba, URF head
Abu Gharda is planning to leave N'djamena for Europe within
one week. End note.)

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Comment
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9. (C) Deby has put himself in a difficult position vis-Q-
vis JEM. Continued backing for the movement puts him in
violation of the myriad peace agreements with Sudan,
provides a pretext for continued Sudanese-backed aggression
against his regime, and risks international rebuke.
However, having benefited from overt JEM aid during the
February attack on N'djamena, Deby's total withdrawal of
political and logistical support could generate a backlash
within the Zaghawa Kobe and those members of the regime
with long-standing familial ties to Khalil and JEM, such as
intelligence chief Ismail Chaibo, at the moment that he
faces the possibility of another major rebel incursion.
Given the tenuous JEM dynamic, Chad's effort to facilitate
dialogue between the URF and SLA/Unity to forge a more
cohesive SLA structure may be an effort to create another
Sudanese rebel force willing to defend Deby's regime in the
event of a new attack inspired by Khartoum. End comment.

TAMLYN