DARFUR: TENSIONS MOUNT BETWEEN JEM AND URF REBELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000123 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: 03/27/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID CD SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: TENSIONS MOUNT BETWEEN JEM AND URF REBELS CLASSIFIED BY DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) REFTEL: NDJAMENA 00117 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Two Darfur rebel movements--JEM and the URF--are on the verge of "war" and conflict has erupted between their forces in Chad in recent weeks, according to the chief URF commander. While JEM's military strength is declining as a result of a recent Sudanese offensive and widespread defections, the URF is now the most potent military and political force in Darfur. The URF assisted in the defense of President Deby's regime during the rebel offensive on N'djamena in February, despite the fact that Chad provided military supplies only to JEM. Deby has since changed course, according to the commander, and will soon move to undermine JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim among Khalil's own fighters. The URF remains prepared to back the Chadian Government against any future Chadian rebel incursion in order to stave off chaos in the country. ¶2. (C) While we do not have independent confirmation of Bakheit's version of the shifting relationships between Deby and Sudanese rebels, we do know that his relationship with Khalil Ibrahim has waxed and waned. Bakheit's account highlights the complexity and mutability of the alliances Deby must maintain in order to defend his regime; it also underscores the transnational dimension of the Darfur conflict. Bakheit's account indicates that Deby's dexterity as a diplomatic tactician rivals his skillfulness as a military tactician. The question remains the same in both fields, however -- Does he have the ability to translate tactical victories into the kind of strategic success that will ensure more resilient stability for his regime. End Summary. -------------- JEM, URF at "War" -------------- ¶3. (C) Two of Darfur's major rebel factions--the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the United Revolutionary Front (URF)--are on the verge of "war," URF chief commander Adam Bakheit told Poloffs on March 27. While the URF is poised to announce the consolidation of five rebel movements under the leadership of former JEM Secretary General Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda (reftel),JEM has lost considerable strength in recent weeks as a result of the Sudanese Armed Force's (SAF) campaign in West Darfur and of the defection of non-Zaghawa elements of the movement. Conflict erupted between the two factions in Mango (600 km east of N'djamena) shortly after the Chadian rebel withdrawal from N'djamena. Bakheit reported that the Chadian military separated the two movements to prevent large-scale hostilities. ¶4. (C) Bakheit confirmed other, more impartial reports (such as from the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in Sudan) that JEM now has more vehicles and arms than it has fighters to utilize them. "The URF is looking forward to taking JEM's weapons, since they will be easily defeated and aren't using them anyway," joked Bakheit. -------------- Chad Playing Favorites? -------------- ¶5. (C) The disparity in military capacity has combined with fluctuating Chadian policy toward the two movements to foment tension between them. During the Chadian rebel offensive in early February, the Chadian Government provided supplies only to JEM, even though the URF also came to the aid of President Idriss Deby's regime at that time. In a meeting with Deby on March 22, Bakheit questioned Chad's unbalanced support. Deby replied angrily that he had ordered the provision of military supplies to both JEM and the URF and blamed Minister of Defense Mohammed Ali Nasour for diverting all of the assistance to JEM because of ulterior motives. (Nasour, according to Bakheit, is plotting to overthrow Deby in a palace coup.) ¶6. (C) To remedy the situation, Deby told his brother Dousa and intelligence chief Mohammed Ismail Chaibo to bring Ibrahim to N'djamena within 24 hours. Deby planned to force Ibrahim to reconcile with Abu Gharda and to combine JEM and the URF into a single movement. If Ibrahim refused, Deby threatened to "withdraw" support for JEM. NDJAMENA 00000123 002 OF 002 (Comment: Deby's response is a probable face-saving measure to cover for the actions of Dousa Deby and Chaibo, who have long-standing ties to JEM. End comment. ¶7. (C) As Ibrahim has not yet arrived in N'djamena, Bakheit predicted that Deby will move to undermine JEM, a course that the URF prefers because it is reticent to reconcile with a movement that it views as an extension of the "Islamist" Hassan al Turabi. Pressed by Poloff on how Deby could damage JEM in the near term given that Chad just provided fresh arms and vehicles to the movement, Bakheit said that Deby can erode support for Ibrahim within the ranks and file. "Deby is clever," explained Bakheit. "No one discovers what he's doing until it's over." ¶8. (C) Despite Deby's inconsistency, Bakheit pledged that the URF would support the Chadian Government against any future Chadian rebel incursion. Though Deby uses the Darfur rebel movements to protect his "weak" government rather than in the interest of Darfurians, the regime's collapse would cause chaos in Chad, endangering Darfurian refugees and hurting the cause of the rebel movements, according to Bakheit. -------------- Rebel Unification -- then Peace -------------- ¶9. (C) With JEM deteriorating, Bakheit boasted that the URF is now the most potent military and political force in Darfur. The predominance of Zaghawa fighters within the movement bolsters its fighting ability--"10 Zaghawa equal 40 fighters from other tribes"--and the ethnically diverse leadership structure will ensure broad popular appeal. He indicated that several field commanders affiliated with Fur leader Abdulwahid al Nur in North Darfur are moving to join the URF. Bakheit also anticipated that the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity will soon merge with the URF. He called on the USG to support the Darfur peace process by pressing SLA/Abdulshafie to join the URF as well. Once unification efforts are complete, the movements will then be ready prepared for negotiations with the Sudanese Government, said Bakheit. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) While we do not have independent confirmation of Bakheit's version of the shifting relationships between President Deby and Sudanese rebel factions, we do know that the President's relationship with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim has waxed and waned. Bakheit's account highlights the complexity (and mutability) of the alliances which President Deby is obliged to maintain in order to shore up his regime; it also underscores the transnational dimension of the Darfur conflict. ¶11. (C) Bakheit's account indicates that Deby's dexterity as a diplomatic tactician rivals his skillfulness as a military tactician. The question remains the same in both fields, however -- Does he have the ability to translate tactical victories into the kind of strategic success that will ensure more resilient stability for his regime. NIGRO