Somalia -- Conversation with TFG President Yusuf

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000734 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SO SUBJECT: Somalia -- Conversation with TFG President Yusuf REF: A) Yates-A/S Frazer email 03/12/2008 B) Nairobi 733 C) Nairobi 726 Classified by Special Envoy John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) Summary: President Yusuf confirmed that he had endorsed the draft TFG Reconciliation Strategy prepared by the Prime Minister and Cabinet during meeting with Special Envoy March 10. He asked again for our support to assist the TFG to accomplish the tasks stipulated in the Transitional Federal Charter within the specified time frame. Yusuf was transiting through Nairobi en route to the Dakar OIC Summit where he hoped to secure more support for the TFG. He accepted our request that Somalia not be represented at the Chief of State or Government level at the upcoming Arab League Summit in Damascus. Yusuf appeared to be physically quite well and mentally acute. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf met with Special Envoy briefly March 10 evening during his overnight transit from Mogadishu to Dakar to attend the OIC Summit. Yusuf, who was traveling with the First Lady and only a couple of staffers, looked to be as strong physically as he had before his December and January medical consultations/treatment in London. He was feisty, declared himself to be in good health, and appeared in full possession of his mental acuities. ¶3. (C) After a brief discussion of the security situation in Mogadishu and recent bloody encounters around Villa Somalia (where he lost several men) and Bakara market (where forces retaliated brutally in the name of the TFG),Yusuf volunteered that he had endorsed the cabinet-approved reconciliation document which he said he had read before departing Mogadishu. He said that the Prime Minister would be sharing it with the U.S. (Ref A and B) and Ethiopia "because we need your advice" as well as with SRSG Ould-Abdallah, whom he identified as "our diplomat" in whose leadership he had full confidence. (COMMENT: We subsequently received the draft reconciliation paper, which has now been issued. END COMMENT). Special Envoy welcomed the meeting of minds between the President and PM on reconciliation and urged Yusuf's continued support for the process. Yusuf acknowledged that a public position of openness to all Somalis who wanted to be part of the process was the preferred one even though he was convinced that extremists would not join the process and "personally I do not want them to come." On the other hand, he thought there was a good chance to attract back the former MPs and other politicians who had joined the Asmara group. ¶4. (C) Yusuf then began to enumerate the many actions stipulated by the Transitional Federal Charter that had to be completed by 2009. Noting that three months had already passed since he named Nur Hassan Hussein as Prime Minister, in a wry twist he urged us to assure the PM followed the program. Special Envoy again reaffirmed USG confidence in the Prime Minister, who with the support of President Yusuf, was making commendable efforts to fulfill his responsibilities. SE Yates praised the recent solidarity between the two leaders especially in regard to the reconciliation initiative ¶5. (C) The TFG President said he would be looking for "support" (unspecified but presumably financial as well as political) at the OIC Summit, then segued to the fact that Colonel Ghadafi had requested Yusuf meet with him and Museveni in Kampala following the Dakar meeting. It was unclear if that meeting would take place. SE used the opening to carry out instructions requesting Somalia and other states not be represented at the Damascus Arab League Summit. Yusuf said that he had planned for the Prime Minister to go to Damascus but given our demarche he would issue instructions that Somalia be represented instead by the Foreign Minister (Ref C). ¶6. (C) While on the subject of travel, Yusuf reiterated that he had been outside Somalia for medical reasons recently but now he really needed to spend most of his time at home tending to business. Thus, although he had discussed informally with us and SRSG Ould-Abdallah about traveling to Washington and New York in conjunction with UNSC consultations on Somalia later in March, he would rather schedule such a visit only after a couple of months; for example, in May if there was another occasion in New York with the Security Council and he could schedule meaningful discussions in Washington. Special Envoy and Yusuf's staff agreed to remain in touch about future possibilities and scheduling. ¶7. (S/NF) During a brief tete-a-tete after withdrawal of other participants from both sides, Special Envoy expressed appreciation for Yusuf's public support on fighting terrorism in the wake of the Dhoble action a week earlier. Yusuf exclaimed with unhesitating positive conviction that known terrorists such as Aden Ayrow and Mukhtar Robow had to be captured or killed. ¶8. (S) COMMENT: Although we have spoken with President Yusuf numerous times by telephone, this was our first meeting in person NAIROBI 00000734 002 OF 002 since November 2007. To the non-medically-trained eye, he looked and acted remarkably similarly to previous meetings before his most recent medical crises. And while his words were fully supportive of Prime Minister Hussein's initiatives, his body language on the issue of reconciliation belied any enthusiasm. Clearly recent security setbacks with higher casualties among his closest forces stir in him the attitudes and actions of many years in military uniform. Under pressure from the international community, particularly the UN SRSG, the U.S. and Ethiopia, he will accord the Prime Minister and Cabinet some space to pursue their vision of reconciliation. However, a lack of progress on the security front--whether setbacks inflicted by al-Shabaab or continued disintegration of "TFG" forces--would test his patience rather rapidly. END COMENT RANNEBERGER