Somalia - Revised Travel Request

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001642 SIPDIS FOR M, ACTING A/S STARR, AND A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018 TAGS: OTRA PREL ASEC PTER MOPS ET SO SUBJECT: Somalia - Revised Travel Request REF: A) Nairobi 1129 B) Nairobi 544 C) Nairobi 473 Classified by PolOff Jessica Davis Ba for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (U) This is a revised and updated version of reftels. Per DOD requirements, proposed travelers are concurrently seeking Special Area and Theater clearances. See paras 2 and 21 for action request. ¶2. (C) Embassy Nairobi requests Department approval for Bradley G. Anderson, Colonel, Defense Attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Lisa R. Schade, Colonel, Marine Corps Attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office Nairobi, Kenya to visit Mogadishu, Somalia from July 10-11, 2008. At the invitation of the African Union, COL Anderson and Col Schade will be traveling with Colonel George Amamoo, Chief of Military Planning, African Union, military representatives from NATO and the European Union, and the Addis Ababa-based British, Swedish, Danish, Finnish, and French Defense Attaches and will visit the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu, Somalia. Additionally they will call on Somali political leaders, visit the port, and possibly meet with commanders of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). ¶3. (C) Ambassadors Ranneberger and Yamamoto strongly support this proposed travel. -------------- Travel Details -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) COL Anderson and Col Schade will depart from Nairobi for Mogadishu along with the delegation on July 10 on a regularly scheduled Daallo Airlines flight. The delegation will arrive 1000 at Mogadishu's International Airport and will be met planeside by AMISOM/Ugandan security forces with wheeled armored vehicles and armed Ugandan escort to travel to KM-4. At 1200, the delegation will depart KM-4 to travel to Mogadishu University for meetings with the Burundian contingent of AMISOM, which is billeted at the University. At 1500, the delegation will depart Mogadishu University and return to the Airport. Upon return to Mogadishu Airport, the delegation will tour the UNDP weapons, ammunition, and UXO storage and disposal facility, followed by formal briefings with the AMISOM staff. The delegation will rest overnight in accommodations provided by Ugandan forces in their billeting at Mogadishu International Airport. ¶5. (S/NF) On July 11, the delegation will travel with wheeled armored vehicles and armed escort to the Port of Mogadishu to review AMISOM/Ugandan forces. From the Port the delegation will to travel to Villa Somalia (Presidential Offices) for meetings with the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and AMISOM security personnel. At 1200, the delegation will depart Villa Somalia via wheeled armored vehicles and armed Ugandan escort to return to the Airport. ¶6. (S/NF) The delegation will be booked to depart Mogadishu International Airport on the regularly scheduled Daallo commercial flight at 1430, July 11 and return to JKIA, Nairobi, Kenya at 1630. However, the delegation intends to depart on an unannounced charter flight earlier in the day at a time TBD by the African Union. COL Anderson will rest overnight in Nairobi on July 11 and depart Nairobi for Addis Ababa on July 12. -------------- Threat Assessment -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Embassy Nairobi RSO: Numerous credible intelligence reports clearly indicate that the East Africa al-Qa'ida and affiliated Somali extremists remain operationally active in Mogadishu. These elements have frequently used suicide bombings, well planned ambushes and roadside improvised explosive devices in attacks against ENDF, AMISOM forces and TFG leaders. RSO stresses that the pro-TFG security forces inside Mogadishu have yet to prove they are capable of predicting, let alone, completely mitigating deadly roadside IED detonations, even in areas near their alleged control. Members of the Jihadi militant group, al-Shabaab, are actively engaged in conducting attacks inside Mogadishu, to include targeted assassinations of high profile individuals. The Addis Ababa DATT and Nairobi Marine Corps Attache would present extremely High Value Targets for the East Africa al-Qa'ida and affiliated Somali extremists. Given the opportunity, these entities would expend considerable effort and resources to conduct attacks against any visiting USG personnel despite the promise of protection by the ENDF. ¶8. (S/NF) The TFG, AMISOM, and the ENDF cannot be expected to provide sufficient protection and appropriate security for this visit as evidenced by the constant attacks they themselves endure in Mogadishu, which are unpredictable, non-counterable, and continue NAIROBI 00001642 002 OF 003 unabated. RSO also questions the efficacy and professionalism of pro-TFG security elements in Mogadishu, especially when it comes to their involvement in protecting persons of interests (close quarter protection, safeguarding travel itineraries, the ensuring of all motorcade movements, etc.) whose arrival and subsequent movements will become quickly known to many divergent elements in the city. Furthermore, any aircraft arriving and departing from Mogadishu is vulnerable to attack by MANPADS, and/or mortars when landing and taking off as has happened in the past, and there is no viable method of deterring these types of threats. Based upon all currently available information from relevant security and intelligence sources, both within and outside of the U.S. Mission and USG, RSO is of the opinion that the dangerous, volatile and uncertain security situation in Mogadishu does not support the visit of USG personnel at this time. -------------- Security Plan: Air Transportation -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Air Transportation for the group will be provided by regularly scheduled commercial airlines or contract air provided by the African Union. Commercial air is desirable as it lowers the profile for the trip and there has been no threat to commercial aviation in recent history. Contract air, especially for departure will allow the Attaches to depart earlier than scheduled as part of a deception plan. Regardless of the origin of the plane, the AMISOM forces are prepared to provide security for the aircraft while it remains on the ground. ¶10. (S/NF) Aviation safety, especially during take-off and landing, is a concern of all flight operations in this region of the world. Both the commercial and contract air crews are experienced in conducting flight operations at this airport and are aware of the dangers during take-off and landing due to runway conditions and the possible ground fire from small arms and crew served weapons. ¶11. (S/NF) The use of man portable anti-aircraft weapons (ManPads) are known to be used in and around Mogadishu. Accordingly, to minimize the threat, the aircraft will approach the airport over the water from the south, bank hard to port descending rapidly to minimize the amount of time over the city and land. On departure, the plane will take off toward the south and bank quickly to port, ascending rapidly over the water. No aircraft have been shot down using these maneuvers. -------------- Security Plan: Ground Transportation -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) Ground transportation will be provided by AMISOM/Ugandan security officials. Immediately upon arrival at the Mogadishu International Airport, the Defense Attaches will be met on the tarmac by wheeled armored vehicles and armed Ugandan escort. All transportation will be accomplished with these vehicles and security forces. ¶13. (S/NF) The two day visit will require travel to Villa Somalia, Mogadishu University, and the Port of Mogadishu. The times and routes of travel will be kept secret. TFG security forces will not be made aware of travel until after the AMISOM/Ugandan convoy is actually moving to minimize the possibility of compromise. Ahead of each planned movement, AMISOM/Ugandan forces will clear and secure several different routes to different locations. -------------- Security Plan: Other Logistics -------------- ¶14. (S/NF) RON: The delegation will overnight in the AMISOM/Ugandan billeting at Mogadishu airport. The Ugandans have taken several measures to ensure their security at the Airport; including the construction of berms, sandbags, concertina wire, hardened shelters, security perimeter, armed guards, patrols, etc. The Ugandan force will provide an extra security perimeter inside their regular security force specifically for the visiting Attaches. ¶15. (S/NF) PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT: The U.S. Attaches will be unarmed but each member of the team will have body armor (soft armor and hard plates) and Kevlar helmets. Coordination is being conducted to provide each U.S. Attache with a Blue Force Tracker and appropriate emergency signaling devices. ¶16. (S/NF) COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: Each Attache will carry a Thuraya satellite phone and a cellular phone with a Somali SIM card. Additional communication assets will be provided by AMISON/Ugandan contingent for the purposes of coordinating movements and conducting safety checks. NAIROBI 00001642 003 OF 003 ¶17. (S/NF) MEDICAL: The U.S. Marine Attache from Nairobi is a physician assistant, trained in orthopedic trauma and surgery. She will be equipped with emergency medical care equipment, and capable of stabilizing any injured or wounded team member until they can be medevaced to the AMISOM/Ugandan field medical hospital located at Mogadishu Airport. Additional medical support will be provided by the AMISOM/Uganda medical doctors. In addition, each team member will carry a personal medical kit equipped for self aid and buddy aid. ¶18. (S/NF) MEALS/WATER: Meals and water will be provided by AMISOM/Uganda officials; however, each Attache will carry water bottles and two MREs in their individual backpacks. ¶19. (S/NF) SAFEHAVEN: The Attaches will use AMISOM/Uganda at the airport and AMISOM/Burundi at Mogadishu University as safehavens. Additionally, coordination is being conducted with the United Nations Development Program to use their compound for this purpose with AIMSOM/Uganda security forces and internal team security procedures to protect the delegation. ¶20. (S/NF) EVACUATION/PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR): In the event of severe weather conditions or a mechanical failure of the departing aircraft, the delegation is prepared to remain overnight at the AMISOM/Uganda billeting in Mogadishu Airport for additional nights. AIMSOM/Uganda security forces will provide an internal security force at the airport billeting and provide security for the compound. In the event of an act of violence or severe accident that requires immediate evacuation (and if the situation still allows for air support),coordination has been conducted for the use of a contract aircraft to fly to Mogadishu to recover the delegation. In the event that the Attaches cannot be extracted by air, coordination is being conducted to utilize the RHIB boats provided to the AMISOM/Ugandan forces for port security. The Attaches would embark on the RHIB and rendezvous with coalition ships currently on station in the area. -------------- Action Request -------------- ¶21. (C) Action Request: Embassy Nairobi requests M approval of this proposed travel to Somalia as soon as possible. Once approved, the final travel itinerary will be forwarded to AF and DS. RANNEBERGER