SOMALIA - TFG PRESIDENT RESIGNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002879 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR MARR SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG PRESIDENT RESIGNS Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf ended months-long stand-off with the Prime Minister and, probably, closed the final chapter on his almost forty years in Somali politics by resigning on December 29. With Yusuf's resignation, Parliament Speaker Sheikh Aden "Madobe" became the interim President, and is charged with arranging for a successor to Yusuf. Triggering Yusuf's decision to resign was a December 22 conversation with Assistant Secretary Frazer (septel). Yusuf has promised not to interfere with the Djibouti Process, and to permit the estimated two-thousand TFG troops loyal to him to remain in place, as well as most of the members of his 800-strong Presidential Guard. Immediately after resigning, Yusuf traveled to Puntland, where he will remain through the January 8 Puntland presidential elections. He has requested USG support in fulfilling his wish to settle ultimately in Abu Dhabi or Saudi Arabia. We have informed the Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) Ould-Abdallah, who is taking the lead on these issues. TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein Nur Adde has told us he expects intensified al-Shabaab attacks in the wake of Yusuf's resignation, and that he, and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) Chairman Sheikh Sharif, have been coordinating actively in Mogadishu with Ethiopian and AMISOM forces in order to repulse al-Shabaab. We have separately sent to the Department a proposed draft USG press statement on Yusuf's resignation. End summary. Yusuf Resigns -------------- ¶2. (C) As promised, on December 29 at 10:00 a.m (local) TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf appeared before Parliament in Baidoa, and in brief remarks announced his resignation to an estimated 120-140 members of Parliament. In his remarks, Yusuf urged that the parliamentarians unite behind the TFG. He was resigning, Yusuf said, because "when I assumed power, I pledged that if I was unable to fulfill my duty, I would resign and that I would do all within my power to create a national government whose leaders cooperated for the common good." Those things did not happen, Yusuf said. "Most of the country is not in our hands and the international community has failed to help us." After handing the Speaker ;his letter of resignation in view of the assembled MP's, Yusuf departed Baidoa at 11:00 a.m. for his native Puntland. ¶3. (C) Yusuf's resignation brought to an end a period of increasingly public conflict between the President and the Prime Minister that had seen Yusuf reject the Prime Minister's proposed interim cabinet, attempt to dismiss the Prime Minister himself, and endeavor to appoint a rival prime minister and cabinet of ministers. His departure potentially offers an opportunity to accelerate the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement. At the same time, his departure could contribute to a sense of TFG collapse, if not handled well. Crystallizing Yusuf's decision to bow out was a December 22 airport conversation with Assistant Secretary Frazer (septel),in which A/S Frazer urged Yusuf to work with Prime Minister Hussein, told Yusuf that the USG recognized Hussein as the legitimate TFG PM, and would publicly associate itself with a December 21 IGAD communique announcing sanctions against Yusuf. On balance, Yusuf's remaining in office could have exacerbated tensions within the TFG and blocked any chance or possibilities to further implementation of the Djibouti Agreement. Yusuf's Plans -------------- ¶4. (C) In advance of his December 29 resignation, Yusuf, members of his family, and his advisors were in frequent contact with Ambassador Ranneberger and Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates in an effort to set the terms for his departure. At issue were: -- First, where he will live, following a brief stopover in Puntland through the January 8 regional presidential elections. Yusuf requested USG support for his preference to live in Abu Dhabi or Saudi Arabia. Yusuf also noted that he would continue to need to travel semi-annually to England for medical treatment. -- Second, money. Those close to Yusuf have suggested that the President will need a USD 3 - 4 million "golden parachute" to pay his medical expenses, discharge his debts, NAIROBI 00002879 002 OF 002 and support his family. -- Third, an exit strategy for militia loyal to him. In particular, Yusuf was worried about the fate of his estimated 800-strong Presidential Guard, who are based in Mogadishu and Baidoa. During a December 29 pre-resignation conversation Yusuf appeared to heed Ambassador Ranneberger's urging that the Presidential Guard begin a phased withdrawal only when the Ethiopian pullout began. The Ambassador has spoken with the SRSG, who agreed to take the lead on items 1 and 2. Speaker in Charge -------------- ¶5. (C) Yusuf's departure leaves Parliament Speaker Sheikh Aden Madobe the interim President. According to the Transitional Federal Charter, Madobe will have thirty days in which to accomplish the succession. Observers believe that Yusuf's Darod clan will have to continue to be represented in the TFG leadership (either as President, Prime Minister, or Speaker). In the days preceding Yusuf's resignation, Madobe suggested that it may take longer than thirty days to find a successor and/or that it might be better to transition directly from his interim presidency to a unity government presidency, a process that will take longer than thirty days. The Embassy has energetically discouraged Madobe from extending the process, and SRSG Ould-Abdallah agrees. ¶6. (C) Yusuf, in a confidential letter to the SRSG, has proposed that Omar Yusuf al-Azhari succeed him. al-Azhari was formerly Somali Ambassador to the United States and several countries in West Africa. He is a member of Yusuf's sub-clan. He studied in Ethiopia and, to all appearances, has good relations with the current GoE leadership. al-Azhari has just returned from consultations in Addis Ababa, presumably in an effort to advance his candidacy with the GoE. ¶7. (C) Prime Minister Hussein has told us repeatedly over the past several days that he was reassured and gratified by Yusuf's pre-resignation statements supporting the Djibouti Process and Yusuf's orders to his military commanders to continue to cooperate with the TFG as it wages its uphill struggle against al-Shabaab and other elements. That said, Yusuf and the Puntland leadership undoubtedly see themselves as an alternate center of gravity should the TFG collapse. ¶8. (C) Yusuf's resignation caps a near-forty year career in Somali politics that has seen him rise from a police commander in Mogadishu to President, with a six-year stint in prison along the way. Yusuf was President of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland, where he is remembered for his struggle against and defeat of al-Itihad-al-Islam. Yusuf was elected TFG President in 2004. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Although Yusuf's resignation appears to bring a long period of infighting among the TFG's leadership to an end, the government still faces an uncertain future with an unpredictable Speaker, an ARS leadership anxious to increase its weight in the unity government, and an ambitious al-Shabaab. As noted above, we have been urging the Speaker to transition rapidly to a new president, but continued pressure will likely be necessary. The TFG - ARS continues to look to the international community for practical aid in fielding a joint security force that could allow it to contend with al-Shabaab and others. It is important in the wake of Yusuf's resignation that the TFG leadership make every effort to allay uncertainty among Yusuf's Darod clan, and we will be urging the Prime Minister to make a public statement as soon as possible. RANNEBERGER