KENYA TALKS - KEY ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S, D, P, G, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PDEM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA TALKS - KEY ISSUES STILL UNRESOLVED

REF: A. NAIROBI 515


B. NAIROBI 486 AND PREVIOUS


1. (SBU) Summary. Although both sides agreed to creation of
a prime minister position following the Secretary's February
18 visit, the talks have bogged down over the authority the
PM will be given and over related issues, including formation
of a cabinet. Gordon Brown spoke with Kibaki February 23 to
push for progress. Annan met separately with Kibaki and
Odinga on the 25th and may seek a joint meeting on the 27th
if there is no movement in the talks. There has been
widespread positive coverage of the Secretary's visit, which
highlights the importance Kenyans attach to the U.S. role in
helping to resolve the crisis. End summary.


2. (C) As reported in ref A, the Secretary's February 18
visit helped move the negotiations forward. Following her
visit both sides agreed on the creation of a position of
prime minister. However, the talks have since bogged down
over the issue of the extent of the authority the prime
minister will have. While Odinga and his team accept that
the prime minister will not have full executive authority,
they insist that the position must have real responsibility.
They want the prime minister's portfolio to include
supervising government ministers and leading government
business in Parliament. The government side maintains that
the vice president must continue to be the leader of
government business and that the prime minister's authority
should extend only to coordination of government ministers.
Another key issue is whether Kibaki will have the authority
to fire the PM, or whether only a vote of no confidence in
Parliament can achieve that.


3. (C) There are several related issues. One is how
government ministries will be apportioned. Odinga insists
that there must be at least close to 50/50 sharing of
ministries, with Odinga naming his ministers (once the two
sides have agreed about which ministries they will get).
Kibaki seeks to retain the sole power to appoint and fire
ministers. In the negotiations Karua has refused to agree to
a specific number of ministers for Odinga's ODM. A second
issue is whether dissolution of the Kibaki-Odinga coalition
would result in the holding of new elections. Yet a third is
how the position of prime minister and agreement to form a
coalition will be encapsulated within the bounds of the law
and constitution.


4. (C) The media has carried the leaked text of an older
draft "act on temporary regulation of the cabinet" that
reflects the state of negotiations last week, according to
Annan's staff. The act, while establishing the position of
prime minister, is heavily caveated regarding the points
discussed above.


5. (C) Frustration at what the ODM team interprets as
government foot-dragging in the negotiations led some ODM
members to threaten return to mass action by February 27 if
there has been no deal. Odinga, however, has not agreed to
this and is working to control his supporters.


6. (SBU) Although Karua has publicly warned of misleading
reports of progress on some issues which have not yet been
resolved, President Kibaki issued a positive statement on the
23rd. The statement read in part that the President has
encouraged his team to resolve outstanding issues, "taking
into account the broader national interests and also ensuring
that the solutions they arrive at will withstand the test of
time and enhance national cohesion, stability, and
prosperity."


7. (SBU) Meanwhile, Odinga's sudden February 22-24 trip to
Nigeria at a time when the talks are at such a sensitive
stage raised eyebrows and speculation. On the 25th he made a
questionable one-day visit to Eldoret to be present at the
court arraignment of an ODM supporter who is widely perceived
as having been involved in violence.


8. (C) The British High Commissioner told me that Gordon
Brown talked with Kibaki on February 23. Brown emphasized
the need to reach a deal quickly. He laid out the incentives
of the increased support that will come from the UK and

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others if a deal is reached, but also the implications should
the talks not succeed.


9. (C) Civil society organizations continue to make their
influence felt in high profile calls for the two sides to
strike a deal. There are indications of similar sentiment
developing in Parliament on both sides. A number of
pro-government and ODM Members of Parliament held an off-site
this past weekend to develop ideas to help move the
government-ODM talks forward. On a more ominous note, we
continue to receive reports that individuals on both sides
are involved in arming supporters in anticipation of
bloodshed should the talks not succeed (septel).


10. (C) The Secretary's February 18 visit continues to be
the subject of extensive follow-up media coverage and
commentary. Comments such as "it wasn't business as usual"
when the Secretary visited, "the U.S. must undo the Gordian
Knot," and the Secretary "stuns all by her professionalism"
reflect the importance the media attached to the visit. The
direct U.S. involvement in support of Annan and the eminent
persons was welcomed with a sigh of relief by most Kenyans,
many of whom continue to doubt the capacity and willingness
of their leaders to put the nation above their personal
interests. We are continuing to make clear the importance
the U.S. attaches at the highest levels to resolution of the
Kenyan crisis along the lines laid out by the Secretary.


11. (C) In an effort to push the two sides to resolve the
remaining issues, particularly regarding parameters for the
PM position, Annan consulted late on February 25 directly and
separately with Kibaki and Odinga. If this does not result
in progress, Annan may seek another joint Kibaki-Odinga
meeting on February 27. Additional pressure from us and
others may be needed in the coming days to help Annan and the
parties bring the process to closure. Tensions remain high
and if the talks drag on it will be hard for Annan to
maintain his positive public posture that progress continues
to be made.


RANNEBERGER