Somalia -- Travel Request

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000233 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS FOR M, ACTING A/S STARR, AND A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018 TAGS: OTRA AMGT ASEC PTER PREL SO SUBJECT: Somalia -- Travel Request Classified by SE John M. Yates for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (U) This is an action message. See paras 2 and 30. ¶2. (C) Post requests Department approval and country clearance for a Mobile Security Deployments (MSD) Advance Team to travel to Hargeysa, Somaliland. The MSD Team will conduct a security assessment for future travel by Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer. The MSD Team personnel will include Joe Lestorti, Eric Kriley, John Satanek, Hodan Hassan, James Spoo, and Daud Abdi (Nairobi FSN-translator). Post proposes that this travel begin on January 26. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger strongly supports this proposed travel so that a security assessment can be completed so future travel by Embassy Nairobi staff members can be facilitated, given the Department's approval. Engagement in Somaliland is required to demonstrate U.S. support for political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, and achievement of U.S. policy objectives. ¶3. (C) Specifically, the MSD Team intends to visit the following location: Hargeysa Sites to meet security officials: Hargeysa Airport Ambassador Hotel National Security Service (if necessary) Police Headquarters (if necessary) Sites to be surveyed for future official visits: Hargeysa Airport Ambassador Hotel Hargeysa University (if possible) -------------- Threat Assessment -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The MSD Team presently assigned to Embassy Nairobi working closely with DS/ITA views the threat assessment for Hargeysa, Somaliland as "Medium to High." Hargeysa is one of the largest cities in Somaliland and it has a population of approximately 450,000 people. There are no reports of large scale fighting in and around the city. There are reports of clashes between the forces of Somaliland and Puntland in the Sool region adjacent to their common border. ¶5. (S/NF) There are no specific threats directed against U.S. interests planning to visit Hargeysa. However, there are reports of varying credibility and sourcing that indicate extremists and those linked directly to al-Qaida continue to use Hargeysa as a logistics center, a transit point, a safe-haven, and base of operations for the planning of future terrorist operations. ¶6. (S/NF) Radical religious elements and members of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) remain active in Hargeysa. Some of the tactics used by these groups encourage an increase in the use of assassinations, guerilla warfare, ambushes, and the kidnapping of prominent individuals in order to destroy the institutions of the "infidels." ¶7. (S/NF) There is also a concern that the hotels in Hargeysa are 'targeted' since they are used frequently by Western officials. Al-Qaida and like-minded extremist groups are aware that foreign officials and security officers frequent the Ambassador and Mansoor Hotels in Hargeysa. (Comment: A minimum seven-member donor steering committee consisting of Swedish, Norwegian, British, French, and other EC nationals is staying at the Ambassador Hotel January 21-23. End Comment) ¶8. (S/NF) There are also potential threats against the Hargeysa Airport due to uncertainty about the reliability of government forces protecting this facility. It is felt the airport is vulnerable to strikes by missiles and stand-off weapons. There is also a concern that extremist groups plan to shoot down aircraft during their final approach into Hargeysa Airport. The overall threat extends to road movement from the airport into the center of the city. The use of "command detonated" land mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (EID) have been used in Hargeysa. ¶9. (S/NF) Reports indicate the Somaliland President would welcome a visit by a senior U.S. Diplomat and do everything in his power to ensure its success. However, there is a concern that the members of NAIROBI 00000233 002 OF 004 the Somaliland Security Service (SSS) are corrupt and relatively incompetent. They are also known to "look the other way" when they are properly compensated. They can be influenced to take bribes, and the turning of their 'blind eye' can be determined by their clan loyalty. The lack of a well-trained and fully vetted security force in Somaliland presents a security concern for DS. Likewise, the arrival of a high level U.S. Diplomat (at the A/S or Ambassadorial level) could be publicized locally thus increasing the profile of the visit. ¶10. (S/NF) The MSD Team learned that the paying for assistance, transportation and wages can improve the level of security and reliance of the assistance provided by the members of the SSS. ¶11. (S/NF) There is little to no threat directed against the members of the United Nations and the NGOs. From time to time, these organizations have been known to use clan militias for "security." Having the U.S. Government use local militias to conduct "security" has the potential of increasing the influence of the militias and thereby undermining the authority of the traditional elders. It is therefore recommended that the U.S. Government not rely on UN or NGO assets (armored vehicles, local staff, and lodging) when traveling into Somaliland. Using these organizations could increase the threat on international relief personnel since they may be targeted for assisting the U.S. Government. ¶12. (S/NF) The security of the MSD Team in Hargeysa can be improved by receiving "real time" security information from the members of the interagency assigned to Embassy Nairobi. -------------- Security Plan -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Five Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) Special Agents will conduct an advance visit into Hargeysa on January 26, 2008 in order to conduct a security assessment of the Hargeysa Airport, Ambassador Hotel, and to meet with senior Somaliland security officials in preparation for a diplomatic visit by the Assistant Secretary (A/S) of State for African Affairs on February 3, ¶2008. ¶14. (S/NF) AIR TRANSPORTATION: Air transportation for the advance team will be provided by an element of the interagency or by a private charter aircraft company. Every attempt will be made to coordinate the use of the interagency aircraft since this aircraft will be piloted by American pilots who will remain on the ground for the duration of the advance visit. Having an American pilot will provide the advance team with a higher level of security since the air crew will be focused on the security situation at the airport. An American pilot could also provide early warning in the event the security situation changes, and he/she would remain at the airport until the advance team returns to the airport in order for the air crew and advance to depart in a timely manner and ahead of any deterioration in the security environment. The advance team is prepared to provide security for the aircraft while it remains on the ground. Having a dedicated aircraft will also enable the advance team to depart earlier, if required. Aviation safety, especially during take-off and landing, is a concern of all flight operations in this region of the world. The American air crew is experienced in conducting flight operations at these types of airports and is aware of the dangers during take-off and landing due to runway conditions and the possible ground fire from small arms and crew served weapons. The use of man portable anti-aircraft weapons (ManPads) and "command detonated" Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are known to be used in and around Hargeysa. ¶15. (S/NF) GROUND TRANSPORTATION: Ground transportation will be provided by Somaliland security officials. In the event there is a shortage of security vehicles for the transportation of the advance team, the team is prepared and possesses a sufficient amount of cash to pay for local rental vehicles. In either case, the advance team will not have physical control of the vehicles used to transport the team to the various meeting places and location that need to be visited as part of the security assessment. Immediately upon our arrival at the Hargeysa Airport the members of the advance team will begin the process of building rapport and gaining the confidence of the local security officials. During the rapport building process, the advance team members will attempt to determine the reliability of the drivers and security officials transporting the team. Area and security awareness will be a major requirement for the advance team, and it will begin immediately with the observation and the initial impression of the drivers and security officials traveling with the team. ¶16. (S/NF) RON: The advance team is not planning to remain overnight NAIROBI 00000233 003 OF 004 in Hargeysa. However, in the event of severe weather conditions or a mechanical problem which prevents the aircraft from returning on the day of the advance team visit, the team is prepared to remain overnight in the Ambassador Hotel. Every attempt will be made to request or hire local security officials to provide security for the team's overnight stay. As with all security operations in Somalia, the team will establish a security perimeter within the security provided by local security officials. Therefore, the advance team will establish an internal security force and guard rotation during an overnight stay at the hotel. The team is presently waiting for contact information for British officials living and working in Hargeysa. This would be our primary emergency contact and overnight location, but the team is presently using the Ambassador Hotel since this is the only known location at this time. ¶17. (S/NF) Special Protective Equipment (SPE): The members of the advance team will be equipped with individual sidearms and long rifles (Sig-229Rs and M-4 carbines). Each member of the team will also have body armor (soft armor and hard plates) in their carrying-on baggage, but will only use the body armor if the initial security assessment is unfavorable. ¶18. (S/NF) COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: The primary means of communications will be with the AN/PRC-117F satellite radio. The advance team will be in constant contact with the MSD Command Center located at Post Two at Embassy Nairobi. This is actually the interagency command net, and it will be monitored by the interagency. Assistance from the interagency Quick Reaction Force (QRF),CSAR and Personnel Recovery elements will be requested by the advance team for the MSD Command Center at Post Two (and monitored by the interagency). Each team member will be equipped with a cell phone that provides cell phone coverage for the region (Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya). The advance team will also be equipped with Iridium satellite telephones (2) that provide worldwide telephone communications. Additionally, the team will carry two BFTs that will be constantly tracked by the interagency on the JBV. The JBV will be monitored in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and the interagency. DS will monitor the BFTs via SA-20 and Embassy Nairobi. NSA will provide a Force Protection Box vicinity Hargeysa, which allow for an additional security measure. ¶19. (S/NF) MEDICAL: There will be one member assigned to the advance team who is Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) qualified. He will be equipped with the required emergency medical care equipment, and capable of stabilizing any injured or wounded advance team member until they can be medevaced to the field medical hospital located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti (approximately a one hour flight from Hargeysa). In addition, each team member will carry a personal medical kit equipped for self aid and buddy aid. -------------- Other Items -------------- ¶20. (S/NF) Water: Each team member will carry water bottles in their individual backpacks and an additional two (2) gallons per man will be stored on the team's aircraft. An additional case of water will also be placed on the aircraft in the event of an emergency or extended stay on the ground by the advance team. ¶21. (S/NF) MRE - Each team member will carry two (2) MREs during the advance team visit. An additional case will be placed on the team's aircraft for use in the event of an emergency or the visit lasts longer than the one day in and out advance trip. ¶22. (S/NF) Emergency Signaling Devices: Each advance team member will be equipped with the proper number, color and type of Flares, Parachute Flares, Smoke Grenades and Star Clusters as stated in team's operations order. ¶23. (S/NF) Operational Funds: The amount will be determined based on last minute coordination with the interagency for the cost of rental vehicles, wages for drivers/security officials, and any additional costs associated with the assistance of the advance team. Currently, this amount is estimated at 5000 USD. ¶24. (S/NF) SAFEHAVEN: Presently, the advance team does not have a dedicated safehaven. The team is coordinating contact information with British Government and NGO officials in Hargeysa for this purpose. In the event of an emergency and until the advance team locates a Western owned house, office, or compound for use as an emergency safehaven, the advance team will have to rely on the Ambassador Hotel for this purpose with host nation security forces and internal team security procedures to protect the team. -------------- NAIROBI 00000233 004 OF 004 Evacuation and Personal Recovery -------------- ¶25. (S/NF) An evacuation and recovery plan has been coordinated between the advance team and members of the interagency at Embassy Nairobi. The aircraft used to transport the advance team into Hargeysa will remain on the ground for the duration of the advance team's visit and security assessment. In the event of a mechanical failure, act of violence or accident the interagency will request an emergency extraction aircraft to fly to Hargeysa to recover the air crew and advance team. As a back-up, the advance team will coordinate for the contracting of a stand-by emergency self-extraction charter aircraft to fly to Hargeysa to extract the advance team and air crew. In the event of severe weather conditions, the advance team and air crew will be prepared to remain overnight at the Ambassador Hotel and waitfor the weather to clear. In the event of a mechanical failure, the same procedure will be followed and the team will await the arrival of the interagency's emergency extraction aircraft or the advance team's contract aircraft. In either case, the advance team will provide an internal security force at the hotel and request the local security official to provide security for the hotel compound. ¶26. (S/NF) It has been recommended that the interagency back-up aircraft and the advance team's charter aircraft be based out of Djibouti in order to reduce the response and flight time to Hargeysa. If the advance team and air crew must remain overnight, it will be recommended that either aircraft will arrive in Hargeysa the following day at the earliest arrival time. Every attempt will be made to limit the amount of time the advance team remains on the ground in Hargeysa. The emergency evacuation plan would be to request emergency extraction by the Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The JFT-HOA Quick Reaction Force (QRF) would conduct an emergency extraction operation of the advance team and air crew using CH-53 Helicopters. The request for this extraction would be made by the advance team to the MSD Command Center and through the interagency command net. ¶27. (S/NF) The "last case scenario" would be the advance team 'hiring' local security officials to transport the advance team and air crew using overland transportation from Hargeysa to the Djibouti border. In the event this scenario would be used, the MSD Command Center would contact MSD Team Djibouti and request RSO Djibouti obtain Chief of Mission (COM) Djibouti approval for diplomatic assistance to permit the streamlining of 'border crossing requirements' from Somaliland into Djibouti. -------------- Risk Assessment -------------- ¶28. (S/NF) The risk assessment associated with this mission is medium to high. Compatible communications with the interagency, approval for the use of JTF HOA QRF, and inter-agency and inter-regional coordination have mitigated risk to our operation. Transporting Diplomats into a failed state and providing for their protection increases the risks associated with this mission. -------------- Conclusion -------------- ¶29. (S/NF) The advance team has conducted a thorough and detailed plan for travel into Hargeysa and the conduct of its area assessment. This plan required extensive interagency coordination and includes a series of primary, alternate, and contingency courses of action (COA) for communication, transportation, remaining overnight (RON) and emergency extraction. The advance team has ensured its radios are properly coded and communications tests will be conducted prior to the advance team's travel into Hargeysa. The team has also prepared a communications plan with the interagency that includes communication requirements for informing the interagency and the JTF-HOA QRF of the advance team's lift off from the departure airfield, situation reports during travel, the crossing of phase lines, arrival at the Hargeysa Airport, and scheduled dates while on the ground conducting the advance visit and security assessment. The advance team has worked diligently to ensure that every aspect of the preparation for the advance team visit has been coordinated with the interagency and that all team members understand every aspect of the operations plan. ¶30. (C) Action Request: Post seeks Department approval and country clearance for the team's travel. Ambassador Ranneberger, Special Envoy Yates, and Regional Security Officer Robert Whigham concur. RANNEBERGER