SOMALIA - TFG PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER FAIL TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002598

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER FAIL TO
COMPROMISE; IGAD TO CONVENE EXTRAORDINARY MEETING NOVEMBER
17

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3109

Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,
d).


1. (C) Summary: As forecast reftel, the Somali Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) President and Prime Minister failed
November 15 - 16, without really trying, to compromise in
their continuing disagreement about the composition of the
TFG cabinet. Each publicly blamed the other for the failure.
The President was departing Nairobi late afternoon November
16, reportedly for Libya. The Prime Minister remained in
Nairobi and was expected to huddle on the evening of November
16 with those members of the cabinet he has unilaterally
appointed. The Prime Minister told the Embassy November 15
that he planned to pursue an IGAD/Djibouti Process-charted
roadmap without the President, whom he described at a
November 16 press conference as opposed to the TFG. The Prime
Minister turned aside efforts to arrange a meeting with
President Yusuf on the evening of November 15. Both the
Yusuf and Prime Minister "Nur Adde" are lobbying the
approximately 180 members of parliament who remain in
Nairobi; Yusuf reportedly in an effort to prevent a quorum
from assembling in Baidoa to approve Nur Adde's cabinet.
Embassy Addis Ababa has confirmed that a snap IGAD meeting on
Somalia, possibly at the ministerial level, will be convened
November 17. Somali contacts in Nairobi, expect a dramatic
gesture from the GOE at that event. End summary.

Yusuf Unwilling
to Budge on Cabinet
--------------


2. (C) As forecast reftel, TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf and
Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde" reached no
agreement on the composition of an interim cabinet while
together in Nairobi November 15 - 16. In a meeting November
15, Yusuf told us that Nur Adde "doesn't know how to
compromise," and maintained that he would not accept a
cabinet that included the five members (among them Deputy
Prime Minister Ahmed Abdisalam Aden) who had refused to do
his bidding and resign the first time around. Yusuf
fatalistically forecast that the TFG would collapse unless
Nur Adde compromised. Then, he said, Ethiopian forces would
withdraw and there would be even greater chaos. In
preparation for that inevitability, Yusuf urged that Amisom
be rapidly expanded and that a decision to quickly deploy a
UN force be taken. (Later in the conversation, Yusuf
admitted that he did not know if the GOE would follow through
on its threat to withdraw troops by the end of the year.)
Yusuf seemed unfazed by al-Shabaab's recent gains, telling us
that "they can't take Mogadishu as long as the Ethiopians are
there," and telling SRSG Ould-Abdallah in a separate meeting
that he would "move to Puntland with his men if Mogadishu
fell to al-Shabaab." Appeals by the Embassy to Yusuf's
"legacy" in Somalia and the importance of supporting the
Djibouti process got Yusuf to say only that he would be
willing to compromise with Nur Adde, if Nur Adde agreed to
replace the five offending ministers with five "technical"
specialists.

Nur Adde Newly
Confident
--------------


3. (C) In separate November 15 meetings with both the Embassy
and the SRSG, Nur Adde appeared very confident. He
emphatically dismissed the possibility of compromise with
Yusuf, who "would not accept a cabinet from me no matter who
was in it." His months-long effort to work with Yusuf had
been, Nur Adde said, a "waste of time." Nur Adde told us he
would chart his own IGAD/Djibouti Process-influenced roadmap,
to include: unilaterally appointing a cabinet, composing a
Benadir administration, completing the constitution, ensuring
that the high-level and security committees were fully
staffed and able to accomplish their tasks, and negotiating
with the ARS a government of national unity, to include an
enlarged parliament.


4. (C) Nur Adde expected that Yusuf would actively attempt to
disrupt the Djibouti process, but he seemed determined to
work around the President, and he requested the international
community's support for his efforts. Yusuf lost no time in
attempting to undermine the Prime Minister. He hosted a
lunch on November 15 for the approximately 180
parliamentarians remaining in Nairobi. Those present told us

NAIROBI 00002598 002 OF 002


that Yusuf lambasted Nur Adde, who had been a "failure" as
Prime Minister. "Before (Nur Adde became Prime Minister) you
were getting paid, and you weren't stranded in Nairobi,"
Yusuf helpfully pointed out. The Prime Minister,
nevertheless, appears confident that the Speaker and a
significant number of parliamentarians will back him in his
confrontation with President Yusuf.

President - PM: No
Meeting in Nairobi
--------------


5. (C) Nur Adde's new-found confidence prompted him to refuse
to attend a one-on-one meeting with Yusuf that had been
scheduled for evening, November 15. An aide to the Prime
Minister told us he had been offended by Yusuf's November 15
public dismissal of the TFG. (Yusuf told parliamentarians and
the media that the TFG controls only Mogadishu and Baidoa.
And al-Shabaab, he said, is eleven kilometers from Mogadishu
and only five kilometers from Baidoa.) The Prime Minister
countered with a press conference of his own on November 16,
where he unilaterally unveiled his 10 minister, 14 deputy
minister cabinet and called on IGAD and the rest of the
international community to support him. Members of the Prime
Minister's staff tell us that he is currently meeting with
those of the nominated ministers who are with him in Nairobi
in an effort to chart his next steps.

November 17 IGAD Meeting
--------------


6. (C) The President and Prime Minister's continued failure
to compromise has evidently prompted the GOE as Chair to
convene an impromptu IGAD ministerial, scheduled for November
17 in Addis Ababa, where observers here are expecting
decisive action. In the meantime Yusuf, after announcing
that he would return to Mogadishu, is reportedly traveling to
Libya, where some suggest he may seek financing for possible
efforts to undermine the newly-allied TFG and Alliance for
the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).


7. (C) SRSG Ould-Abdallah plans to issue a statement calling
on Somalis to continue to support the Djibouti Process. The
SRSG has asked that the ARS issue a similar statement of
support. ARS contacts have told us that they are wary of
issuing a statement, which could be used by the wily Yusuf to
portray the ARS as in league with co-Hawiye clan member Nur
Adde against the President's Darod clan. ARS contacts report
that Yusuf is already pressuring Darod members of Nur Adde's
unilateral cabinet to withdraw.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) With the President and Prime Minister unable to
compromise, the ball seems to be in the Government of
Ethiopia's court. Some here suggest that Nur Adde's
new-found confidence may be traced to support that has been
promised him by an Ethiopian leadership terminally frustrated
with Yusuf. Still, should Yusuf be forced out or leave the
presidency himself, his name would have to be added to the
list of "spoilers," along with al-Shabaab, selected warlords,
and parts of the Islamic Courts Union who have been so
actively impeding the work of the TFG. Nur Adde nevertheless
seems to have decided that Yusuf had become as much of an
impediment to the TFG within the government as he would be
without, and is possibly banking on Ethiopian help to move
Yusuf to the sidelines.
RANNEBERGER