Somalia -- Country Clearance for Contractors

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 000971

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: OTRA ASEC PREL SO
SUBJECT: Somalia -- Country Clearance for Contractors

REF: A) Draft AF/EX cable 01/31/2007 B) Nairobi 637 C) 2007 Nairobi

1014

Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (U) This is an action request, see para 6.


2. (C) In order to implement more effectively USG assistance programs
designed to support capacity building of the Transition Federal
Institutions (TFIs),Post requests that a new policy be established
that will permit USAID contractors to travel to Somalia without
having to obtain prior country clearance from Washington. Current
country clearance procedures for Somalia, as outlined in a draft
cable provided to Post (Ref A),while created for USG personnel, have
been applied equally to contactors (but not/not grantees) as well as
USG personnel.


3. (C) Because of the inability to obtain consistent country
clearance approval for non-DOD contractors, and the bureaucratic and
administrative burden that repeated requests would involve should
USAID attempt to use contract mechanisms, the practice has been to
funnel all USG assistance for Somalia through grant mechanisms. Of
the approximately 20 grantee partners of all USAID agencies working
in Somalia there are upward of 50 international and AMCIT staff
working in Somalia on any given day implementing over $100 million of
U.S. supported programming. Grants are an effective and primary tool
in the provision of humanitarian assistance, and some types of
development assistance. However, a grant may not always be the best
tool when it comes to some of the more sensitive programs, such as
improving governance, building a democracy, or implementing security
sector reform initiatives.


4. (C) One downside of using grantees - such as the UN - is that they
are subject to relatively little USG direction or control. A
contract, on the other hand, would allow much greater USG direction
and involvement to ensure that implementing partners carry out USG
foreign policy priorities and objectives. Because of the issue of
travel USAID is unable to engage contractors for work in Somalia -
just as USAID would be unable to use grantees if country clearance
was required. Ref B is a case in point. Current procedures,
designed for USG employees, in which travel details, a "threat
assessment" and "security plan" (which presume the involvement of
Diplomatic Security elements) are inappropriate and unnecessary both
for grantees as well as contractors.


5. (C) Although regulations require unequivocally M clearance for USG
employees, there is no formal State or USAID policy or regulation
requiring country clearance for employees of outside institutional
contractors. Informal requests for guidance have generated
conflicting replies, both over time and from within the same office.
The practice in such high-risk conflict zones as Afghanistan or Iraq
has been mixed and there is no standard approach. USAID legal
counsel has indicated that the use of institutional contractors (who,
like grantees, would travel without Washington-granted country
clearance) in high-risk environments does not pose any undue
liability risk to the USG. Such contractors routinely operate in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and elsewhere.


6. (C) USAID grantees, like all international agencies working in
Somalia, have established extensive security guidelines which
restrict their travel to parts of Somalia which are considered safe.
This has worked well, and USAID contractors could easily follow
similar guidelines and procedures. In order to put contactors on a
more equal footing with grantees, and to accomplish USG policies and
priorities in Somalia much more effectively, we seek authorization
from Washington for Nairobi COM to grant approval for contractor
travel. We would keep Washington appraised of all such travel.

RANNEBERGER