APPROVAL REQUEST FOR TRAVEL TO SOMALIA

S E C R E T NAIROBI 000341 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS FOR M, ACTING A/S STARR, AND A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR ADDIS ABABA PASS TO A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2018 TAGS: OTRA AMGT PGOV PREL KE SO SUBJECT: APPROVAL REQUEST FOR TRAVEL TO SOMALIA Classified By Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Action Request: Post seeks Department approval and country clearance for travel of the following DS security personnel and delegation members to Hargeysa, Somaliland on February 2 and 3. Ambassador Ranneberger, Ambassador Yates, and Regional Security Officer Robert Whigham concur with the proposed travel and operational security plan. Operational Advance Team (Arrives Hargeysa 2/2) MSD Team Leader Joe Lestorti MSD Team Member John Satanek MSD Team Member Erik Antons MSD Team Member Michael Fitzpatrick MSD Team Member Justin Rowan MSD Team Member Ken Haynes MSD Team Member James Guanci MSD Team Member Kip Doan MSD Team Member Dave Farthing MSD Team Member Dave Jordan MSD Team Member Bjorn Sunde Protective Detail (Arrives Hargeysa 2/3) MSD AIC Anthony Tortora MSD Team Member Eric Kriley MSD Team Member Lawrence Rice MSD Team Member Brian Wood MSD Team Member Gerard Brillinates Protectees (Arrive Hargeysa 2/3 with Protective Detail) Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer Ambassador Michael Ranneberger Ambassador John Yates Somalia Desk Officer Nole Garey AF Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh ¶2. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger strongly supports this travel. Engagement in Somaliland is required to demonstrate U.S. support for political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, and achievement of U.S. policy objectives. ¶3. (C) The MSD Security Force and delegation intend to visit the following location: Hargeysa Sites to be visited: Hergeysa Airport Ambassador Hotel ¶4. (S/NF) Threat Assessment: The MSD Security Force presently views the threat assessment for Hargeysa, Somaliland as "Medium to High". Hargeysa is one of the largest cities in Somaliland and it has a population of approximately 450,000 people. There are no reports of large scale fighting in and around the city. There are reports of clashes between the forces of Somaliland and Puntland in the region adjacent to their common border. There are no specific threats directed against U.S. interests planning to visit Hargeysa. However, there are reports of varying credibility and sourcing that indicate extremists and those linked directly to Al-Qaida continue to use Hargeysa as a logistics center, a transit point, a safe-haven, and base of operations for the planning of future terrorist operations. Radical religious elements and members of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) remain active in Hargeysa. Some of the tactics used by these groups encourage an increase in the use of assassinations, guerilla warfare, ambushes, and the kidnapping of prominent individuals in order to destroy the institutions of the "infidels". There is also a concern that the hotels in Hargeysa are 'targeted' since they are used frequently by Western officials. Al-Qaida and like-minded extremist groups are aware that foreign officials and security officers frequent the Ambassador and Mansoor Hotels in Hargeysa. The Hargeysa Airport is also considered a threat due to the uncertainty as to the reliability of the government forces protecting this facility. It is felt the airport is vulnerable to strikes by missiles and stand-off weapons. There is also a concern that extremist groups plan to shoot down aircraft during their final approach into Hargeysa Airport. The overall threat extends to road movement from the airport into the center of the city. The use of "command detonated" land mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (EID) have been used in Hargeysa. Reports indicate the Somaliland President would welcome a visit by a senior U.S. Diplomat and do everything in his power to ensure its success. However, there is a concern that t he members of the Somaliland Security Service (SSS) are corrupt and relatively incompetent. They are also known to "look the other way" when they are properly compensated. They can be influenced to take bribes, and the turning of their 'blind eye' can be determined by their clan loyalty. The lack of a well-trained and fully vetted security force in Somaliland presents a security concern for DS. Likewise, the arrival of a high level U.S. Diplomat (A/S or Ambassador) could be publicized locally thus increasing the profile of the visit. There is little to no threat directed against the members of the United Nations and the NGOs. From time to time, these organizations have been known to use clan militias for "security". Having the U.S. Government use local militias to conduct "security" has the potential of increasing the influence of the militias thus undermining the authority of the traditional elders. It is therefore recommended that the U.S. Government not rely on UN or NGO assets (armored vehicles, local staff, and lodging) when traveling into Somaliland. Using these organizations could increase the threat on international relief personnel since they may be targeted for assisting the U.S. Government. The overall security of the MSD Security Force in Hargeysa can be improved by receiving "real time" security information from the members of the interagency assigned to AmEmbassy Nairobi. ¶5. (S/NF) Security Plan: SUMMARY: An MSD Advance Team conducted an advance visit to Hargeysa on Tuesday, January 29, 2008. The visit was a complete success and the team was well received by Somaliland officials upon their arrival at the airport. They also received outstanding support from local officials and security forces during the visit. The experience and information learned from the advance visit enabled the team to improve and finalize their operational plan. This plan required extensive interagency coordination and includes a series of primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) courses of action (COA) for communication, transportation, remaining overnight (RON) and emergency extraction. The MSD Security Force has ensured its radios are properly coded and communications tests will be conducted prior to the conduct of the A/S's visit to Hargeysa. The team has also prepared a communications plan with the interagency that includes communication requirements for informing the interagency and the JTF-HOA Personnel Recovery Force of the Operational Advance Team's lift off from the Djibouti Airport, the return of their Alternate aircraft, the departure of the A/S and the Operational Protective Service Detail's aircraft from Djibouti, the arrival of the A/S's party in Hargeysa, the Primary and Alternate aircraft departure from Hargeysa, and everyone's safe landing and return to Djibouti. The entire MSD Security Force has worked diligently to ensure that every aspect of preparation for the A/S's visit has been coordinated with the interagency and that all team members understand every aspect of the operations plan. An 11 man Mobile Security Deployments (MSD) Operational Advance Team will arrive in Hargeysa at 6:00PM on Saturday, February 2, 2008 to maintain "eyes on" and provide overnight security at the Ambassador Hotel. A five man MSD Operational Protective Service Detail (PSD) will arrive at 10:00AM on Sunday, February 3, 2008 providing security for Assistant Secretary Frazer and four members of her official party (for a total of ten passengers). GROUND TACTICAL PLAN: The MSD Security Force will position two (two man) designated marksmen teams on the roof of the Ambassador hotel during the A/S's visit. Deployment of these DDM teams has been coordinated with hotel management and Somaliland security personnel. The hotel has two access control points (gates). The northern gate will be locked and two MSD Special Agents will along with two local security officials will control the southern gate Both gates are located along the eastern wall of the hotel complex which parallels the "airport road". The A/S's meeting will take place in a conference room located on the second floor of the hotel. A pre-poster will be positioned on the stairwell that is in close proximity to the conference room entrance. At the completion of the meeting, a light lunch will be served in the conference room. At 1:15PM the A/S and her party will move downstairs and load the motorcade vehicles positioned at the hotel main entrance. The motorcade will then depart the hotel enroute to the airport. Somaliland security officials will provide security and traffic control along the route. During the advance visit, travel time from the hotel to the airport was approximately five minutes in duration. CONTINGENCY PLANS: The MSD Security Force has established contingency plans for their actions in the event of ground fire during flight operations to/from Hargeysa Airport, motorcade movements to/from the airport/hotel, and hostile fire directed against the motorcade during travel or arrival/departure from the airport. The MSD Security Force is prepared to abort the mission and return to Djibouti if an aircraft receives ground fire while enroute to Hargeysa. The aircraft will report their situation and return to Djibouti in order to receive further instructions. If direct or indirect fire is directed at the A/S's party or MSD members/elements positions at the airport, they will seek cover/shelter in the airport's terminal building, report their situation, and await further instructions from the AIC. The VIP lounge at the airport has been identified as a defendable area that can serve as a safehaven. If direct or indirect fire is directed against the hotel, everyone will seek cover and wait until the firing has stopped, report their situation and wait until the attack has ended. Rooms on the ground and third floor of the hotel have been identified as defendable areas that can serve as safehavens. If possible, the MSD Security Force will move to the airport and conduct a self-evacuation. However, if there is hostile activity the MSD Security Force will remain in place, defend themselves to the best of their ability and wait for the arrival of the JTF-HOA PRF. RON: The Operational Advance Team will remain overnight at the Ambassador Hotel. The Team will establish a security observation and communications position on the roof of the hotel. MSD has also reserved a hotel room ("down room") for the advance team. This room is in close proximity to the access door to the roof. The advance team will establish around the clock security keeping thirty-three percent (33%) of the team awake and alert at all times. The advance team will establish a sleep rotation plan, and conduct a communications check on their tactical radio with MSD Nairobi and the interagency every hour on the hour. Their communications plan also requires them to immediately report any hostile activities or events that could impact on the arrival of the MSD Security Force and/or the A/S and her party. AIR TRANSPORTATION: The MSD Security Force has contracted two commercial aircraft to provide transportation for A/S Frazer's visit to Hargeysa. Both aircraft will arrive in Djibouti on February 2, ¶2008. The Alternate aircraft will transport the Operational Advance Team departing Djibouti at 5:00PM and arriving in Hargeysa at 6:00PM on the evening of February 2, 2008. This aircraft will drop off the Operational Advance Team and return to Djibouti. The advance team will be transported by Somaliland security personnel to the Ambassador Hotel where they will remain overnight. The Operational Advance Team's aircraft will return to Djibouti where it will remain in position to serve as the MSD Security Force's Alternate aircraft. This aircraft has the responsibility to travel to Hargeysa to extract the advance party in the event of an emergency. The Primary aircraft will transport the A/S, her official party, and the Operational Protective Security Detail to Hargeysa on February 3, ¶2008. The aircraft will depart Djibouti at 9:00AM and arrive at Hargeysa Airport at 10:00AM on February 3, 2008. This aircraft will remain on the ground in Hargeysa while the A/S conducts her official visit at the Ambassador Hotel. The duration of the official visit is estimated to be three hours. Local security forces will provide security for the aircraft while it remains at the airport and one MSD Special Agent and the pilot will remain with the aircraft at all times. The Alternate aircraft will remain at the Djibouti Airport along with the pilot and one DS/IP personnel to provide communications connectivity with MSD personnel in Hargeysa until approximately 12:00PM on February 3, 2008. At 12:00PM, the Alternate aircraft will return to Hargeysa and arrive at 1:00PM. The Alternate aircraft will remain on the ground in Hargeysa with the Primary aircraft. The A/S, her official party, and the MSD Operational Protective Service Detail will depart Hargeysa on the Primary aircraft at 1:30PM and arrive in Djibouti at 2:30PM. Once the Primary aircraft is "wheels up" and has departed Hargeysa airspace the Alternate aircraft will remain on the ground for 30 minutes, departing at approximately 2:00PM returning the remaining members of the MSD Security Force to Djibouti arriving at approximately 3:00 PM. The contract air crews are experienced in conducting flight operations at the Hargeysa Airport, and are aware of the dangers during take-off and landing due to runway conditions and the possible ground fire from small arms and crew served weapons. The air charter company has indicated that should MSD personnel require the them to land in Hargesya in response to an emergency, they are willing to do so based on an assessment from MSD personnel in Hargeysa that the security at the airport is sufficient to permit a safe landing. The use of man portable anti-aircraft weapons (ManPads) and "command detonated" Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are known to be used in and around Hargeysa. GROUND TRANSPORTATION: Ground transportation will be provided by Somaliland security officials. A total of ten (10) vehicles will be provided to the MSD Security Force by the Somaliland Government. Seven (7) vehicles will be used for movement between the Hargeysa Airport and the Ambassador Hotel. Two of these vehicles will be advance vehicles that will run the route in advance of the movement of the motorcade. Three (3) trail vehicles will travel with the motorcade. One will be the TST vehicle while the remaining two will be used as spare vehicles. During movement from the airport to the Ambassador Hotel, the A/S, her party, the MSD Agent-in-charge (AIC), and members of the MSD Security Force will travel with Somaliland officials and security personnel in the seven (7) primary vehicles. The Tactical Support Team (TST) will have a designated vehicle. When the motorcade departs the airport or the hotel, the motorcade will depart first and then the TST vehicle and two trail vehicles will depart thirty seconds after the motorcade. This thirty second 'gap' enables the TST Team to observe the movement of the motorcade. This 'gap' provides time for the TST personnel in the trail vehicles to observe the motorcade's departure, and respond to any attacks or the initiation of an explosive device (IED or landmine) directed against the motorcade. SPE: The members of the advance team will be equipped with individual sidearms and long rifles (Sig-229Rs and M-4 carbines). Each member of the team will wear individual body armor. The MSD Security Force will also be armed with two M-249 automatic weapons, and two M-203 grenade launchers. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: The primary means of communications will be with the AN/PRC-117F satellite radio. The advance team will be in constant contact with the MSD Command Center located at Post Two at AmEmbassy Nairobi. This is actually the interagency command net, and it will be monitored by the interagency. Assistance from the interagency Personnel Recovery Force (PRF),elements will be requested by the advance team to the MSD Command Center at Post Two (and monitored by the interagency). Each team member will be equipped with a cell phone that provides cell phone coverage for the region (Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya). The advance team will also be equipped with Iridium satellite telephones (2) that provide worldwide telephone communications. Additionally, the team will carry two BFTs that will be constantly tracked by the interagency on the JBV. The JBV will be monitored in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and the interagency. DS will monitor the BFTs via SA-20 and AmEmbassy Nairobi. NSA will provide a Force Protection Box vicinity Hargeysa, which allows for an additional security measure. MEDICAL: The Operational Advance Team and the Operational Protective Service Detail both will have Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) qualified MSD personnel assigned to their team. The MSD EMTs will be equipped with the required emergency medical care equipment, and capable of stabilizing any injured or wounded advance team member until they can be medevaced to the field medical hospital located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti (approximately a one hour flight from Hargeysa). In addition, each team member will carry a personal medical kit equipped for self aid and buddy aid. OTHER ITEMS: Uniform of the Day: The members of the Tactical Support Team (TST) will wear full tactical gear and tan battledress uniforms (BDU). The Protective Security Detail (PSD) will present a low visibility appearance wearing khaki 5.11 trousers, shirts, and a tan 5.11 vest over their body armor. Water: Each team member will carry water bottles in their individual backpacks and an additional two (2) gallons per man will be stored on the team's aircraft. An additional case of water will also be placed on the aircraft in the event of an emergency or extended stay on the ground by the advance team. MRE: Each team member will carry two (2) MREs during the advance team visit. An additional case will be placed on the team's aircraft for use in the event of an emergency or the visit lasts longer than the one day in and out advance trip. Emergency Signaling Devices: Each advance team member will be equipped with the proper number, color and type of Flares, Parachute Flares, Smoke Grenades and Star Clusters as stated in team's operations order. Operational Funds: During the visit to Hargeysa by the Advance Team on January 29, 2008 the Somaliland security officials charged $1,000 for the vehicles and assistance provided to the team. The Operational Advance Team will have an additional $1,500 to pay for vehicles assistance provided during the A/S's visit on February 3, ¶2008. RULES of ENGAGEMENT: DS Firearms Policy will be in effect, and any hostile fire received will be met with an appropriate escalation of force in accordance with the DS Firearms Policy. SAFEHAVEN: Presently, the advance team does not have a dedicated safehaven. The Ambassador Hotel will be used for the overnight stay of the Operational Advance Team, for the A/S's visit, and as the emergency safehaven in the event of a weather delay, mechanical failure, or violent act preventing the A/S, her official party, and the MSD Security Force from departing Hargeysa as scheduled. EVACUATION and PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR): An evacuation and recovery plan has been coordinated between the advance team and members of the interagency at AmEmbassy Nairobi. The aircraft used to transport the advance team into Hargeysa will return to Djibouti and take up its position as MSD's Alternate aircraft. This aircraft will remain at the airport. An MSD element equipped with an AN/PRC-117F radio will also remain with the Alternate aircraft and monitor their radio during the entire time the advance team in on the ground in Hargeysa. This aircraft and team will remain at the Djibouti Airport, monitor their radio and be prepared to fly to Hargeysa and assist in the event of a mechanical failure, act of violence or accident during the A/S's visit. The emergency evacuation plan requires the request for emergency extraction by the Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The JFT-HOA Personnel Recovery Force (PRF) would conduct an emergency extraction operation of the advance team and air crew using CH-53 Helicopters. The request for this extraction would be made by the MSD Security Force to the MSD Command Center and through the interagency command net. The MSD Security Force has designated two (2) Designated Areas of Recovery (DAR) sites to support an emergency extraction from the area around the city of Hargeysa. The first location is an airfield code name "BLACK" located approximately forty miles west of the city of Hargeysa, and a second location is an airfield, code name "GOLD", located approximately twenty-five miles to the east of the city. In the event of hostile action in Hargeysa which prevents the team from departing the airport, the team will move to one of the designated DAR sites, call for assistance, and have the Alternate MSD contracted aircraft fly to that location in order to extract those needing assistance. The "last case scenario" will have the advance team 'hiring' local security officials to transport them and air crew using overland transportation from Hargeysa to the Djibouti or Ethiopian borders. In the event this scenario would be used, the MSD team members would contact MSD Team Djibouti and request RSO Djibouti obtain Chiefs of Mission (COM) Djibouti and Addis Ababa approval for diplomatic assistance to permit the streamlining of 'border crossing requirements' from Somaliland into Djibouti and Ethiopia. RISK: The risk assessment associated with this mission is medium to high. Compatible communications with the interagency, approval for the use of JTF HOA QRF, and the inter-agency and inter-regional coordination have mitigated risk to our operation. Transporting Diplomats into a failed state and providing for their protection increases the risks associated with this mission. RSO ASSESSMENT: RSO Nairobi has carefully reviewed the threat assessment for Hargeysa, Somaliland and the proposed operational security plan to support travel by official U.S. personnel to Hargeysa. It is RSO Nairobi 's assessment that the proposed operational security plan represents a viable plan for safely conducting travel into Hargeysa on February 2 and 3 by official US personnel. RANNEBERGER