CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER: GIVE BORDER MONITORING MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000119

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RSA, S/CRS AND PRM

E.O. 12958: 03/27/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER: GIVE BORDER MONITORING MORE
TEETH


CLASSIFIED BY DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: In a wide ranging meeting with Chad
Foreign Minister Allam-mi the Ambassador broached the topic
of what messages the United States might usefully convey to
Chadian rebels that approached us. Allam-mi urged
commitment to the Sirte accords and asked for U.S.
assistance in putting in place the border monitoring called
for in the Dakar accord. Allam-mi recalled that President
Deby was still very interested in an official visit to
Washington, and asked for an update on the C-130 sale. We
think it was useful to have broached the subject of U.S.
messages to the Chadian rebel chiefs: the GOC now knows
how we are trying to help them in this regard, and can
engage us on implementation - if it so chooses. End
Summary.


2. (U) The Ambassador met with Chadian Foreign Minister
Allam-mi on March 26 in his newly refurnished office in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (looters had completely
emptied his office in the aftermath of the February 2-3
attacks). DCM (notetaker) and Youssem Konto, Secretary
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended.


3. SBU) The Ambassador opened by reiterating that the
United States supported Chad's legitimate right of self-
defense against aggression supported by a neighbor. He
explained that the United States was looking for ways to
diminish the tension between Chad and Sudan, but that the
first step was for the attacks to stop. He urged
strengthening of the Chadian state by the creation of more
political space and allowing for a more participatory
political system. He recalled that these points had been
raised by Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Jim Swan in his
recent meeting with President Deby.


4. (C) The Ambassador informed Allam-mi that Ambassador
Bechir had conveyed a message from President Deby
indicating that he would appreciate U.S. support in
negotiations with Chadian rebels. President Deby had also
mentioned his plans for a new Government of "National
Opening." The Ambassador had three questions in this
regard:

-- What message would be useful to send the rebels?
-- What flexibility did the Chadian state have in order to
persuade the rebels to lay down their arms and enter into a
political dialogue?
-- What can US do to facilitate a political opening which
would strengthen Chadian state?

REBEL DISUNITY
--------------


5. (C) Foreign Minister Allam-mi thanked the Ambassador for
the U.S. condemnation of the recent attacks. He provided a
recording and a transcript of a conversation between Sudan
Intelligence Chief Saleh Gosh and Chadian rebel leader
Mohamat Nouri dating from last week in which Gosh
encouraged him said to "attack quickly while the President
goes to France for medical treatment." However, this
attack did not take place because the groups could not
decide who would be the leader. Even within the UFDD there
were divisions. Allam-mi commented that Nouri was
sufficiently well-equipped to attack, but he was not ready
(despite Sudanese pressure). Right now the RFC was
negotiating; the Ouaddaian group was tired of being used in
the service of others and also was talking to the
Government. Allam-mi stated that former Ambassador
Soubiane was the recent arrival in the rebel fold and was
supported by the janjaweed (who shared his Arab ethnicity).


6. (C) Turning to the question of how to help diminish
tensions between Chad and Sudan, Allam-mi acknowledged that
"it was true Chad should not be supporting Sudanese
rebels," but he asked that Chad's minimal support -
practically limited to simple hospitality -- be contrasted
to Sudan's disproportionate actions in favor of Chadian
rebels. Across the border, the Chadian rebels were totally
dependent on Sudan for everything from food to fuel. If
the Government of Sudan "stopped feeding them for 24 hours"
they would be ready to negotiate out of hunger.

NEED FOR EFFECTIVE BORDER MONITORING
--------------

7. (C) One of the biggest problems, according to Allam-mi,
was the lack of effective border monitoring. Although this
was mentioned in all of the accords (Dakar, Riyadh, Sirte),

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it had never been implemented. Libyan/Eritrean monitoring
after the Tripoli Accord had been nothing more than the
stationing of some intelligence officers in Abeche.
Effective border monitoring required a neutral, effective,
international force at the border. The United States could
help drum up support from the AU, from CEN-SAD and from the
CEEAC countries to set up an observer force.


8. (C) As far as rebels, Allam-mi said clearly: "tell them
to live up to their commitments in the Sirte Accord." The
agreements promised them jobs and funding. It allowed
their cadres to return to former positions or be given new
ones. Those who chose to be politically active could
participate in the August 13 follow-up process. Concerning
the possibility of a new government, Allam-mi stated that
it needed to be more than just a dividing up of the pie.
The President needed to be given latitude to choose those
who would govern well, and would set the country on the
path towards elections and rule by democracy rather than
arms. Allam-mi rejected the idea of a new inclusive
roundtable (similar to the national convention held in the
mid-1990's to draft a new constitution). He argued that
questioning the validity of government institutions at this
stage was counterproductive; maybe after the rebels had put
down arms some questions could be raised, but the needed
to respect the current constitution. Healso cautioned
that civil society and the political opposition - by
advocating for an inclusive dialogue - were running the
risk of being squeezed out "as was the case in Cote
D'Ivoire" where those with the arms simply divided up the
pie.


9. (SBU) Regarding "power-sharing," Allam-mi said that this
was unworkable and unnecessary. The rebels should
implement Sirte, then join in the political debate inside
Chad under the August 13 Accord. If they wanted power,
they would have to compete for it in the 2009 and 2011
elections, as foreseen by the August 13 Accord.


PLANES AND VISITS
--------------


10. (SBU) Turning to Chadian charges that the Government of
Sudan was providing Chinese weaponry to the Chadian rebels,
and the U.S request to examine these items first-hand,
Foreign Minister Allam-mi encouraged the Embassy Defense
Attache to work with the Ministry of Defense to view the
items. In closing, the Foreign Minister reminded the
Ambassador that the President still sought a visit to the
United States, and that the request for new C-130's was
still very much on his mind.

COMMENT:
--------------


11. (C) Allam-mi's analysis of dissension within rebel
ranks indicates that the GOC "intra-Chadian diplomacy" has
had some success. But the initiative still lies with the
rebels. They will decide when and where to strike - or not
to strike at all. We think it was useful to have broached
the subject of U.S. messages to the Chadian rebel chiefs:
the GOC now knows how we are trying to help them in this
regard, and can engage us on implementation - if it so
chooses. Embassy subsequently reached out to rebels in
UFDD-F and FRS in synch with demarches made from the
Department.


12. (C) We expect more queries on the C-130's and need
information on where this process lies and the suitability
for Chadian needs (or cheaper alternatives that might be
delivered sooner - such as C-27s.) A visit to the United
States by President Deby provides an opportunity for
impressing upon him the key elements of our Chad policy at
the highest possible levels of our government.

NIGRO