KENYA'S ELECTORAL CRISIS: WORKING FOR A SOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 000200

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S, D, P, G, R, DS, DRL, AND AF/AS FRAZER FROM THE
AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: PREL KE
SUBJECT: KENYA'S ELECTORAL CRISIS: WORKING FOR A SOLUTION

REF: A. NAIROBI 199


B. NAIROBI 198

C. NAIROBI 197

D. NAIROBI 196

E. NAIROBI 192

F. NAIROBI 190

G. NAIROBI 187

H. NAIROBI 186

I. NAIROBI 184

J. NAIROBI 148

K. NAIROBI 128

L. NAIROBI 126

M. NAIROBI 125

N. NAIROBI 77

O. NAIROBI 76

P. NAIROBI 62

Q. NAIROBI 61

R. NAIROBI 13

S. NAIROBI 12

T. FRAZER-SECRETARY-RANNEBERGER-OPS CENTER TELCONS
JANUARY 4-11

Classified By: Political Counselor Larry Andre for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. With strong support through the Secretary's
calls and A/S Frazer,s recent visit, we are continuing
intensive efforts to facilitate dialogue between President
Kibaki and Raila Odinga in order to achieve a political
resolution of the post-electoral crisis. If achieved, this
will be but the beginning of a process to address underlying
issues. Both have privately signaled willingness to meet
without pre-conditions. The likely visit of Kofi Annan early
next week provides an important opportunity to arrange a
meeting between the two. The U.S. continues to be viewed by
both sides as crucial to a solution. Odinga,s victory in
electing the Speaker of Parliament January 15 has changed the
dynamics by giving him more leverage for dialogue. Kibaki
realizes he will have to work with Odinga. End summary.


2. (C) As reported in refs, since the outset of the election
crisis, we have been working to promote a solution. These
efforts have focused on efforts to facilitate dialogue
between President Kibaki and Raila Odinga, and their
respective camps. At the same time, I have been involved in
intensive public diplomacy, with messages directed at the
Kenyan people as well as the two sides. Although progress
has been made, there has been no breakthrough and tensions
remain high.

--------------
Nature and Dimensions of Violence
--------------


3. (C) Sitreps have reported on the security situation (refs
C, I, J, O, P, Q, and S). The substantial violence that took
place has claimed hundreds of lives and has displaced over
200,000, mainly in Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces. As
reported in ref R, the violence has involved attacks by
Kalenjin and Luo supporters of Odinga against Kikuyu, Kisii,
and Kamba supporters of Kibaki. Kisiis, although they split
their vote between Kibaki and Odinga, have also been attacked
by Kalenjins and Luos as "Bantu foreigners" occupying Nilotic
lands. Kalenjins and Luos have been affected to a much
lesser extent, although some have fled to the Nairobi
environs from neighboring Kikuyu-dominated Central Province.
Violence has largely diminished during recent days, but
tensions remain high and we continue to receive reports of
sporadic violent incidents (and there was some violence
connected to demonstrations held January 16).


4. (C) There are credible reports that much of the violence,
particularly the worst violence carried out in Rift Valley,
was well-organized. (One factor may have been that the
violence in Rift Valley coincided with the end of month-long
initiation rites for Kalenjin youth.) Indications are that
such violence was planned well before the electoral results
were known. It is worth remembering, in this context, that
one of the main campaign issues of Odinga,s Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) was majimboism (the notion that

NAIROBI 00000200 002 OF 005


each region and tribal group is entitled to relative autonomy
in its area). This raised expectations among Kalenjins in
their traditional Rift Valley area that Kikuyus would be
forced off land they own there. Some of the violence,
particularly in Odinga,s home area of Nyanza, was likely
spontaneous, but also involved a degree of opportunistic
criminality. The very high unemployment and relative poverty
rate for youth throughout the country is also a contributing
factor to violence.


5. (C) Although Kenyans are certainly aware of underlying
problems between communities that have existed for many
years, the extent and brutality of the violence has shocked
Kenyans across the tribal, social, and political spectrum.
While the violence ranged between spontaneous and planned, it
brought home to virtually all observers that what happened
revealed the depth of long-simmering unresolved grievances.
Those include the reality and perception of marginalization
of certain areas, centralization of power in Nairobi, the
absence of any land reform policy, and Kikuyu domination of
the economy and government. Much of the violence was clearly
aimed at forcing Kikuyus to abandon their homes and farms in
Rift Valley. The objective did not seem to be to kill
Kikuyus, although hundreds probably died resisting efforts to
force them to flee. There has not been a significant amount
of violent Kikuyu reaction yet, and the government deserves
credit for helping prevent that. The violence that happened
never approximated, even in miniature, a Rwanda-style
slaughter.


6. (C) That said, tensions between these tribal communities
have risen in the wake of the violence, with a number of hate
messages appearing in SMS texts, for example. We are
monitoring vernacular radio stations and have not found much
in the way of hate speech. The extent of tensions was,
however, highlighted by rising ethnic tension within the
Mission, something which I addressed firmly in a town hall
meeting. We are providing necessary support to our Kenyan
staff,s efforts to deal with this national tragedy.

--------------
Public Diplomacy and the Voice of Kenyans
--------------


7. (C) One of the more encouraging developments has been that
the voice of the Kenyan people against violence and for a
political solution to the post-electoral crisis is being
felt. Last week all the media coordinated the launching of a
&save our beloved country8 campaign, which included
constructive editorials; the featuring of peace,
reconciliation, and unity messages; and the hosting of live
call-in shows. Civil society groups have stepped forward,
and religious groups are speaking out. Our MIST team is
endeavoring to work with key civil society groups and the
media to support their positive messages. We are in close
touch with a wide range of civil society and religious groups.


8. (C) My public diplomacy efforts have involved dozens of
radio and live TV interviews (thus flouting the government's
ban on live media news coverage),and interviews with the
print media. Radio shows have generated extensive call-ins,
with one station receiving several hundred. My message
focuses on the need for a political resolution (including
some form of power-sharing and commitment to institutional
reform),the importance of non-violence and respect for the
rule of law, the need for ordinary Kenyans to make their
voices heard, the U.S. position of &no business as usual8
until the crisis has been resolved, and my confidence that
Kenyans are fully capable of working out a way forward.
Feedback to the forthright U.S. public approach has been
extremely positive. (With the U.S. having an 85 percent
approval rating here, the U.S. voice is influential.)


9. (C) The fact that the government has restricted live media
news coverage (based on the rationale that this is essential
in order to control violence and hate speech) and has banned
all demonstrations has made vigorous public diplomacy all
that more important. The ODM has welcomed the U.S. approach,
and the government has acknowledged that our efforts have

NAIROBI 00000200 003 OF 005


been even-handed. We are publicly and privately pressing the
government to end media restrictions and to permit peaceful
demonstrations (at least in Nairobi, where there had been no
violence in recent days). The government,s refusal to give
the ODM a permit for demonstrations planned for January 16
and 17 resulted in some confrontations with protesters and at
least four deaths.

--------------
Facilitating a Political Accommodation
--------------


10. (C) Even as the violence was occurring, we were heavily
engaged in efforts to promote dialogue between Kibaki and
Odinga, and their respective teams. Almost from the outset
of the electoral crisis, both have privately signaled their
willingness to talk. However, those positions were heavily
caveated. Kibaki has insisted that he will not step down
since he was declared the winner by the Electoral Commission,
even if the process was flawed. Odinga,s initial position
was that there must be a recount and/or new election after a
short interim period of several months. Calls by the
Secretary to Odinga and Kibaki, and the visit by A/S Frazer

SIPDIS
during January 4 to 11, were instrumental in pushing both
towards realistic positions for dialogue. As a result,
Kibaki and Odinga have privately indicated willingness in
principle to hold a one-on-one meeting without
pre-conditions.


11. (C) Odinga has repeatedly insisted that any discussions
must be mediated by the international community. Kibaki
refuses to accept the concept of outside &mediation,8 but
both seem to accept some form of &facilitation8 of direct
talks. Although AU Chairman Kufuor was unable to bring about
direct talks during his visit last week, his visit was
constructive in pinning both sides down to general acceptance
of the need for discussions focused on achieving some form of
power-sharing, an agreed agenda for institutional reform
(constitutional, electoral, decentralization, land),and a
commitment to work together to end violence. This was
encapsulated in the statement Kufuor made at the end of his
visit. His efforts to bring the two sides together were
complicated by a document that was drafted under the aegis of
the local World Bank representative by low-level
representatives of the Kibaki and Odinga camps. The document
was ostensibly intended to provide a point of departure for
negotiations (focusing on examination of what went wrong in
the elections, agreement to facilitation by a group of
eminent persons, and next steps to move the country forward).
The representatives of the two sides claimed they were in
direct touch with Kibaki and Odinga (we know Odinga had seen
the document). Odinga insisted that Kufuor get Kibaki,s
final blessing on the document before Kibaki and Odinga met
together with Kufuor. When Kufuor showed the document to
Kibaki it was evident that Kibaki had never seen it.


12. (C) Despite this contretemps, Kibaki and Odinga have
subsequently made clear their commitment to dialogue. The
upcoming visit of Kofi Annan, accompanied by the other
eminent persons former President Mkapa and Graca Machel,
provides a major opportunity to broker a meeting between the
two. Latest reports are that Annan will probably arrive over
the weekend or early next week. We have made clear to both
sides that we strongly support this visit and expect the two
sides to use it to facilitate direct dialogue between Kibaki
and Odinga.

--------------
U.S. Role
--------------


13. (C) Both sides continue to view the U.S. as crucial to a
political solution. This is because both appreciate the huge
dimensions of the partnership between the U.S. and Kenya.
This embraces about USD 2 billion in funds flowing from the
U.S. to Kenya annually (from all sources including USG
assistance, remittances, private investment, tourism to
Kenya, etc.); the large number of Kenyan students in the U.S.
(more than from any other sub-Saharan African country); the

NAIROBI 00000200 004 OF 005


extensive network of American non-governmental groups working
in Kenya; the Kenyan diaspora in the U.S.; and shared
regional interests (particularly Somalia and Sudan).


14. (C) Partly as a result of the strict neutrality that we
maintained throughout the electoral campaign and U.S. efforts
to ensure a credible electoral process, Kibaki and Odinga see
us as a credible interlocutor. They trust us to facilitate
dialogue and to help overcome the deep distrust each side has
for the other. We have been encouraging dialogue through
frequent meetings with Kibaki, Odinga, and members of their
teams. In effect, there has been indirect dialogue with us
as the intermediary. A/S Frazer,s visit was instrumental in
moving this forward. The statement issued at the end of her
visit, which referred to &no business as usual8 until the
crisis is resolved, rattled the cages of both sides in a
helpful way, and highlighted to all our seriousness on the
need for rapid progress.


15. (C) Kibaki and Odinga are mirror images of one another,
in that both are surrounded by hardliners who do not want to
achieve a real political accommodation. To some extent
Kibaki and Odinga may be using this as an excuse not to
engage, but there is also the reality that they must bring
along their people if the results of any dialogue are to be
meaningfully implemented. Our ability to talk directly to
Kibaki and Odinga helps cut through the hardliners, but they
remain highly influential on both sides. That is why only a
direct contact between Kibaki and Odinga can get serious
dialogue started.


16. (C) The immediate objective is to get a process started
that will end violence, return the country to relative
normalcy, and create the space necessary to achieve a
political accommodation and to begin to address the
underlying issues that manifested themselves in the violence.
This means having Kibaki and Odinga designate teams to
negotiate on a formula for power-sharing, to map out an
agenda for institutional reform, and to end violence.


17. (C) As ref H reports, Odinga,s January 15 victory in
electing an ODM Speaker of the Parliament changes the
dynamics in a potentially positive way. Having finally
scored a win ) and a big one ) Odinga is in a stronger
position to bargain with Kibaki. Kibaki and hardliners
around him have been dealt a blow, and will have to find a
way to work with Odinga if they want to have a constructive
legislative agenda. Odinga has close to an absolute majority
in the Parliament.


18. (C) As of this writing, both sides continue to posture
publicly and to pursue misguided strategies while privately
signaling willingness to talk. Government and ODM hardliners
continue to make tough public statements with maximalist
positions (one government minister's statement rejecting
outside meddling; ODM statements insisting Kibaki is
illegitimate). ODM demonstrations January 16 and 17 were
intended to keep pressure on the government and to show the
limits of the government,s security resources as part of the
threat to make the country ungovernable. This resulted in
some violence in Nairobi and other parts of the country as
the police reacted. At least four people were killed.


19. (C) While dealing with both sides has been our primary
focus, we are also working all sources of potential influence
to promote dialogue and end violence. This includes
extensive contacts with the business community (the Kikuyu
elite and others),civil society, the media, and religious
groups. Ref E addresses the huge economic consequences of
the post-electoral crisis.


20. (C) The election crisis is a watershed for Kenya in that
the country has not gone through a period of such intense
ethnic violence since the Mau Mau insuregency in the 1950s.
Observers across ethnic lines agree this reflects fundamental
problems that must be addressed in order to ensure long-term
stability. There is no quick fix. The U.S. is uniquely
situated to help Kibaki and Odinga, and the Kenyan people,
put in place a process to address the underlying issues in a

NAIROBI 00000200 005 OF 005


way that will stop violence. While achieving that is by no
means assured, Kenya has (as discussed in previous messages)
inherent strengths that make chances for success reasonable.
The country can emerge from this crisis on the path towards a
stronger democracy. The priority that the U.S. is giving to
achieving this reflects the importance of Kenya to our
regional interests and to our broader objective of fostering
democratic governance.

RANNEBERGER