DARFUR: TENSIONS MOUNT BETWEEN JEM AND URF REBELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000123

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: 03/27/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: TENSIONS MOUNT BETWEEN JEM AND URF REBELS

CLASSIFIED BY DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

REFTEL: NDJAMENA 00117

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Summary
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1. (C) Two Darfur rebel movements--JEM and the URF--are on
the verge of "war" and conflict has erupted between their
forces in Chad in recent weeks, according to the chief URF
commander. While JEM's military strength is declining as a
result of a recent Sudanese offensive and widespread
defections, the URF is now the most potent military and
political force in Darfur. The URF assisted in the defense
of President Deby's regime during the rebel offensive on
N'djamena in February, despite the fact that Chad provided
military supplies only to JEM. Deby has since changed
course, according to the commander, and will soon move to
undermine JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim among Khalil's own
fighters. The URF remains prepared to back the Chadian
Government against any future Chadian rebel incursion in
order to stave off chaos in the country.


2. (C) While we do not have independent confirmation of
Bakheit's version of the shifting relationships between
Deby and Sudanese rebels, we do know that his relationship
with Khalil Ibrahim has waxed and waned. Bakheit's account
highlights the complexity and mutability of the alliances
Deby must maintain in order to defend his regime; it also
underscores the transnational dimension of the Darfur
conflict. Bakheit's account indicates that Deby's dexterity
as a diplomatic tactician rivals his skillfulness as a
military tactician. The question remains the same in both
fields, however -- Does he have the ability to translate
tactical victories into the kind of strategic success that
will ensure more resilient stability for his regime. End
Summary.

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JEM, URF at "War"
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3. (C) Two of Darfur's major rebel factions--the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) and the United Revolutionary
Front (URF)--are on the verge of "war," URF chief commander
Adam Bakheit told Poloffs on March 27. While the URF is
poised to announce the consolidation of five rebel
movements under the leadership of former JEM Secretary
General Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda (reftel),JEM has lost
considerable strength in recent weeks as a result of the
Sudanese Armed Force's (SAF) campaign in West Darfur and of
the defection of non-Zaghawa elements of the movement.
Conflict erupted between the two factions in Mango (600 km
east of N'djamena) shortly after the Chadian rebel
withdrawal from N'djamena. Bakheit reported that the
Chadian military separated the two movements to prevent
large-scale hostilities.


4. (C) Bakheit confirmed other, more impartial reports
(such as from the UN Department of Safety and Security
(UNDSS) in Sudan) that JEM now has more vehicles and arms
than it has fighters to utilize them. "The URF is looking
forward to taking JEM's weapons, since they will be easily
defeated and aren't using them anyway," joked Bakheit.

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Chad Playing Favorites?
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5. (C) The disparity in military capacity has combined with
fluctuating Chadian policy toward the two movements to
foment tension between them. During the Chadian rebel
offensive in early February, the Chadian Government
provided supplies only to JEM, even though the URF also
came to the aid of President Idriss Deby's regime at that
time. In a meeting with Deby on March 22, Bakheit
questioned Chad's unbalanced support. Deby replied angrily
that he had ordered the provision of military supplies to
both JEM and the URF and blamed Minister of Defense
Mohammed Ali Nasour for diverting all of the assistance to
JEM because of ulterior motives. (Nasour, according to
Bakheit, is plotting to overthrow Deby in a palace coup.)


6. (C) To remedy the situation, Deby told his brother Dousa
and intelligence chief Mohammed Ismail Chaibo to bring
Ibrahim to N'djamena within 24 hours. Deby planned to
force Ibrahim to reconcile with Abu Gharda and to combine
JEM and the URF into a single movement. If Ibrahim
refused, Deby threatened to "withdraw" support for JEM.

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(Comment: Deby's response is a probable face-saving measure
to cover for the actions of Dousa Deby and Chaibo, who have
long-standing ties to JEM. End comment.


7. (C) As Ibrahim has not yet arrived in N'djamena, Bakheit
predicted that Deby will move to undermine JEM, a course
that the URF prefers because it is reticent to reconcile
with a movement that it views as an extension of the
"Islamist" Hassan al Turabi. Pressed by Poloff on how Deby
could damage JEM in the near term given that Chad just
provided fresh arms and vehicles to the movement, Bakheit
said that Deby can erode support for Ibrahim within the
ranks and file. "Deby is clever," explained Bakheit. "No
one discovers what he's doing until it's over."


8. (C) Despite Deby's inconsistency, Bakheit pledged that
the URF would support the Chadian Government against any
future Chadian rebel incursion. Though Deby uses the
Darfur rebel movements to protect his "weak" government
rather than in the interest of Darfurians, the regime's
collapse would cause chaos in Chad, endangering Darfurian
refugees and hurting the cause of the rebel movements,
according to Bakheit.

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Rebel Unification -- then Peace
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9. (C) With JEM deteriorating, Bakheit boasted that the URF
is now the most potent military and political force in
Darfur. The predominance of Zaghawa fighters within the
movement bolsters its fighting ability--"10 Zaghawa equal
40 fighters from other tribes"--and the ethnically diverse
leadership structure will ensure broad popular appeal. He
indicated that several field commanders affiliated with Fur
leader Abdulwahid al Nur in North Darfur are moving to join
the URF. Bakheit also anticipated that the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity will soon merge with the URF.
He called on the USG to support the Darfur peace process by
pressing SLA/Abdulshafie to join the URF as well. Once
unification efforts are complete, the movements will then
be ready prepared for negotiations with the Sudanese
Government, said Bakheit.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) While we do not have independent confirmation of
Bakheit's version of the shifting relationships between
President Deby and Sudanese rebel factions, we do know that
the President's relationship with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim
has waxed and waned. Bakheit's account highlights the
complexity (and mutability) of the alliances which
President Deby is obliged to maintain in order to shore up
his regime; it also underscores the transnational dimension
of the Darfur conflict.


11. (C) Bakheit's account indicates that Deby's dexterity
as a diplomatic tactician rivals his skillfulness as a
military tactician. The question remains the same in both
fields, however -- Does he have the ability to translate
tactical victories into the kind of strategic success that
will ensure more resilient stability for his regime.

NIGRO