NAIROBI JANUARY 11 EAC MEETING AND SECURITY WRAP-UP

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 000126 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2010 TAGS: ASEC CASC KE SUBJECT: NAIROBI JANUARY 11 EAC MEETING AND SECURITY WRAP-UP REF: A. NAIROBI 113 ¶B. 76 ¶C. 62 ¶D. 61 ¶E. 12 ¶F. STATE-EMBASSY TELCONS 01/09 ¶G. 01/07 ¶H. 01/04 ¶I. 01/03 Classified By: DCM Pamela Slutz, reason 1.4 b, d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Nairobi's Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) convened Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on 11 January 2008 to review and discuss Post's security posture in the aftermath of the announcement on December 30 of the results of a "seriously flawed" presidential election. Tripwires were reviewed and all members concurred that, given the continuing civil disorder, Post (Nairobi and Kisumu) should remain in a "Standfast" operating mode and the security, economic, and political environment should be monitored on a daily basis. Post/RSO continues to disseminate daily (or more frequently as needed) updates on the security situation through our SMS texting system that reaches all Mission personnel and non-official American wardens. Post is continuing to deny country clearances for non-essential TDY visitors. ¶2. (SBU) All American and FSN employees are accounted for; those CDC personnel assigned to Kisumu but "held" in Nairobi after the outbreak of violence, returned to Kisumu on January 9 without incident. Peace Corps has no Volunteers in western Kenya at this time. PC Regional Safety and Security Officer will visit Kisumu and Kakamega on January 14 to assess the situation in some PCV sites; PC Washington will be making a decision next week about re-posting volunteers to western Kenya. There have been no reported American citizen deaths or injuries and the number and nature of ACS calls has returned to normal. The International School of Kenya (ISK),attended by a majority of USG dependents, opened without incident on January 10. Other schools attended by USG dependents will open January 14 and 15. Several FSNs remain stranded in western Kenya; some are afraid to travel for fear of being targeted by vigilante groups conducting "ethnic screening." ¶3. (SBU) The non-perishable food and fuel situation is returning to normal as containers and trucks move out of Mombasa port, but road travel remains problematic on some feeder roads with sporadic illegal roadblocks being thrown up by criminal groups to demand payment for safe passage. The rural economy in western Kenya has taken a serious blow: production and distribution of maize and dairy products from western Kenya ("the breadbasket") have been interrupted; prices for perishable food and maize are rising in urban areas. Tourism -- and the people whose income depends on tourism -- has suffered a severe blow with most hotels and operators reporting massive cancellations. ¶4. (SBU) The political -- and therefore the security -- situation remains unstable. The two main political parties and their leaders have been unable to reach an accommodation. The next flashpoint will be the opening of Parliament on January 15; the opposition Orange Democratic Party (ODM) has called for peaceful demonstrations on January 16 in Nairobi and elsewhere. The EAC concludes that we can anticipate skirmishes between demonstrators and police and possibly more ethnic violence over the next week. END SUMMARY. -------------- Pre-Election and Election Day Action -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Beginning in early December, DCM chaired weekly meetings to prepare for the Embassy's massive election observation (EO) effort: 54 mobile teams of three or four people on each team dispersed to selected constituencies throughout the country for the period of December 26-8, plus a central control room in the Embassy. Regional Security Office (RSO) were included in all of these meetings and reported back to requesting Diplomatic Security (DS) Headquarters entities. RSO briefed all election observers and held a special briefing session with Mission motorpool drivers tasked with EO transportation. RSO also established robust communication with an expansive number of police contacts throughout the country, who were, and continue to be, utilized for security needs and assessments. ¶6. (SBU) RSO personnel remained in close contact and in close agreement with their counterparts in the Diplomatic Community, to include member states of the European Union (EU),EU Observation team, and United Nations (UN),in assessing the risk of violence and its affect, if any, on Western/Diplomatic personnel. All agreed that violence would most likely occur after the election, regardless of the outcome, but would not target Western interests. The potential for Western/Diplomatic personnel to fall victim to the violence was largely dependent on people traveling to/through then undetermined volatile areas. Members agreed that such areas could not be predicted due to their reliance on the actual outcome of the election. Participants agreed that the best counter to this possibility was to maintain communication with each other and each entity's respective communities. ¶7. (SBU) Anticipating violence in the campaign period, Embassy sent SMS cautions to mission personnel and wardens. On December 21, Mission issued an internal notice and parallel Warden Message urging vigilance during the holiday and election period and recommending people stock food, water and fuel in anticipation of possible shop closings and transportation interruptions. Note: Embassy was closed for holidays (both Kenyan and US) from December 24 through January 1, and reopened on January 2. ¶8. (SBU) Post began operating its EO Control Room (CR) on December 26. Volunteers and members of the Political and RSO sections maintained a permanent presence. Regular contact was made with police contacts and each EO team for security and EO reporting purposes. Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) provided critical information regarding both political and security developments. The Embassy, Warden, and cooperating Diplomatic communities, as well as members of RSO's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC),were advised of critical security issues and developments. Balloting and counting at the constituency level on December 27-8 went smoothly with no incidents reported. All Mission electoral observers returned to post by cob December 28. ¶9. (SBU) Tension in Nairobi and elsewhere increased during the day of December 28, as the Electoral Commission of Kenya announced it did not have sufficient results from constituencies to announce the winner of the presidential race. Following the announcement late in the day December 30 of a winner in the presidential election, violence broke out in parts of Nairobi and western Kenya, including Kisumu. ACS inquiries from outside Kenya and calls from Americans in Kenya began to increase on December 31, and to taper off on January 2-3. RSO entities provided police contacts and made calls on behalf of American citizens when/if necessary. -------------- Core EAC -------------- ¶10. (C) On the morning of December 29, Embassy augmented the task force in the control room to constitute a Core EAC group: DCM, RSO, POL, ECON, CONS, MO/GSO, PAO, DAO, KUSLO, and RA. The Core EAC task force worked in an emergency mode through January 1; it was disbanded on January 2 when the Embassy re-opened for business after the holidays. RA, DAO, and KUSLO representatives routinely briefed Core EAC members on developing information, including the Kenyan military posture. (Note: The Kenyan military remained on alert throughout but was not mobilized. Units of General Services Unit (GSU) and Police -- regular and Administrative -- were and remain the riot control and security frontline.) Each mission component proved critical to daily and future planning of Embassy operations, Public Diplomacy, and security messages distributed to the communities. In total, between December 26 and January 1, Post put out over 40 SMS messages (with parallel All Call radio messages issued by Post 1) reaching over 1300 individuals each time. Other Diplomatic Missions, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and OSAC member businesses regularly utilized these timely messages to inform their own staff, family, and friends. ¶11. (SBU) Decisions for the next day's activities were made by the DCM in close coordination with Post's security and other Core EAC elements. All American and Kenyan employees were accounted for on a daily basis. The Ambassador held morning and evening meetings with core Country Team members to review events, political developments, and the security environment and was engaged in the decisions affecting the Embassy community. RSO sent daily Spot Reports to numerous DS and State Department offices and watch centers. ¶12. (C) DCM chaired a session of the EAC on January 4 and January 11, 2008; Core EAC held telcon with State on January 3, 4, 7, and 9; Post sent front channel status reports on January 2, 5, 6, 8, and 10. Ambassador convened a Mission-wide Town Hall meeting on January 4. On January 4 and 11, EAC members reviewed Post's Tripwires as they pertain to Civil Disorder. EAC members agreed, and continue to agree, that Nairobi should remain in a "Standfast" mode of operation based on the following specific indicators occurring and/or being possible: a) Wider or more severe negative public reaction to an act or domestic policy of the Government of Kenya (GOK),statements by influential opposition figures indicate a desire to organize civil disorder. b) Spontaneous acts of disorder indicating wider negative reaction to local economic events or policies (e.g., fuel price increases, labor problems, land/farm issues). Nonviolent protests in Nairobi (for any reason) resulting in the temporary blockage of streets and/or restriction of the freedom of movement of Mission personnel over a period of several days at a time or more. -------------- Kisumu and Kericho -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The security situation -- physical and food -- in Kisumu, where there were one CDC employee and family and two Walter Reed Medical Research Unit (MRU) employees and families, and in Kericho where there was one MRU employee, was reviewed daily, if not hourly, beginning with the onset of violence in the area on December 29. Several CDC employees assigned to Kisumu who returned from vacation outside of Kisumu during this period, were "held" in Nairobi pending restoration of order and security in Kisumu. On January 2, 2008 Ambassador and CORE EAC, after consultation with Washington, determined that a plan devised by the CDC and MRU employees in Kisumu to drive overland to Uganda on the morning of January 3 was ill-advised. USG personnel were advised to remain in place; local police were requested to -- and did -- beef up security around the residential compound where the USG officials and 16 Peace Corps Volunteers from the surrounding area were staying. At no time was there any indication that Amcits or westerners were targets of violence. ¶14. (SBU) On January 4, an Embassy team (RSO, CONS, MO, RMO/P, CDC, and MRU) flew to Kisumu (on the DAO C-12) and met with USG personnel and non-official Americans to assess the security, food and fuel situation. Physical security for the residential compound was good; but food and fuel shortages remained a problem. On that basis, Core EAC, CDC, and MRU representatives agreed that employees in Kisumu should standfast for the time being. CDC/Kisumu employees in Nairobi were told to remain in Nairobi. On January 3-4, 34 PCVs were flown out of Kisumu, Kericho and Kakamega to in-service training in Tanzania. ¶15. (SBU) On January 7, 8, and 9, Core EAC, CDC and MRU met to discuss when to permit CDC/Kisumu personnel to return to Kisumu. The decision on January 9 to permit CDC/Kisumu personnel to return to Kisumu was conducted in consultation with Kenyan security elements and CDC and MRU staff in Kisumu. Deciding factors included: a) reinforced police presence in Kisumu and around the CDC-MRU residential compound; b) face-to-face discussions by A/RSO and Officer in Charge of the Kisumu Police District (OCPD) on January 4; c) improvement of travel/road access in and around Kisumu; d) successive days of days of calm; e) CDC and MRU offices in Kisumu and Kericho reopened on January 7 without incident; f) food and fuel supplies/availability improved day-by-day; g) announcement that the Kisumu International School would reopen on January 15. -------------- American Citizen Services/Consular Affairs -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Post did not receive any reports of a US Citizen being targeted or hurt by the violence. -------------- Next Steps -------------- ¶17. (C) The January 11 EAC meeting concluded that the Tripwires are currently adequate and that Post remains in a standfast mode. ¶18. (C) The EAC assesses that potential flashpoints for violence in the coming week(s) include, but are not limited to: failure of talks between the two main political parties; opening of Parliament on Tuesday, January 15; naming of additional Cabinet members who are not viewed by members of the opposition or public as legitimate. ¶19. (C) Post security elements remain focused and committed to gathering information on potential flashpoints, demonstrations, and/or other threats related to this crisis. EAC members agreed that Post will take positive and immediate action to update its Emergency Action Plan (EAP). RSO will work with CDC and MRU personnel in Kisumu-Kericho to develop a Kisumu/Kericho-specific EAP, including tripwires. ¶20. (SBU) Points of Contact for EAC issues are DCM Pamela Slutz and D/RSO Jeff Roberts. RANNEBERGER