NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000111 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RSA, S/CRS AND PRM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MARR EAID PREF UN EU SU CD SUBJECT: NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR PROGRESS REPORT, REQUESTS U.S. LIAISON OFFICER REF: N'DJAMENA 108 NDJAMENA 00000111 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (U) This is an action message: See para 10. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) New MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo briefed ambassador 3/21 on progress since he arrived two weeks ago, especially signing a Status of Mission Agreement with the GOC, after having successfully for now resisted GOC demands for higher pay and "international status" for Chadian police and gendarmes. MINURCAT is authorized not only 58 police trainers, but also 50 military liaison officers, 102 UN security officers, and up to 145 locally-recruited assistant security officers. Angelo said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to Eastern Chad as soon as possible, despite unresolved logistical and transportation obstacles. Angelo said that he regretted that his mission's mandate was not broader, but that after getting MINURCAT up and running, and overcoming extreme GOC suspicion of its role, he might be able to look at "helping Chad in other ways." ¶3. (SBU) Angelo requested that the USG consider assigning a military liaison officer to MINURCAT, saying that an American MLO would be of considerable utility to MINURCAT's mission. Besides supporting the assignment of military liaison officers, the Department should consider assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an S/CRS officer, which would not only underline U.S. support but also enable the USG to learn from the experience of the unique EU-UN enterprise to protect Darfur refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad. End summary. -------------- NEW SRSG ANGELO -------------- ¶4. (U) Ambassador met March 21 with new Speial Representative of the Secretary General (SRS) for MINURCAT in Eastern Chad, Victor Angelo. It was their second meeting. -------------- STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT SIGNED -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Angelo briefed Ambassador on the progress of MINURCAT since he arrived two weeks ago. Angelo said he had signed the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the GOC that morning, after having resolved problems that had blocked an agreement and avoided concessions to the GOC on pay and "international status" for its police and gendarmes. The mode of payment would be directly to the police officer or gendarme (as UN rules required) not to the GOC (as the GOC had wanted) but in the presence of GOC officials and with their countersignature on the voucher. GOC demands that their police and gendarmes be paid more than UN rules permit and that they have "international status" were rejected. The name of the Chadian force itself -- originally to be called Chadian Police to Protect Humanitarians -- was being changed to respond to GOC objections that it also included gendarmes and to NGO and IO objections to use of the word "humanitarian." The new name would be announced shortly. -------------- MINURCAT'S FORCE STRUCTURE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Angelo said that MINURCAT's eventual maximum force structure was more robust and complex than perhaps some had assumed. He was authorized not only 58 police trainers, but also 50 military liaison officers, 102 UN security officers, and up to 145 locally-recruited assistant security officers. Angelo said he intended to make MINURCAT as robust as possible given its ambitious goals and the difficult circumstances it would work in. -------------- NEXT STEPS -------------- NDJAMENA 00000111 002.2 OF 002 ¶7. (SBU) Angelo said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to Eastern Chad as soon as possible. He would overcome logistical roadblocks - UN lack of alacrity in contracting for logistical services - by sending MINURCAT personnel forward and seek logistical services locally. Lack of sufficient air mobility was also a problem, given the vast amount of geography that MINURCAT would have to cover. Angelo said he was trying to recruit Europeans as military liaison and security officers, to enhance cooperation with EUFOR. -------------- MINURCAT'S MANDATE -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Angelo said that he regretted that his mission's mandate was not broader: He was restricted to MINURCAT and eastern Chad. Angelo agreed with Ambassador's analysis that the international community's attempt to reinforce security in Chad vis-Q-vis external aggression was linked closely to the need to strengthen the Chadian state internally by increasing its legitimacy through an opening of its authoritarian and ethnically-based political system. Angelo said that it was important first to get MINURCAT up and running, and second to overcome extreme GOC suspicion of its role in Chad. Once that were accomplished, he might be able to look at "helping Chad in other ways." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Angelo says he wants results and seems to be getting some pretty impressive ones quickly. MINURCAT should be deploying to its eastern Chad and Northeast CAR operating area soon, following closely on the heels of its EUFOR protecting force (reftel). We like Angelo's idea of one or more U.S. liaison officers for MINURCAT and wonder if, besides supporting the assignment of military liaison officers, the Department would consider assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an S/CRS officer, to such duty. Assigning both civilian and military liaison officers to MINURCAT would not only underline U.S. support for it but enable the USG to learn from the experience of the complex and conjoint EU-UN enterprise to protect Darfur refugees, IDPs, and other stressed Chadian populations in eastern Chad. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶10. (U) That the Department support the assignment of a military liaison officer to MINURCAT and consider assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an S/CRS officer. NIGRO