Somalia Prime Minister and President at Odds

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000878 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SO ET SUBJECT: Somalia Prime Minister and President at Odds Classified by Special Envoy John Yates for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein confided in SE Yates that he believes President Yusuf is organizing to have him removed from office. He asked for our support and advice on how to handle what he termed as "increasingly aggressive attacks" against him. SE Yates confirmed our unequivocal support for the initiatives he had taken and suggested closer coordination and communication between the offices of the presidency and prime minister. Yates and the Ambassador later called Yusuf to voice our support for the PM and reconciliation, and urge united government. USG support for reconciliation, peace, and security in Somalia were subsequently reinforced by the Ambassador using local Somali media. End Summary. -------------- Prime Minister Besieged -------------- ¶2. (C) Special Envoy met with PM Hussein March 28-29 in three separate pull-asides on the margins of UNSRSG Amadou Ould-Abdallah's economic conference on Somalia. The PM was tired and despondent with what he termed very aggressive attacks on his efforts at reconciliation. He felt confident he was making real progress on reconciliation. The Bakara market agreement that was negotiated in great detail with the local business community was viewed as a model that could be applied to other districts within Mogadishu. However, Hussein said the spoilers see his efforts at reconciliation as a threat; indeed, "the vision itself" is a threat. The spoilers, he said, are the warlords, led by the President, and they are organizing to eliminate him politically. ¶3. (C) Hussein told us the President was meeting with Members of Parliament to convince them to pass a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and his government. According to Hussein, the President's message is simple: the PM is becoming a difficult and dangerous element, who is proceeding with his own plan, which is a danger to the Parliament and the President. The Prime Minister said the President's plan is first to move against him and then to orchestrate the removal of the Speaker of Parliament. Subsequently we learned from some MPs that the President had organized a lunch at his residence in Mogadishu for approximately 40 MPs, and he was meeting separately with smaller groups and individual MPs. Contrary to what the PM told us, we heard separately that his message to the MPs was more nuanced: use the constitution to protect your interests, you are not getting paid, and you don't know what the PM and his government is doing with the money they have. ¶4. (C) According to the PM, the President's primary complaint is that the PM has not consulted with him on a variety of issues: his travel, his meetings and outreach with opposition elements, and his efforts at reconciliation. The PM relayed point-by-point his various consultations and discussions with the President on the issues of concern. For example, the PM said he consulted the President on the question of meeting with Sheikh Sharif and Sharif Hassan, respectively the Executive Committee Chairman and Central Committee Chairman of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS),and the President agreed that he could meet with them secretly, but not openly. Yet, claimed Hussein, since March 27 the President has been telling MPs and others that the Prime Minister is meeting with the opposition without his knowledge. "He is organizing against me," said Hussein. (Comment: In fact, PM Hussein did not/not meet with any ARS personalities before he departed Nairobi for Saudi Arabia, nor did he even contemplate doing so according to several knowledgeable sources. The TFG reconciliation plan prescribes naming of a committee to meet with opposition groups but that committee has not yet been named. End Comment) ¶5. (C) Hussein told us the President has now seen that the Prime Minister's approach to reconciliation will lead to peace in Mogadishu, "but he does not want peace." He claimed the President wants Mogadishu to remain in a state of chaos so that he can convince the U.S. and the Europeans that the Hawiye do not want peace. The President allegedly NAIROBI 00000878 002 OF 002 told his security commanders that the Bakara market agreement is null and void, and that is what sparked the looting by security forces and the counter attacks. (Comment: The Bakara market agreement, whereby the Bakara traders and business association pledged to self-police in order to prohibit either the Shabaab or Islamic Court militia to use Bakara as a base in exchange for peace and security, was a key result of the PM's efforts to improve security in Mogadishu. If successful, it was to be a model for the rest of Mogadishu. End Comment). ¶6. (C) The PM and Mohamed Ali Nur "Americo," the Ambassador of Somalia to Kenya, told SE Yates they had been unable over 24 hours to reach the President. Americo said each time he called he was told the President was in a meeting, sleeping, or eating. The PM said he was given similar excuses. Allegedly the President met with Mohamed Dheere (Hawiye/Abgal/Warsangeli) and other Abgal leaders recently when the PM was out of town and told them the PM's reconciliation efforts were useless and they needed to prepare to fight. The PM claimed the President's health situation renders him vulnerable and unable to make decisions freely, such that "he is not in a position to say no to spoilers." Hussein claimed during a conversation the President will veer off subject, or digress on a long and irrelevant rumination, evidence enough for Hussein that he is losing his grasp on the situation. But, said Hussein, if you tell him "this is your enemy, he will understand." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Bewildered, the PM said he would keep trying to pursue reconciliation and do what he knew to be right, but in the meantime this relationship with Yusuf was broken. More than once Hussein said, "I don't know what is happening." SE Yates assured the PM of our unequivocal support for him on his reconciliation efforts, and advised that all effort be directed toward increasing communication with the President, who also told us he was on board although his actions belie that. Toward that end, SE Yates joined a meeting March 29 between Presidential Staffer Adam Abdirizak and the PM and Americo. Yates reiterated U.S. support for the PM, and for President Yusuf and his reconciliation efforts, and urged both sides to coordinate more closely and avoid misunderstandings. Abdirizak opined that the differences between the two sides were more of style than substance, and caused in part by incomplete or inaccurate information. SE Yates and the Ambassador later on March 28 called President Yusuf to urge support for reconciliation and the PM. Yusuf was abrupt and non-committal, but understood our message on the need for a unified government both to combat extremism and terrorism, as well as to promote peace and reconciliation. On March 29 the Ambassador reinforced these private messages through interviews with local Somali media. RANNEBERGER