SOMALIA - ARS LEADERS READY FOR RADICAL CHANGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002602

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ARS LEADERS READY FOR RADICAL CHANGE

REF: A. NAIROBI 2543

B. NAIROBI 2598

C. NAIROBI 2580

Classified By: PolOff Jessica Davis Ba. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Leaders of the Alliance for the
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) seek to consolidate support
from their recent mission in Somalia and are committed to the
Djibouti Process and a unity government, even as internal
strife threatens to implode the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG). The ARS views President Yusuf as an
irredeemable impediment to the peace process and made clear
that leadership in Somalia's three highest offices must
change. They provided various scenarios by which Yusuf could
be immediately sidelined, stating that security
considerations and the humanitarian catastrophe demand the
international community and Somalis to select new leaders
before a 2009 transition. They argued that even if a TFG
leadership change might be disruptive, nothing can be worse
than the status quo. ARS leaders evinced sincere
appreciation for consultations with the USG and invited
continued discussions about the way forward. They emphasized
that increased visible support from the USG is critical to
galvanizing increased tangible international and Somali
support for the peace process. End Summary.

Unwavering Support for Djibouti Process
--------------


2. (SBU) In the last two weeks, we have spoken several times
with ARS leaders who insist that despite current difficulties
within the TFG (Ref A),they remain fully committed to the
Djibouti Process, a unity government, and to implementing the
cease-fire. On November 13, Special Envoy John Yates spoke
by phone with ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Chairman
of the Central Committee Sharif Hassan Aden, both of whom
were in Djibouti. The "Two Sharifs" were extremely grateful
for his call and underlined that they looked forward to
talking more with us prior to and during the next meeting of
the High Level Committee (HLC) and the Joint Security
Committee (JSC) November 22-25 in Djibouti. We have met
three times with ARS Central Committee Chairman Sharif Hassan
Aden -- on November 5 in Nairobi, on November 9 in Dubai, and
on November 17, again in Nairobi. During these meetings,
Hassan spoke pragmatically on how to capitalize on the recent
mission in Somalia, the difficulties of forming a unity
government when "there is nothing left of the TFG but its
name" and when questions about Ethiopian intentions and
constant pressure from spoilers all around consistently
threaten the process.


3. (SBU) S/E Yates congratulated the "Two Sharifs" on their
successful recent mission to Jowhar and Beledweyne (reftel
A). Sheikh Sharif said support on the ground was excellent
and people came from other areas, most notably Mogadishu, to
consult with them. Prevailing interest of elements inside
Somalia seemed to be "prove to us that collaboration with the
TFG in the Djibouti process is productive and the correct
strategy." In that regard, Sharif expressed the ARS's
appreciation for Embassy Nairobi statement of November 7
noting concern about the increase in violence in Mogadishu
and re-iterating USG support for the Djibouti Process. He
said it was the strong endorsement needed from the
international community, most specifically the USG, and
precisely the kind of political support they need to
demonstrate backing.


4. (SBU) With S/E Yates, Sheikh Sharif emphasized that any
movement of Ethiopian troops, no matter how slight, would be
extremely helpful in demonstrating dividends from the
Djibouti Process. Sharif Hassan made this same point in all
our meetings, asking for USG assistance with Ethiopia
fulfilling the guidelines for withdrawal in the Djibouti
Agreement, and the timeline set forward in the agreement to
implement the cease fire. As long as Ethiopia remains in
Somalia, Sharif Hassan said, it will be impossible to
generate the grassroots support needed to truly implement a
peace process. In Dubai, Hassan asked us pointedly about
Ethiopia's plans, indicating that no matter how much momentum
they achieved on the ground, Ethiopia's actions could
undermine any achievement. Sheikh Sharif said they had
not/not been in direct touch with Ethiopians since the
October 28 - 29 Nairobi IGAD Summit but the ARS is

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communicating with Addis through intermediaries.


5. (C) S/E Yates reminded the ARS of our concerns as
emphasized to them by A/S Frazer about the humanitarian
situation. Sheikh Sharif said if the international community
(meaning at a minimum, the USG) would work more closely with
the ARS, they could help on the ground. The TFG, they said,
is too weak to do so. Sheikh Sharif said their capabilities
could be tested in either of the two areas he had visited --
Jowhar or Beledweyne. In our last meeting in Nairobi, Sharif
Hassan intimated that both the Ethiopians and President Yusuf
were lightening rods for the recruitment of extremists who
are exacerbating the crisis. He told us that in 2004 when
Yusuf came to power, there were no Islamic Courts and in
2006, Yusuf did not follow the suggested approach of dealing
with al-Shabaab and instead made them stronger. "Our people
are dying; they cannot wait for several months for Yusuf to
complete his term," Hassan concluded.

Security Considerations
--------------


6. (C) In their conversation with S/E Yates, the "Two
Sharifs" asked for material support for the 5,000 member ARS
"police" force (their half of the 10,000 member monitoring
force with TFG),foreseen by the Joint Security Committee in
its plan to implement the cessation of armed confrontation.
They requested the means to help persuade youth, now
attracted by al-Shabaab and its resources, that there were
other, better, alternatives to pay-for-fighting. In Dubai,
Sharif Hassan said the ARS is looking for the USG to make
good on our promise to support a joint ARS/TFG security
force. Hassan told us that a paid force that could be
immediately stood up would be key to preventing any security
vacuum as Ethiopia withdraws. He said that at present,
al-Shabaab is using piracy ransoms to fund its armed
opposition. "They are paying children between the ages of 13
and 25 50 dollars per month. If we can offer 100 dollars per
month, we can have the support of all of Somalia," Hassan
stressed.


7. (C) When S/E Yates raised al-Shabaab's recent territorial
gains in Lower Shabelle, Sheikh Sharif claimed the situation
in Marka, where ARS still controlled the police station and
the port, would be rectified in 2-3 days. (Note: The
situation in Marka remains fluid as groups allied with the
Islamic Courts Union and al-Shabaab vie for ultimate control
of the area and its strategic port. Thus far, there has been
no visible push by ARS supporters against those who occupy
the town.) Sharif said the "people of the region" were
organizing to combat al-Shabaab and he implied other
"outsiders" who were claiming to have taken control,
including ARS-Asmara, do not have command. Hassan also
emphasized that the people do not want al-Shabaab, but they
do not have the means to fight. "Give us the financial
support, we are ready to fight -- we Somalis will stand in
Mogadishu and face al-Shabaab," he insisted.

Governance Challenges Intensify
--------------


8. (C) The ARS leaders confirmed there had been no real
movement on a Unity Government and that their vision is still
as laid out to A/S Frazer in Nairobi (Ref B). They
acknowledged that although the IGAD Summit communique offered
the TFG an opportunity to reorganize and become more cohesive
in advance of a Unity Government, the TFG squandered this
opportunity. Hassan was more pointed in his criticism of
Yusuf saying that it is impossible to work with him as he
believes he is the only person ordained to lead Somalia.
Hassan compared Yusuf's personality to Siad Barre's, minus
the military force behind Barre's dictatorship. On November
17, reflecting on the impasse within the TFG, Hassan told us,
"If the international community insists on preserving Yusuf,
it will not serve Somalia." We made it absolutely clear that
it is not the USG policy to categorically back Yusuf, but
that we had serious concerns about the ramifications of a
grab for power in the event of his removal. We said we are
concerned with the process, not personalities.


9. (C) Hassan agreed that there is some risk in changing the
TFG leadership but that anything is better than the status
quo. The TFG, under Yusuf has remained resolute in its
position and is busy outside of Somalia, fighting each other.

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"We want reconciliation, and all Yusuf wants to do is fight;
we are ready to talk with him, but he will refuse." Hassan
briefly outlined various scenarios to sideline Yusuf: 1) The
TFG President would be stripped of his power, but remain
through the end of his term; 2) Yusuf would be removed
entirely and substituted with another Darod personality
chosen within the clan; 3) the TFG and ARS would address the
issue in the next meeting of the High Level Committee and
work through specific plans to select new leaders. On
November 17, Hassan once again told us the ARS is ready to
engage in active negotiations on the composition of a unity
government in Djibouti. The ARS position is that all
political positions and influence be shared equally between
the ARS and the TFG, he said.


10. (SBU) S/E Yates asked the ARS leaders about their
support in Mogadishu and whether or not they could help the
TFG to implement Banadir Administration reform as stipulated
in the IGAD communique and August Addis agreement. They
claimed, as noted above, that many community elders had
traveled from Mogadishu to see them and they would go there
on their next trip into Somalia. Lamenting TFG weakness, the
Sharifs said they'd like to discuss with us arrangements on
the ground in more depth. In our meeting, Hassan told us the
ARS has not participated in the Benadir reform process
because they have not been consulted and invited into the
process by the TFG. Nonetheless, he said that the first
priority is to finalize the political terms at the national
level and then work through details on how to do the same at
the local administrative level.

Immediate Support Necessary
--------------


11. (C The most salient point in all of these conversations
was that ARS-Djibouti needed more signs of support for the
Djibouti Process being led by SRSG Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. In
our meetings, Sharif Hassan emphasized that this support must
be tangible and should begin with immediate financial support
for a joint security force. He said that thus far, the
international community had delivered little more than words.
Citing the European Community's support to bring all of the
parliamentarians to Nairobi, Hassan said that in many cases
the international community seems to be working at odds with
the Djibouti Process. In our last meeting he concluded, "The
USG must not be silent -- it must state and demonstrate its
support for the Djibouti process. With this support, other
international actors will easily come on board, as will
Somalis."

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Both Sheikh Sharif and Sharif Hassan claimed to be
much more comfortable and reassured about working with the
USG, specifically citing their meeting with A/S Frazer, the
Somalia Unit's outreach to them, and Embassy Nairobi's public
statement. They said that despite the challenges and risks,
they remain committed to the process and look forward to
continued consultations with us prior to the November 22 - 25
Djibouti discussions. Other members of the ARS Central
Committee have commented to us that IGAD's renewed
involvement has further clouded what was already a difficult
and murky process. They told us that Sheikh Sharif is
getting advice from all sides, much of it unhelpful, leaving
him without a clear vision on how to attain the goals set
forward in the Djibouti process agreements. This confusion
is exacerbated by a TFG so fully consumed with internal
strife that it is "nonexistent," they said. The ARS leaders
asked for our advice on the mechanisms to begin implementing
a unity government, emphasizing that it is clear that nothing
good can happen with President Yusuf still at the helm. They
have been assured that the USG fully supports the Djibouti
Process and all Somali parties who attempt to advance it.
RANNEBERGER