KENYA'S ELECTORAL CRISIS: NEARING THE CRUNCH POINT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000419 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR S, D, P, G, R, DS, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018 TAGS: PREL KE SUBJECT: KENYA'S ELECTORAL CRISIS: NEARING THE CRUNCH POINT REF: (A) NAIROBI 380 AND PREVIOUS (B) NAIROBI 378 Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Now that Kenya's peace talks have begun to focus on political issues, they are expected to rapidly reach the crunch point regarding power-sharing. There are constructive developments that mitigate in favor of progress, but also indications that achieving this will be extremely difficult. Kofi Annan, who is sticking to his February 13 timeframe to achieve a political solution, has arranged a one-on-one meeting with Kibaki and Odinga for the afternoon of February 8. Serious Kenyan interlocutors see the potential for civil war if the talks do not succeed. Continuing U.S. pressure on both sides enhances, but by no means makes certain, prospects for progress in the talks. End summary. ¶2. (C) As previewed in ref A, the talks between the government and ODM are near the crunch point. The prospects for achieving a viable political solution are mixed. -------------- Constructive Developments -------------- ¶3. (C) Several developments are potentially constructive. First, there are indications that Kibaki and his team are finally coming to appreciate the severity of the crisis, particularly with respect to continuing insecurity. (While there have been no major incidents in recent days, a pattern of insecurity continues to plague all the affected areas. This includes localized gang-type activities by youth, intimidation against non-Kikuyus by the Kikuyu-linked Mungiki in areas of Nairobi and environs, reports of groups arming themselves, and the virtual breakdown of government authority in Kisumu and some other towns in affected areas.) Second, Kibaki knows that the Kenyan military does not want to be drawn into a political dispute by being ordered to help maintain law and order. The Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff told me February 6 that the military does not want to be drawn in, although they will obey civilian orders to support the police to maintain law and order. We understand as well that Kibaki does not want to call on the military because -- while the armed forces have a reputation as highly professional ) he does not want to test its unity given the fact that the military ranks are 60 percent Kalenjin while the top officers are primarily Kikuyu and their Kamba allies. Third, ODM's leader Raila Odinga has more forcefully asserted his authority within the ODM, making the ODM's public and private negotiating approaches more effective and reasonable. On February 7, Odinga told the media that he is prepared to "cede some ground" in order to break the impasse in the talks. (Per ref A, Odinga had indicated to me his fallback position. Odinga also told his leadership team during a meeting this week that he views the U.S. role as very positive in pushing for progress in the talks.) Fourth, the impact of international pressure is increasingly being felt. The UNSC statement this week had a sobering impact. And Annan managed to turn off the planned East African Community summit set for the 8th as well as persuading the IGAD foreign ministers who showed up February 7 not to hold any formal meetings. ¶4. (C) Our transmission of letters to a number of individuals on both sides indicating that they were jeopardizing their visa status as a result of involvement in violent activities (ref B) has had a substantial constructive impact. While we have not revealed the names of those who received letters, word has leaked from some of the recipients and has generated real concern among others that they could be next. I have had a number of calls from key people on both sides suddenly asking to see me urgently to discuss their ideas for promoting peace and stopping violence. There has also been an overwhelmingly positive reaction from the Kenyan public. One Kenyan citizen I spoke to reflected what others said: "Thank you; those guys shouldn't be able to go abroad and leave us to live with the consequences of the mess they created." We also understand that President Kibaki is asking questions about letters that have gone to some people on his side because he is concerned that such people may have NAIROBI 00000419 002 OF 003 been involved in violent activities. (One of the letters went to the owner of a club where a meeting took place to raise funds. Martha Karua and other key people on the government side took part in the meeting and were concerned to learn that we knew about it. The money, ostensibly for humanitarian assistance, was channeled to Kikuyu youth gangs operating in the Navaisha area.) -------------- Troubling Developments -------------- ¶5. (C) There are, on the other hand, developments that are not constructive. After having accepted during the talks early on February 7 that there needs to be a political settlement, the government returned to the discussions in the afternoon pulling back that position and returning to the hardline formula: Kibaki is the legitimate president, must be recognized as such, and the only recourse is for ODM to challenge electoral results in the courts. The government team also held out the possibility of a recount, but that is not seen as positive given a number of indications that any tampering with the vote tallying paper trail has been cleaned up in anticipation of a possible recount. The government would not hold out this possibility without certainty of having a recount come out in its favor and ODM has already signaled that a recount is not feasible. ¶6. (C) Another bad sign, according to ODM sources, emerged from President Kibaki's February 5 meeting with the Bishop of the African Inland Church, who is a Kalenjin. Kibaki purportedly told the bishop that the Kalenjins need to tell him what they want to strike a deal. According to the ODM sources who spoke with the bishop, Kibaki told the bishop to ask William Ruto, one of the ODM's leaders and a key Kalenjin leader, what he needs to strike a deal on behalf of the Kalenjins. Kibaki said he planned to form the rest of his cabinet soon, and the Kalenjins could have some of the ministries. Ruto rejected the overture. ¶7. (C) Also according to ODM sources, Vice President Musyoka, while visiting London before traveling to the U.S., told the staff of the Kenyan embassy in London that the government has no intention of striking a deal in the Annan-mediated talks. We are talking because we have to, Musyoka reportedly said, but nothing will come of the Annan process. -------------- A Serious Player Worries About Civil War -------------- ¶8. (C) A conversation I had with George Thuo early on February 8 was both hopeful and sobering. Thuo, who is about 40 and a Kikuyu, represents the younger generation of Kenyan politicians and is the government Party of National Unity chief whip in the Parliament. Thuo expressed concern that, if the Annan-led talks fail, the country will slip quickly into chaos, with civil war to follow (a number of other serious people we are talking to are expressing similar concerns). He claimed he has recived numerous reports of people on both sides stock-piling food and weapons. Thuo has been publicly outspoken on the need for a political settlement and has close ties to reputed hardliners like Martha Karua and former Minister of Security Michuki. Thuo did not hold out much hope of altering Karua's hardline position in the Annan-led talks. Based on his knowledge of Kibaki, he believes the President is willing to be more flexible and accommodate some form of power-sharing. He is trying to see the President to emphasize the need to achieve this quickly through the talks. Thuo wanted to discuss fallbacks should the Annan-brokered talks fail, which he sees as a real possibility. I told him that there are none; the talks must be made to succeed and neither side should be given hope that there are alternatives to that. Thuo said he is dismayed at the depth of Kikuyu-centric intransigence he is seeing from parliamentary colleagues from the Kikuyu-dominated Central Province. On a hopeful note, he emphasized that these views do not reflect those of ordinary Kikuyus. The sentiment in his constituency, he stressed, is pro-peace and includes acceptance of a possible power-sharing NAIROBI 00000419 003 OF 003 arrangement with Odinga. -------------- Annan Brokers Another Kibaki-Odinga Meeting -------------- ¶9. (C) Against this uncertain backdrop, Annan has arranged for Kibaki and Odinga to meet with him, one-on-one on the afternoon of February 8. Although billed as an opportunity for Annan to brief both principals, Annan sees the meeting (and possibly additional one-on-one meetings) as a way of getting around hardliners on both sides, but particularly Martha Karua on the government side. Graca Machel and Benjamin Mkapa are back, and it is hoped that Machel can have some positive impact on Karua. (According to one source, Karua this week told Kibaki that "the Annan initiative is becoming unstoppable," but whether she meant this means the government will have to compromise or that they will have to find a way to stop it is unclear.) Meanwhile, Annan continues to insist on his February 13 deadline for achieving a political solution. ¶10. (C) I am seeking a meeting with the President to encourage his direct engagement in efforts to find a political solution, to explore ideas with him, and to emphasize yet again the importance the U.S. attaches to this. ¶11. (C) If the parties cannot bridge the huge divide on power-sharing during the coming days, Annan may have to table a compromise proposal or risk breakdown of the talks. We are remaining in close touch with him and his team in order to ensure close coordination. It is also possible that ) given pressure coming from the Kenyan people and the international community -- neither side will want to be seen as derailing the talks and that they may find some way to show progress short of a full agreement on power-sharing (like announcing, for example, establishment of an impartial mechanism to investigate electoral irregularities). This would buy some time, but Annan has made clear he will not be sucked into an open-ended process as this would destroy his credibility and the credibility the talks have with the Kenyan people. ¶12. (C) Meanwhile, civil society and the media continue to keep the Kenyan people focused on the talks, and to reflect the Kenyan people's desire for peace and justice. We are continuing our outreach with civil society and the media. -------------- Maintaining Pressure on Both Sides -------------- ¶13. (C) We need to keep the ODM on track for a reasonable power-sharing fallback formula. We will also continue to emphasize to Odinga the importance of maintaining flexibility in his position and of remaining at the table even if the government persists in a hardline posture. With both sides we continue to make clear that achieving a political solution through the Annan-brokered process is the only way forward, and that our future relations with each side are linked to their cooperation to achieve this. At the same time, we must continue to maintain pressure on the government to compromise and keep working to close off all efforts they may undertake to work a unilateral approach around the Annan-led talks. The letters sent out on visas has, by demonstrating our firmness regarding those who do not cooperate to achieve peace, further enhanced our credibility with both sides, and with the Kenyan people. The Kenyan people also welcome our message that, as a true friend and partner in good times and bad, the United States will remain intensively engaged to help Kenyans successfully overcome this crisis. RANNEBERGER