KENYA'S ELECTORAL CRISIS - STATE OF PLAY AND NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000380 SIPDIS SIPDIS EMBASSY ADDIS PLEASE PASS TO A/S FRAZER FOR S, D, P, G, R, DS, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KE SUBJECT: KENYA'S ELECTORAL CRISIS - STATE OF PLAY AND NEXT STEPS REF: A) NAIROBI 357 AND PREVIOUS B) NAIROBI 370 C) NAIROBI 371 D) NAIROBI 378 Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Having reached agreements regarding violence and humanitarian issues, the Annan-mediated talks between the government and ODM today started focusing on elements of a political solution. Annan wants to achieve this by February 13. The two sides start this discussion with diametrically opposite positions. Odinga told us his bottom-line is power sharing involving him (coupled with institutional reform) that could leave Kibaki in office for his full five-year term. The government continues to insist that the ODM should go to the courts to challenge the elections results. We remain intensively engaged with both sides to press for a political solution. As early as the next few days the talks could reach the crunch point at which the two sides will be faced with fundamental decisions in order to work out a deal - or not. Annan will probably have to intervene to bridge the gap. U.S. support for Annan and intervention with both sides will be essential to bring about an acceptable outcome to the talks. End summary. -------------- Talks Now Focusing on Political Issues -------------- ¶2. (U) Following agreements on cooperation to end violence and on humanitarian assistance (refs B and C) the talks between the government and ODM today began to focus on political issues. The two sides will discuss the disputed election and ways to achieve a political solution. ¶3. (C) The two sides start the discussion of a possible solution with almost diametrically opposite positions. The government, publicly and privately, continues to insist that ODM should go to the courts to challenge the election results. ODM maintains that the judicial system is not sufficiently independent or credible for this purpose. (This is an assessment we share.) Government sources have indicated to us that its fallback position is to incorporate five to ten ODM members as ministers (which ministries is not specified),with others to receive positions ranging from assistant ministers to permanent secretaries. ¶4. (C) The ODM will start the talks on a political solution by insisting either that there be a forensic audit and recount of the votes (with Kibaki agreeing to step down if the recount comes out in Odinga's favor),or that there be a rerun within a few months following revamping of the electoral commission. Odinga told me today that he does not expect the government to accept either of these options. Odinga's fallback position is meaningful power-sharing. His initial position on this will demand power-sharing as part of a "transitional government." This transitional government would remain in place long enough to carry out institutional reform (constitutional, electoral, land, devolution of authority to local government, equitable distribution of resources, and other issues). At the end of this process (within 1-3 years) there would be a new election. ¶5. (C) However, Odinga indicated to me today that his ultimate bottom-line can, in effect, accommodate Kibaki as President for his full term. Odinga made clear he realizes that anything less would not be saleable to Kibaki and his Kikuyu supporters. In order to do so, there would have to be a serious power-sharing arrangement, including Odinga in the government. This would require a constitutional amendment to establish a strong executive prime minister position for him. Odinga said he will have difficulty selling to his people any agreement that leaves Kibaki in place for his full term. This can be finessed, Odinga said, by indicating that the transitional government will remain in place for as long as the reform process takes, which could be the full five years of Kibaki's term. Sally Kosgei, a member of the ODM's negotiating team, confirmed to me last night that Odinga had told her this is his bottom-line. NAIROBI 00000380 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Odinga told me he has developed a high regard for Annan, particularly because he has been impressed by Annan's firmness in the talks. Odinga plans to share his bottom-line with Annan. I reiterated the Secretary's message to Odinga on our strong support for Annan and the eminent persons. ¶7. (C) Meanwhile, Odinga remains deeply skeptical that Kibaki and his team are prepared to consider meaningful power-sharing. As the members of Odinga's negotiating team have told us, government team leader Martha Karua has been very hardline in the talks. "She behaves like a prefect," Kosgei said, "and is deliberately argumentative on every point." Privately in the talks and publicly (most recently in Kibaki's remarks at the AU),the government continues to argue that the only constitutional mechanism to resolve the electoral dispute is for the ODM to challenge the results in court. The government continues to maintain that any political solution must be consistent with the existing constitution (which does not provide for an executive prime minister). Odinga and his team are also concerned that the government's rejection of Annan's choice of Cyril Ramaphosa to be chief mediator is intended to delay or even scuttle the talks. The ODM feels Kibaki is seeking to bolster his position and move ahead unilaterally. The visit of IGAD foreign ministers set for February 6 and the East African Community summit set for February 8 are seen as part of that effort. (FM Wetangula told me today that both meetings are at the insistence of Kenya's neighbors, and are intended to highlight the impact on the region of the continuing crisis and to lend support to efforts to resolve it.) Finally, the ODM says it has heard that Kibaki could within the next several days announce the remainder of his cabinet. -------------- Annan Sees Progress But Tough Days Ahead -------------- ¶8. (C) When I met with Annan on February 4 he was pleased with the agreements on violence and humanitarian issues, but previewed a rough few days ahead during the talks on political issues. Annan expressed exasperation over the government's rejection of Ramaphosa. He did not yet seem to have alternative candidates. During a phone conversation February 5, Annan told me he was surprised by the announcement of the IGAD foreign ministers' visit and East African Community summit. He sees them as distractions from the talks, but is not overly concerned. He views the ODM's statement today threatening more mass action if these events take place as an over-reaction. In order to provide maximum support for the talks on a political solution, he has asked Graca Machel and Mkapa to come back. Annan is determined to hold the two sides to the time frame for the talks he announced on February 1: to complete discussions of political issues by February 13, and then to move onto discussion of longer-term issues (institutional reforms). Annan had been planning to leave towards the end of the week once the chief mediator was in place (and then returning as necessary),but it seems likely that he will now stay longer given his obviously strong commitment to achieving a successful outcome in the talks. -------------- State of Play and Next Steps -------------- ¶9. (C) One of the key questions with respect to moving the talks ahead is how engaged Kibaki is in directing his negotiating team. Odinga meets with his team each morning to give them guidance. His and our understanding is that it is principally Karua who sees the President about the talks, though how often is not known. As with so many other issues, it is unclear to what extent the President is engaged on the substance of the talks. Virtually everyone within Kibaki's inner circle maintain hardline positions, so it seems doubtful that Kibaki is getting balanced counsel aimed at achieving a political solution. (Kibaki has his own views, however, and some of them are hardline as well. As previously reported, he told me during our last meeting that he could not imagine having a government that included NAIROBI 00000380 003 OF 003 Odinga.) Annan shares this concern, and so has insisted that he regularly brief Kibaki and Odinga directly, including during joint meetings ¶10. (C) Although it remains to be seen whether and how the agreements to end violence and on humanitarian issues will be resolved, the lifting of the ban on live media coverage which has just been announced is a positive sign. If the two sides move quickly to carry out the other steps in the agreement, such as holding joint rallies against violence, this will help build confidence and make the context more positive for the talks on a political solution. (Ending violence will, however, be at best a gradual process over the coming weeks and months. Ref A reports troubling indications of continuing organization of violence. Septel provides a security update.) ¶11. (C) To support efforts to end violence (and therefore reinforce progress in the talks),I have publicly made clear that those involved in perpetrating, organizing, inciting, or supporting violence will potentially be subject to visa restrictions. Ref D reports on follow-up letters that we have sent to eight individuals (on both sides). Annan welcomed this step and said he appreciates my continuing efforts with the media. We have also made clear to both sides that failure to cooperate to achieve a political solution will negatively affect their relationship with us. Apart from bilateral implications, we have highlighted the point that Kenyan failure to work out a solution will inevitably lead to greater international involvement (as foreshadowed by the increasing UNSC focus on Kenya). ¶12. (C) We have reiterated our offer to the government to provide FBI assistance in the investigations of the recent murders of two ODM parliamentarians. ¶13. (SBU) We are moving ahead to fund several civil society projects to promote dialogue, and we are working closely with the Speaker of the Parliament in his efforts to promote dialogue among parliamentarians and outreach by them to their constituents to urge an end to violence. ¶14. (C) Within a matter of days the talks between the government and ODM could reach the crunch point with respect to a political solution, with the ODM's bottom-line on power-sharing on the table. Currently, it seems doubtful that the two sides will be able to bridge their positions on power-sharing. The government, at this point, is taking the harder-line position. Annan may be forced to craft a compromise and/or exert pressure on the government to accommodate something along the lines of Odinga's bottom-line. Odinga's participation in Kibaki's government will likely be the ultimate sticking point. Although they were allies during the 2002 elections, the 2005 referendum and the current elections imbroglio have engendered deep-seated animosity. A power-sharing agreement that does not involve Odinga in the government would be hard to sell to the half of the country that supported him and feel the election was stolen. A credible political solution is the only way to fully restore peace and stability, and to lay the basis for reconciliation and to address underlying grievances. ¶15. (C) U.S. intervention with Kibaki and Odinga -- in coordination with Annan -- will be essential to help forge a solution. In that regard, the Secretary's direct contacts with Kibaki and Odinga have been extremely helpful to keep the talks energized. We will keep the Department closely informed as the talks unfold. RANNEBERGER