Somalia - Revised Travel Request

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000544 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR M, ACTING A/S STARR, AND A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 TAGS: OTRA PREL ASEC PTER MOPS ET SO SUBJECT: Somalia - Revised Travel Request REF: Nairobi 473 Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (U) This is a revised version of reftel with additional personnel, new dates, more detailed travel information, and a revised and expanded security plan. Per DOD requirements, proposed travelers are concurrently seeking Special Area and Theater clearances. See paras 2 and 24 for action request. ¶2. (C) Embassy Nairobi requests Department approval for Bradley G. Anderson, Colonel, Defense Attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Lisa R. Schade, Lieutenant Colonel, Marine Corps Attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office Nairobi, Kenya; Steven Chang, Major, U.S. Analyst, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Steve Washington, Sergeant Major, Communication Specialist, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and John England, Master Sergeant, Medic, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to visit Mogadishu, Somalia from March 18 to 21 March 2008. At the invitation of the African Union, COL Anderson and group will be traveling with the Addis Ababa-based British, Swedish, Dutch, French, possibly German Defense Attaches and Colonel George Amamoo, Chief of Military Planning, African Union, to visit the security forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu. Additionally they will call on the Somali political leaders, visit the Port, and possibly meet with the commanders of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). ¶3. (C) Ambassadors Ranneberger and Yamamoto strongly support this proposed travel. -------------- Travel Details -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) COL Anderson and group will depart from Nairobi for Mogadishu along with the delegation on March 18 on a regularly scheduled Daallo Airlines flight. The delegation will arrive 1000 at Mogadishu's International Airport and will be met planeside by AMISOM/Ugandan security forces with wheeled armored vehicles and armed escort. On arrival the delegation will travel to the AMISOM/Ugandan headquarters located at the airport for meetings with AMISOM/Ugandan and Burundian staff. The delegation will return to the airport and rest overnight in accommodations provided by Ugandan forces in their billeting there. ¶5. (S/NF) On March 19, the delegation will travel with wheeled armored vehicles and armed escort to KM-4, to review the AMISOM/Ugandan forces there and then travel to the Mogadishu port for meetings with TFG staff and AMISOM security personnel located there and finally to the Villa Somalia (presidential offices) for meetings with Transitional Federal Government (TFG) staff and AMISOM security personnel located there. The delegation will rest overnight at the airport in accommodation provided by Ugandan forces. ¶6. (S/NF) On March 20, the delegation will travel with wheeled armored vehicles and armed escort to Mogadishu University to meet the AMISOM/Burundian contingent there and then possibly to ENDF headquarters for meetings with Ethiopian military staff and security personnel. Afterward the delegation will return to the airport and rest overnight in accommodations provided by Ugandan forces. ¶7. (S/NF) On March 21, the delegation will remain at Mogadishu Airport and tour the UNDP weapons, ammunition, and UXO storage and disposal facility. The group will depart Mogadishu International Airport on the regularly scheduled African Express commercial flight at 1430, March 21 and return to JKIA, Nairobi, Kenya at 1630. COL Anderson and the other members of USDAO Addis will rest overnight in Nairobi on March 21 and depart Nairobi for Addis Ababa on March 22. -------------- Threat Assessment -------------- ¶8. (S//NF) Embassy Nairobi RSO: Numerous credible intelligence reports clearly indicate that the East Africa al-Qa'ida and affiliated Somali extremists remain operationally active in Mogadishu. These elements have frequently used suicide bombings, well planned ambushes and roadside improvised explosive devices in attacks against ENDF, AMISOM forces and TFG leaders. Members of the Jihadi militant group, al-Shabaab, are actively engaged in conducting myriad attacks inside Mogadishu, to include targeted assassinations of high profile individuals. The Addis Ababa DATT and Nairobi Marine Corps Attache would present extremely High Value Targets for the East Africa al-Qa'ida and affiliated Somali extremists. Given the opportunity, these entities would expend considerable effort and resources to conduct attacks against any visiting USG personnel despite the promise of protection by the ENDF. NAIROBI 00000544 002 OF 003 ¶9. (S/NF) The TFG, AMISOM, and the ENDF cannot be expected to provide sufficient protection and appropriate security for this visit as evidenced by the constant attacks they themselves endure in Mogadishu, which are unpredictable, uncounterable and continue unabated. Furthermore, any aircraft arriving and departing from Mogadishu is vulnerable to attack by MANPADS, and/or mortars when landing and taking off as has happened in the past, and there is no viable method of deterring these types of threats. Based upon all currently available information from relevant security and intelligence sources, both within and outside of the U.S. Mission and USG, RSO is of the opinion that the dangerous, volatile and uncertain security situation in Mogadishu does not support the visit of USG personnel at this time. -------------- Security Plan: Air Transportation -------------- ¶10. (S//NF) Air Transportation for the group will be provided by regularly scheduled commercial airlines or contract air provided by the African Union. Commercial air is desirable as it lowers the profile for the trip and there has been no threat to commercial aviation in recent history. However, contract air will allow the aircraft to remain on the ground and allow the Attaches to depart earlier than scheduled if required. Regardless of the origin of the plane, the AMISOM forces are prepared to provide security for the aircraft while it remains on the ground. ¶11. (S//NF) Aviation safety, especially during take-off and landing, is a concern of all flight operations in this region of the world. Both the commercial and contract air crew are experienced in conducting flight operations at this airport and is aware of the dangers during take-off and landing due to runway conditions and the possible ground fire from small arms and crew served weapons. ¶12. (S//NF) The use of man portable anti-aircraft weapons (ManPads) are known to be used in and around Mogadishu. Accordingly, to minimize the threat, the aircraft will be instructed to approach the airport over the water from the south, bank hard to port descending rapidly to minimize the amount of time over the city and land. On departure, the plane will take off toward the south and bank quickly to port, ascending rapidly over the water. No aircraft have been shot down using these maneuvers. Although one Dyncorp plane following these procedures may have been hit by unidentified ground fire in early 2007, it was able to land safely. -------------- Security Plan: Ground Transportation -------------- ¶13. (S//NF) Ground transportation will be provided by AMISOM/Ugandan security officials. Immediately upon arrival at the Mogadishu International Airport, the Defense Attaches will be met on the tarmac by wheeled armored vehicles and armed Ugandan escort. All transportation will be accomplished with these vehicles and security forces. ¶14. (S//NF) The first day all meetings will take place at the airport. The next three days will require travel to Villa Somalia, Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) headquarters, Mogadishu University, and the Port of Mogadishu. The times and routes of travel will be kept secret. TFG security forces will be made aware of travel only after the AMISOM/Ugandan convoy is actually moving to minimize the possibility of compromise. Ahead of each planned movement, AMISOM/Ugandan forces will clear and secure several different routes to different locations. -------------- Security Plan: Other Logistics -------------- ¶15. (S//NF) RON: The Attaches will overnight all three nights in the AMISOM/Ugandan billeting at Mogadishu airport. The Ugandans have taken several measures to ensure their security at the Airport; including the construction of berms, sandbags, concertina wire, hardened shelters, security perimeter, armed guards patrols, etc. The Ugandan force will provide an extra security perimeter inside their regular security force specifically for the visiting Attachs. ¶16. (S//NF) PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT: The U.S. Attaches will be unarmed but each member of the team will have body armor (soft armor and hard plates) and Kevlar helmets. Coordination is being conducted to provide each U.S. Attache with a Blue Force Tracker and appropriate emergency signaling devices. ¶17. (S//NF) COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: The primary means of communications will be with the AN/PRC-117F satellite radio. The US NAIROBI 00000544 003 OF 003 Attaches will be in frequent contact with the command center located at Embassy Nairobi. This is actually the interagency command net, and it will be monitored by the interagency. Assistance from the interagency Quick Reaction Force (QRF),CSAR and Personnel Recovery elements will be requested by the Attaches to CJTF-HOA PRCC (and monitored by the interagency). Each team member will be equipped with a cell phone that provides cell phone coverage for the region (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya). Additionally, the team will carry two Blue Force Trackers (BFTs) that will be constantly tracked by the interagency on the JBV. The JBV will be monitored in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and the interagency. Coordination is being conducted with NSA, requesting them to provide Force Protection Box vicinity Mogadishu, which allow for an additional security measure. ¶18. (S//NF) MEDICAL: The U.S. Marine Attache from Nairobi is a physician assistant, trained in orthopedic trauma and surgery. She will be equipped with emergency medical care equipment, and capable of stabilizing any injured or wounded team member until they can be medevaced to the AMISOM/Ugandan field medical hospital located at Mogadishu Airport. Additional medical support will be provided by the AMISOM/Uganda medical doctors. In addition, each team member will carry a personal medical kit equipped for self aid and buddy aid. ¶19. (S//NF) MEALS/WATER: Meals and water will be provided by AMISOM/Uganda officials. However, all Attaches will carry water bottles and two MREs in their individual backpacks and an additional two (2) gallons per person will be stored on the aircraft. Additional cases of water and MREs will be placed on the aircraft in the event of an emergency or extended stay on the ground by the team. ¶20. (S//NF) SAFEHAVEN: The Attaches will use AMISOM/Uganda at the airport and AMISOM/Burundi at Mogadishu University as safehavens. However, in the event neither location is tenable, presently the team does not have a dedicated safehaven identified. The team is coordinating contact information with the United Nations, ENDF and AMISOM officials in Mogadishu for this purpose. In the event of an emergency and until a Western-owned house, office, or compound can be identified for use as an emergency safehaven, coordination is being conducted with the United Nations Development Program to use their compound for this purpose with AIMSOM/Uganda security forces and internal team security procedures to protect the team. ¶21. (S//NF) EVACUATION/PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR): An evacuation and recovery plan is being coordinated between the team and members of the interagency at Embassy Nairobi. In the event of a mechanical failure, act of violence or accident, the AU representative will request an emergency extraction aircraft to fly to Mogadishu to recover the air crew and team. As a back-up, the US Attaches will coordinate for the contracting of a stand-by emergency self-extraction charter aircraft to fly to Mogadishu to extract the team and air crew. In the event of severe weather conditions, the team and air crew will be prepared to remain overnight at the AMISOM/Uganda billeting in Mogadishu Airport for additional nights. In the event of a mechanical failure, the same procedure will be followed and the team will wait for the arrival of the interagency's emergency extraction aircraft or the team's contract aircraft. In either case, the team will provide an internal security force at the airport billeting and request the local security official to provide security for the compound. ¶22. (S//NF) In the event that the Attaches cannot be extracted by air, coordination is being conducted to utilize the RHIB boats provided to the AMISOM/Ugandan forces for port security. The Attaches would embark on the RHIB and rendezvous with coalition ships currently on station in the area ¶23. (S//NF) Finally, coordination is being conducted to develop an emergency evacuation plan with Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. As a last resort, the JFT-HOA Quick Reaction Force (QRF) could conduct an emergency extraction operation of the advance team and air crew using HC-130 aircraft/MH-53 helicopters. The request for this extraction would be made by the team to the CJTF-HOA JOC and through the interagency command net. -------------- Action Request -------------- ¶24. (C) Action Request: Embassy Nairobi requests M approval of this proposed travel to Somalia as soon as possible. Once approved, the final travel itinerary will be forwarded to AF and DS. RANNEBERGER