KENYA TALKS - KEY ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000545 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR S, D, P, G, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PDEM KE SUBJECT: KENYA TALKS - KEY ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED REF: A. NAIROBI 515 ¶B. NAIROBI 486 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Although both sides agreed to creation of a prime minister position following the Secretary's February 18 visit, the talks have bogged down over the authority the PM will be given and over related issues, including formation of a cabinet. Gordon Brown spoke with Kibaki February 23 to push for progress. Annan met separately with Kibaki and Odinga on the 25th and may seek a joint meeting on the 27th if there is no movement in the talks. There has been widespread positive coverage of the Secretary's visit, which highlights the importance Kenyans attach to the U.S. role in helping to resolve the crisis. End summary. ¶2. (C) As reported in ref A, the Secretary's February 18 visit helped move the negotiations forward. Following her visit both sides agreed on the creation of a position of prime minister. However, the talks have since bogged down over the issue of the extent of the authority the prime minister will have. While Odinga and his team accept that the prime minister will not have full executive authority, they insist that the position must have real responsibility. They want the prime minister's portfolio to include supervising government ministers and leading government business in Parliament. The government side maintains that the vice president must continue to be the leader of government business and that the prime minister's authority should extend only to coordination of government ministers. Another key issue is whether Kibaki will have the authority to fire the PM, or whether only a vote of no confidence in Parliament can achieve that. ¶3. (C) There are several related issues. One is how government ministries will be apportioned. Odinga insists that there must be at least close to 50/50 sharing of ministries, with Odinga naming his ministers (once the two sides have agreed about which ministries they will get). Kibaki seeks to retain the sole power to appoint and fire ministers. In the negotiations Karua has refused to agree to a specific number of ministers for Odinga's ODM. A second issue is whether dissolution of the Kibaki-Odinga coalition would result in the holding of new elections. Yet a third is how the position of prime minister and agreement to form a coalition will be encapsulated within the bounds of the law and constitution. ¶4. (C) The media has carried the leaked text of an older draft "act on temporary regulation of the cabinet" that reflects the state of negotiations last week, according to Annan's staff. The act, while establishing the position of prime minister, is heavily caveated regarding the points discussed above. ¶5. (C) Frustration at what the ODM team interprets as government foot-dragging in the negotiations led some ODM members to threaten return to mass action by February 27 if there has been no deal. Odinga, however, has not agreed to this and is working to control his supporters. ¶6. (SBU) Although Karua has publicly warned of misleading reports of progress on some issues which have not yet been resolved, President Kibaki issued a positive statement on the 23rd. The statement read in part that the President has encouraged his team to resolve outstanding issues, "taking into account the broader national interests and also ensuring that the solutions they arrive at will withstand the test of time and enhance national cohesion, stability, and prosperity." ¶7. (SBU) Meanwhile, Odinga's sudden February 22-24 trip to Nigeria at a time when the talks are at such a sensitive stage raised eyebrows and speculation. On the 25th he made a questionable one-day visit to Eldoret to be present at the court arraignment of an ODM supporter who is widely perceived as having been involved in violence. ¶8. (C) The British High Commissioner told me that Gordon Brown talked with Kibaki on February 23. Brown emphasized the need to reach a deal quickly. He laid out the incentives of the increased support that will come from the UK and NAIROBI 00000545 002 OF 002 others if a deal is reached, but also the implications should the talks not succeed. ¶9. (C) Civil society organizations continue to make their influence felt in high profile calls for the two sides to strike a deal. There are indications of similar sentiment developing in Parliament on both sides. A number of pro-government and ODM Members of Parliament held an off-site this past weekend to develop ideas to help move the government-ODM talks forward. On a more ominous note, we continue to receive reports that individuals on both sides are involved in arming supporters in anticipation of bloodshed should the talks not succeed (septel). ¶10. (C) The Secretary's February 18 visit continues to be the subject of extensive follow-up media coverage and commentary. Comments such as "it wasn't business as usual" when the Secretary visited, "the U.S. must undo the Gordian Knot," and the Secretary "stuns all by her professionalism" reflect the importance the media attached to the visit. The direct U.S. involvement in support of Annan and the eminent persons was welcomed with a sigh of relief by most Kenyans, many of whom continue to doubt the capacity and willingness of their leaders to put the nation above their personal interests. We are continuing to make clear the importance the U.S. attaches at the highest levels to resolution of the Kenyan crisis along the lines laid out by the Secretary. ¶11. (C) In an effort to push the two sides to resolve the remaining issues, particularly regarding parameters for the PM position, Annan consulted late on February 25 directly and separately with Kibaki and Odinga. If this does not result in progress, Annan may seek another joint Kibaki-Odinga meeting on February 27. Additional pressure from us and others may be needed in the coming days to help Annan and the parties bring the process to closure. Tensions remain high and if the talks drag on it will be hard for Annan to maintain his positive public posture that progress continues to be made. RANNEBERGER