NAIROBI JANUARY 11 EAC MEETING AND SECURITY WRAP-UP

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 000126

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2010
TAGS: ASEC CASC KE
SUBJECT: NAIROBI JANUARY 11 EAC MEETING AND SECURITY WRAP-UP

REF: A. NAIROBI 113

B. 76

C. 62

D. 61

E. 12

F. STATE-EMBASSY TELCONS 01/09

G. 01/07

H. 01/04

I. 01/03

Classified By: DCM Pamela Slutz, reason 1.4 b, d


1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Nairobi's Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM) convened Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on 11
January 2008 to review and discuss Post's security posture in
the aftermath of the announcement on December 30 of the
results of a "seriously flawed" presidential election.
Tripwires were reviewed and all members concurred that, given
the continuing civil disorder, Post (Nairobi and Kisumu)
should remain in a "Standfast" operating mode and the
security, economic, and political environment should be
monitored on a daily basis. Post/RSO continues to disseminate
daily (or more frequently as needed) updates on the security
situation through our SMS texting system that reaches all
Mission personnel and non-official American wardens. Post is
continuing to deny country clearances for non-essential TDY
visitors.


2. (SBU) All American and FSN employees are accounted for;
those CDC personnel assigned to Kisumu but "held" in Nairobi
after the outbreak of violence, returned to Kisumu on January
9 without incident. Peace Corps has no Volunteers in western
Kenya at this time. PC Regional Safety and Security Officer
will visit Kisumu and Kakamega on January 14 to assess the
situation in some PCV sites; PC Washington will be making a
decision next week about re-posting volunteers to western
Kenya. There have been no reported American citizen deaths or
injuries and the number and nature of ACS calls has returned
to normal. The International School of Kenya (ISK),attended
by a majority of USG dependents, opened without incident on
January 10. Other schools attended by USG dependents will
open January 14 and 15. Several FSNs remain stranded in
western Kenya; some are afraid to travel for fear of being
targeted by vigilante groups conducting "ethnic screening."


3. (SBU) The non-perishable food and fuel situation is
returning to normal as containers and trucks move out of
Mombasa port, but road travel remains problematic on some
feeder roads with sporadic illegal roadblocks being thrown up
by criminal groups to demand payment for safe passage. The
rural economy in western Kenya has taken a serious blow:
production and distribution of maize and dairy products from
western Kenya ("the breadbasket") have been interrupted;
prices for perishable food and maize are rising in urban
areas. Tourism -- and the people whose income depends on
tourism -- has suffered a severe blow with most hotels and
operators reporting massive cancellations.


4. (SBU) The political -- and therefore the security --
situation remains unstable. The two main political parties
and their leaders have been unable to reach an accommodation.
The next flashpoint will be the opening of Parliament on
January 15; the opposition Orange Democratic Party (ODM) has
called for peaceful demonstrations on January 16 in Nairobi
and elsewhere. The EAC concludes that we can anticipate
skirmishes between demonstrators and police and possibly more
ethnic violence over the next week. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Pre-Election and Election Day Action
--------------

5. (SBU) Beginning in early December, DCM chaired weekly
meetings to prepare for the Embassy's massive election
observation (EO) effort: 54 mobile teams of three or four
people on each team dispersed to selected constituencies
throughout the country for the period of December 26-8, plus
a central control room in the Embassy. Regional Security
Office (RSO) were included in all of these meetings and
reported back to requesting Diplomatic Security (DS)
Headquarters entities. RSO briefed all election observers and
held a special briefing session with Mission motorpool
drivers tasked with EO transportation. RSO also established
robust communication with an expansive number of police
contacts throughout the country, who were, and continue to
be, utilized for security needs and assessments.


6. (SBU) RSO personnel remained in close contact and in close
agreement with their counterparts in the Diplomatic
Community, to include member states of the European Union
(EU),EU Observation team, and United Nations (UN),in
assessing the risk of violence and its affect, if any, on
Western/Diplomatic personnel. All agreed that violence would
most likely occur after the election, regardless of the
outcome, but would not target Western interests. The
potential for Western/Diplomatic personnel to fall victim to
the violence was largely dependent on people traveling
to/through then undetermined volatile areas. Members agreed
that such areas could not be predicted due to their reliance
on the actual outcome of the election. Participants agreed
that the best counter to this possibility was to maintain
communication with each other and each entity's respective
communities.


7. (SBU) Anticipating violence in the campaign period,
Embassy sent SMS cautions to mission personnel and wardens.
On December 21, Mission issued an internal notice and
parallel Warden Message urging vigilance during the holiday
and election period and recommending people stock food, water
and fuel in anticipation of possible shop closings and
transportation interruptions. Note: Embassy was closed for
holidays (both Kenyan and US) from December 24 through
January 1, and reopened on January 2.


8. (SBU) Post began operating its EO Control Room (CR) on
December 26. Volunteers and members of the Political and RSO
sections maintained a permanent presence. Regular contact was
made with police contacts and each EO team for security and
EO reporting purposes. Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs)
provided critical information regarding both political and
security developments. The Embassy, Warden, and cooperating
Diplomatic communities, as well as members of RSO's Overseas
Security Advisory Council (OSAC),were advised of critical
security issues and developments. Balloting and counting at
the constituency level on December 27-8 went smoothly with no
incidents reported. All Mission electoral observers returned
to post by cob December 28.


9. (SBU) Tension in Nairobi and elsewhere increased during
the day of December 28, as the Electoral Commission of Kenya
announced it did not have sufficient results from
constituencies to announce the winner of the presidential
race. Following the announcement late in the day December 30
of a winner in the presidential election, violence broke out
in parts of Nairobi and western Kenya, including Kisumu. ACS
inquiries from outside Kenya and calls from Americans in
Kenya began to increase on December 31, and to taper off on
January 2-3. RSO entities provided police contacts and made
calls on behalf of American citizens when/if necessary.

--------------
Core EAC
--------------


10. (C) On the morning of December 29, Embassy augmented the
task force in the control room to constitute a Core EAC
group: DCM, RSO, POL, ECON, CONS, MO/GSO, PAO, DAO, KUSLO,
and RA. The Core EAC task force worked in an emergency mode
through January 1; it was disbanded on January 2 when the
Embassy re-opened for business after the holidays. RA, DAO,
and KUSLO representatives routinely briefed Core EAC members
on developing information, including the Kenyan military
posture. (Note: The Kenyan military remained on alert
throughout but was not mobilized. Units of General Services
Unit (GSU) and Police -- regular and Administrative -- were
and remain the riot control and security frontline.) Each
mission component proved critical to daily and future
planning of Embassy operations, Public Diplomacy, and
security messages distributed to the communities. In total,
between December 26 and January 1, Post put out over 40 SMS
messages (with parallel All Call radio messages issued by
Post 1) reaching over 1300 individuals each time. Other
Diplomatic Missions, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
and OSAC member businesses regularly utilized these timely
messages to inform their own staff, family, and friends.


11. (SBU) Decisions for the next day's activities were made
by the DCM in close coordination with Post's security and
other Core EAC elements. All American and Kenyan employees
were accounted for on a daily basis. The Ambassador held
morning and evening meetings with core Country Team members
to review events, political developments, and the security
environment and was engaged in the decisions affecting the
Embassy community. RSO sent daily Spot Reports to numerous DS
and State Department offices and watch centers.


12. (C) DCM chaired a session of the EAC on January 4 and
January 11, 2008; Core EAC held telcon with State on January
3, 4, 7, and 9; Post sent front channel status reports on
January 2, 5, 6, 8, and 10. Ambassador convened a
Mission-wide Town Hall meeting on January 4. On January 4 and
11, EAC members reviewed Post's Tripwires as they pertain to
Civil Disorder. EAC members agreed, and continue to agree,
that Nairobi should remain in a "Standfast" mode of operation
based on the following specific indicators occurring and/or
being possible:

a) Wider or more severe negative public reaction to an act or
domestic policy of the Government of Kenya (GOK),statements
by influential opposition figures indicate a desire to
organize civil disorder.

b) Spontaneous acts of disorder indicating wider negative
reaction to local economic events or policies (e.g., fuel
price increases, labor problems, land/farm issues).
Nonviolent protests in Nairobi (for any reason) resulting in
the temporary blockage of streets and/or restriction of the
freedom of movement of Mission personnel over a period of
several days at a time or more.

--------------
Kisumu and Kericho
--------------

13. (SBU) The security situation -- physical and food -- in
Kisumu, where there were one CDC employee and family and two
Walter Reed Medical Research Unit (MRU) employees and
families, and in Kericho where there was one MRU employee,
was reviewed daily, if not hourly, beginning with the onset
of violence in the area on December 29. Several CDC
employees assigned to Kisumu who returned from vacation
outside of Kisumu during this period, were "held" in Nairobi
pending restoration of order and security in Kisumu. On
January 2, 2008 Ambassador and CORE EAC, after consultation
with Washington, determined that a plan devised by the CDC
and MRU employees in Kisumu to drive overland to Uganda on
the morning of January 3 was ill-advised. USG personnel were
advised to remain in place; local police were requested to --
and did -- beef up security around the residential compound
where the USG officials and 16 Peace Corps Volunteers from
the surrounding area were staying. At no time was there any
indication that Amcits or westerners were targets of
violence.


14. (SBU) On January 4, an Embassy team (RSO, CONS, MO,
RMO/P, CDC, and MRU) flew to Kisumu (on the DAO C-12) and met
with USG personnel and non-official Americans to assess the
security, food and fuel situation. Physical security for the
residential compound was good; but food and fuel shortages
remained a problem. On that basis, Core EAC, CDC, and MRU
representatives agreed that employees in Kisumu should
standfast for the time being. CDC/Kisumu employees in
Nairobi were told to remain in Nairobi. On January 3-4, 34
PCVs were flown out of Kisumu, Kericho and Kakamega to
in-service training in Tanzania.


15. (SBU) On January 7, 8, and 9, Core EAC, CDC and MRU met
to discuss when to permit CDC/Kisumu personnel to return to
Kisumu. The decision on January 9 to permit CDC/Kisumu
personnel to return to Kisumu was conducted in consultation
with Kenyan security elements and CDC and MRU staff in
Kisumu. Deciding factors included:

a) reinforced police presence in Kisumu and around the
CDC-MRU residential compound;
b) face-to-face discussions by A/RSO and Officer in Charge of
the Kisumu Police District (OCPD) on January 4;
c) improvement of travel/road access in and around Kisumu;
d) successive days of days of calm;
e) CDC and MRU offices in Kisumu and Kericho reopened on
January 7 without incident;
f) food and fuel supplies/availability improved day-by-day;
g) announcement that the Kisumu International School would
reopen on January 15.
--------------
American Citizen Services/Consular Affairs
--------------

16. (SBU) Post did not receive any reports of a US Citizen
being targeted or hurt by the violence.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------

17. (C) The January 11 EAC meeting concluded that the
Tripwires are currently adequate and that Post remains in a
standfast mode.


18. (C) The EAC assesses that potential flashpoints for
violence in the coming week(s) include, but are not limited
to: failure of talks between the two main political parties;
opening of Parliament on Tuesday, January 15; naming of
additional Cabinet members who are not viewed by members of
the opposition or public as legitimate.


19. (C) Post security elements remain focused and committed
to gathering information on potential flashpoints,
demonstrations, and/or other threats related to this crisis.
EAC members agreed that Post will take positive and immediate
action to update its Emergency Action Plan (EAP). RSO will
work with CDC and MRU personnel in Kisumu-Kericho to develop
a Kisumu/Kericho-specific EAP, including tripwires.


20. (SBU) Points of Contact for EAC issues are DCM Pamela
Slutz and D/RSO Jeff Roberts.
RANNEBERGER