KENYA: SCENESETTER FOR PM ODINGA'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001461 SIPDIS DEPT FOR S, D, F, P, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2018 TAGS: PREL EAID KE US SUBJECT: KENYA: SCENESETTER FOR PM ODINGA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON REF: NAIROBI 1452 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Pamela Slutz, Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The June 16-19 visit of Prime Minister Odinga will highlight U.S. support for the coalition government, bolster the authority of the office of the Prime Minister to supervise and coordinate the government, and provide us an important opportunity to press for results on institutional reform. Kenyans across the political, social, and ethnic spectrum continue to express their deep appreciation of the decisive role the U.S. played in ending the political crisis earlier this year. Odinga will come with a positive message of his and President Kibaki's commitment to make the coalition work. He sees the meetings with the Secretary, A/S Frazer and NSA Hadley as centerpieces of the visit, but will have a heavy schedule on the Hill, with the non-governmental community, and with the private sector. Constituted barely two months ago, the coalition government remains fragile, with substantial noise coming from people on both sides who do not share Odinga's and Kibaki's commitment. Although the coalition government needs to move quickly on constitutional, electoral, and land reform, it faces at the same time enormous challenges to its solidarity and cohesiveness. The negative impact on the Kenyan economy from the crisis is exacerbated by upward-spiraling petroleum prices and the worldwide shortage of staple foodstuffs, including maize and wheat. Para 7 delineates priorities for the coalition government. Deliverables for the Odinga visit include signing an open skies agreement, a Peace Corps event highlighting the return of volunteers to Kenya, and possible announcement of the USD 75 million FY09 supplemental request to Congress. End summary. ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Raila Odinga views the U.S. as having played the decisive role in bringing about the coalition government, and greatly appreciates our invitation to visit. As part of our efforts during the crisis to press him to compromise, we told him that we would invite him to visit in order to bolster the authority and role of the Prime Minister, and that we would provide some measure of technical assistance to the office of the Prime Minister, which we have offered through USAID. In order for the coalition government to succeed, the constitutional authority and role of the Prime Minister to "supervise and coordinate" the government ministries must be carried out effectively. The June 16-19 visit provides a timely opportunity to highlight our support for the coalition government, to bolster the office and role of the Prime Minister, and to make clear the need to achieve results on institutional reforms in order to address the underlying grievances that fueled the post-election violence and crisis. President Kibaki, who also sees the U.S. as having played the decisive role in resolving the crisis, told me that he welcomes Odinga's visit as a means to reinforce the U.S.-Kenya partnership. ¶3. (C) The coalition government, which has been in office barely two months, is fragile. The government is plagued by rivalries among ministers from Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). There is a high volume of noise from players on both sides on such issues as whether or not those who allegedly committed violence during the crisis should be given amnesty, and whether there should be a new opposition to hold the coalition government accountable. Non-governmental groups and other observers are criticizing the cost of the 42-member government, and some are sounding alarm bells that )- in the absence of an opposition -) the coalition government has no incentive to fight corruption. Unfortunately, there are government ministers -- on both sides of the coalition -- tainted by allegations of corruption. ¶4. (C) It is important to filter out the noise in order to listen to what Kibaki and Odinga themselves ae saying. Since the coalition government has assumed office, I have met several times one-on-one with each of them. They have been extraordinarily complimentary of one another. Kibaki praised the way in which Odinga is seeking to play his role to coordinate and supervise the government. Odinga told me he is pleased that Kibaki has told government ministers they must be responsive to the Prime Minister. The antics of some members of their teams notwithstanding, Kibaki and Odinga have avoided quarreling in public. On amnesty, for example, both have highlighted the need to respect the rule of law. Odinga pointed out that giving blanket amnesty up front presumes that everyone detained is guilty, and Kibaki has not ruled out amnesty once cases have been moved through the judicial process. The two men agree that institutional NAIROBI 00001461 002 OF 003 reform is the top priority. Both, of course, see no role for any formal opposition, although a caucus of like-minded parliamentarians to keep the government honest is a possibility. The coalition partners (and we) have drawn the line: now is not the time to constitute a new opposition party that would conceivably bring down the coalition. ¶5. (C) I believe that Kibaki and Odinga share the political will to make the coalition government succeed. Kibaki wants to leave a legacy and has told me he needs Odinga in order to move forward with his agenda for the nation. Odinga has told me that he needs Kibaki to achieve results and to gain credibility for his possible run for the presidency in 2012. This political will to work together is possible because their short- and medium-term agendas for the nation are essentially the same: institutional reform, expansion of social services, and economic growth through the private sector. Two to three years down the line, the coalition could well break up as serious maneuvering begins for 2012. We therefore need to keep strong pressure on Kibaki and Odinga to get results over the next 12-24 months. Maintaining the momentum of the coalition political accord is essential. ¶6. (C) That said, the coalition government faces enormous challenges. If these challenges are not managed effectively, the nation could face new instability fueled by economic pressures on ordinary Kenyans. If that were to occur, it would probably be focused more along class and social lines, than ethnic lines. The severe economic setback resulting from the crisis will be exacerbated in the coming months by rising petroleum prices and the worldwide shortage of staple foodstuffs, including maize, the staple of the Kenyan diet. The government and the entire country have a great deal of work to do to achieve genuine reconciliation to heal the wounds from the worst crisis in Kenya's modern history. Nearly 150,000 internally displaced persons remain in camps either unable or unwilling (or both) to return to their homes/residences/farms. Ethnic identification with "ancestral" lands and fundamental disagreement over how to allocate land nation-wide continue to exacerbate tensions. After several repetitions of such land- and ethnic-based violence (1992, 1997, 2002),many of those displaced are concerned that no amount of increased police presence will provide long-term security in the absence of land reform, social and economic equity, and community-level reconciliation. As reftel reports, the outcomes of the five by-elections held June 11 broke largely along ethnic lines. ¶7. (C) Against this backdrop, we should focus the coalition government's attention on six main priorities. -- First, deliver on promised institutional reforms. While it may not be productive to set absolute deadlines or benchmarks, there must be significant progress on constitutional reform within the next 12 months. Land reform must also be addressed, although this enormously complex problem will take longer to resolve. We understand that the two sides are already working on the draft of a new constitution. -- Second, the commissions that have been established to investigate electoral abuses and recommend changes; to probe the post-election violence; and to advance truth, justice, and reconciliation pursuant to the political accord must work effectively and yield actionable results. Equally important, the recommendations should be implemented. (Note: Of the three commissions, the work of the Kriegler Commission is the most advanced; its report on the conduct of the December 27, 2007 election and recommendations for electoral reform should be ready by September.) -- Third, precisely because the coalition government is a unified political effort, the coalition government must be extra zealous to maintain full transparency and accountability in its actions in order to maintain credibility with the Kenyan people. We must make clear that we are watching closely the government's efforts to combat corruption. In that sense, there can be no "business as usual." The refrain often heard from Kenyans is: "we want unity, but unity with a purpose, and with truth and justice." -- Fourth, steps must be taken to address urgent economic problems. The government has announced removal of import duties on maize and has reduced the tariff on wheat imports. The coalition government must also take steps to control inflation, which is as high as 30 percent in some areas due in large measure to the disruption to transportation and to NAIROBI 00001461 003 OF 003 distribution of commodities during the crisis. It is particularly important that the coalition government attract more foreign investment and bring tourism quickly back to the record levels Kenya was seeing before the crisis. Odinga will be meeting with the private sector during his visit. A letter from me has gone to 60,000 U.S. tour operators and businesses encouraging them to consider returning to and investing in Kenya. -- Fifth, Kibaki and Odinga must lead the way to promote genuine national reconciliation. As part of this process, internally displaced persons must be voluntarily returned to their homes (to their farms and residences ) not their "ancestral" homelands) as soon as community-level reconciliation efforts have paved the way for this. We have already provided USD 15 million for humanitarian assistance to IDPs and are also providing assistance to the reconciliation effort. -- Sixth, the coalition government must work more closely than ever with its international partners/donors. Kenya wants to hold a Kenya-donor community consultative group meeting in the next two months; we and our donor colleagues are generally agreed this should go ahead, provided it is informal and not a pledging conference. There may also be a complementary business promotion event. Odinga is planning a business promotion tour to the UK in July and to the U.S. in September. ¶8. (C) The outpouring of appreciation to us for playing a decisive role to end the crisis continues from Kenyans across the political, social, and ethnic spectrum. The way that people on the street are saying it, and the way we are hearing it from a constant stream of e-mails and letters is: "thank you (U.S. Government and American people) for saving our nation." There are, therefore, high expectations for Odinga's visit, though we have sought to paint a realistic picture. The Kenyan people generally recognize that the U.S. and Kenya already share a huge partnership. We have widely publicized the additional USD 25 million (promised by the Secretary during her visit) following the political accord. ¶9. (C) There are, however, three "deliverables" that can enhance Odinga's visit. First, an "Open Skies" (bilateral aviation) agreement will be signed. Second, there will be a Peace Corps event highlighting the resumption of the program and return of volunteers to Kenya (which began in early June). Third, we should highlight the USD 75 million FY09 supplemental request to Congress for Kenya. ¶10. (C) The most important result of the visit will be to show the continuing strong commitment of the United States to help the coalition government succeed and achieve results for the benefit of all Kenyans. Odinga recognizes this and will come with a positive message. He sees the meetings with the Secretary, A/S Frazer, and National Security Advisor Hadley as centerpieces of his visit. But his well-rounded schedule includes opportunities for him to carry this message to other executive branch agencies, the Congress, non-governmental groups (to include academia and think tanks),the private sector, and the World Bank and IMF. SLUTZ