Somalia -- TFG Divided at the Top

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000566 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL SO SUBJECT: Somalia -- TFG Divided at the Top Classified by Special Envoy John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b,d) REF: A) Nairobi 252 B) Yates/Frazer emails 02/26/2008 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Differences between President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein threaten to halt the recent progress made by Somalia's Transitional Federal Government. The primary issue is how to pursue the process of reconciliation while at the same time addressing the threats by armed groups. While President Yusuf is said to favor the use of military force to quell the violence, Hussein has advocated for restraint and dialogue. The hard-liners in Yusuf's inner circle argue that incursions into the presidential palace and insurgents taking the town of Dinsoor demonstrate that security must be the highest priority. Neither will engage with terrorists, but they have very different ideas about who is a "terrorist." Yusuf's definition seems to be quite expansive, including what many would simply consider opponents, while Hussein believes such a label would only apply to a very small group of extremists. While some have intervened to help bridge the gap, the schism between Somalia's two leaders threatens to undermine recent progress and could eventually rupture the Transitional Federal Government. End Summary. -------------- How to Reconcile? -------------- ¶2. (C) Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Hassan Hussein are sharply divided in their ideas on reconciliation and their approach to dealing with armed groups. At issue are deep differences about how to proceed with the reconciliation process. The division has the potential for a disastrous rupture of the TFG including the resignation or dismissal of the Prime Minister. In a February 25 conversation with the Special Envoy, Yusuf characterized the differences in the following manner: The PM is willing to negotiate with al-Qaeda whereas he did not agree to negotiate with "criminals and the Shabaab"; the PM was willing to negotiate now whereas Yusuf said they had to stop the fighting first and recognize the legitimacy of the TFG and the Charter; and, PM was not willing to elaborate a plan in order to obtain Cabinet [or maybe Parliamentary] approval before proceeding with reconciliation. ¶3. (C) When they speak privately on the issue of reconciliation, both Yusuf and Hussein use virtually the same words -- they are willing to talk to anyone not on international terrorist list and who renounces violence. Yet Hussein has publicly stated he is willing to engage in dialogue with all Somalis (Comment: To our knowledge, Hussein has never met or talked directly with any person in the more extremist armed groups. Hussein has made indirect contact with opposition groups like the Association for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS),most recently sending his Deputy Prime Minister to Djibouti to engage in talks. There is no evidence of dialogue with al-Shabaab or any of the more extreme elements of the insurgency. Indeed, we view Hussein as doing what many in the international community in Nairobi have long advocated - to avoid false roadblocks say publicly you are open to dialogue with everybody because the Shabaab and other real extremists will self-select out anyway, and thereby marginalize themselves. End Comment). ¶4. (C) Since moving his cabinet to Mogadishu Prime Minister Hussein has enjoyed high marks for his initial engagement with communities in the capital (Ref A). While Yusuf was in London, Hussein made notable progress bringing together actors in south central Somalia and other "hot spots" who had been engaged in violent opposition to one another. While in London, all indications were that Yusuf was in support of the Prime Minister's activities, yet Hussein confirmed to the Special Envoy on February 25 that when he returned the "President was angry." Yusuf's February 16 return to Mogadishu also signaled the return of the hard-liners who advocate for security first. President Yusuf is once again supporting a heavy-handed approach to dealing with security which is undermining the Prime Minister's efforts at reconciliation. -------------- Security Trumps Reconciliation -------------- ¶5. (C) Recent armed insurgency attacks have strengthened the position of those in Yusuf's inner circle who advocate the use of military force. The February 18 attack on Villa Somalia resulted in several deaths and injuries among Yusuf's personal militia. After heavy mortar barrages, the armed insurgents actually penetrated the defenses of Villa Somalia. In response, on February 19, fierce fighting broke out when TFG forces made an incursion into the Bakara market junction. The Prime Minister told SE Yates that at the same time he was meeting with business leaders, Mohamed Dheere's militia was looting stores and carrying out retribution for the attack on NAIROBI 00000566 002 OF 002 Villa Somalia. Reports indicate that Dheere's forces withdrew after Hussein appealed to Yusuf to recall the militia. ¶6. (C) On February 24, Mukhtar Robow launched a well-coordinated attack with well-armed fighters to "liberate" Dinsoor. The attackers occupied Dinsoor town (approximately one hundred kilometers from Baidoa where the Transitional Federal Institutions are based) for the better part of the day before retreating. The TFG forces were said to have been taken by surprise and surrendered or fled without many casualties. This incident, as well as the incursion into Villa Somalia, is being used against the Prime Minister as evidence that security has to trump "reconciliation." The PM's detractors claim his efforts have weakened the TFG resistance or at least the will to fight. Notable among these advisors who have Yusuf's ear is Canadian "Adam" Abdirizak, who told SE Yates that Hussein's outreach efforts have provided a "Trojan horse" to terrorists. -------------- Planned Intervention -------------- ¶7. (C) On February 23, Speaker of Parliament Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur "Adan Madobe" arrived in Mogadishu from Baidoa to help mediate between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Hussein. Sources close to the Speaker told us that the three leaders met the night of February 24 until 2:00 a.m. the morning of February 25. They reportedly met again later in the day on February 25. We understand Mesfin Seyoum, the Foreign Minister of Ethiopian, is planning to arrive in Baidoa February 27 to spend at least a day, if not two or three, to address the rift between Yusuf and Hussein (Ref B) as well as other bilateral Ethiopia-Somalia issues. Tekeda Alemu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, told SE Yates on February 26 that Ethiopia is fully supportive of the Prime Minister's efforts. Along with Ethiopia and the UNSRSG, we are actively engaged with Yusuf and the Prime Minister to bridge the divide. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) News about the discord between Yusuf and the Prime Minister is fast becoming a subject of public speculation. While they differ in approach, neither side of the divide is in favor of a rupture. SE Yates emphasized to Yusuf the importance of the TFG maintaining a unified approach on reconciliation and security. Prime Minister Hussein is making good efforts at outreach and may have been making reasonable progress. As evidence we cite Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Abdisalam's comment that for the first time the TFG is posturing (and view's) itself as the servant of the people rather than the oppressor of the people - an all too rare ray of hope in this now three year-old transition. The Prime Minister told the Special Envoy that he has already offered his resignation but is actively working to reach common ground with Yusuf's suite. We also believe that he has been exceedingly responsive to his President's sensitivities and tried to take measured efforts to avoid any rift without totally compromising his own beliefs. A collapse of the Hussein government would almost certainly deal a fatal blow to the transition process. End Comment. RANNEBERGER