OMAN TAKES ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIP REPORT TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000426 SIPDIS WHITE HOUSE FOR OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, G/TIP E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2018 TAGS: PHUM PREL KCRM KWMN SMIG ELAB MU SUBJECT: OMAN TAKES ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIP REPORT TO THE GCC, ARAB LEAGUE, MEDIA REF: MUSCAT 425 Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) During a June 9 meeting on the 2008 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) REPORT (reftel),Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi, informed the Ambassador that Oman planned to raise its ire with our REPORT at the June 9 meeting of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers in Jeddah. Oman would urge a unified GCC response against the TIP report, he said, that calls for the U.S. to "stop humiliating and embarrassing its friends" ) a message that Oman also will present to the Arab League. Sayyid Badr made clear that the Omani government does not have a problem engaging with us on the issue of trafficking, but that the manner in which we have chosen to address it is totally unacceptable to Oman. ¶2. (SBU) Early local press reports on June 10 of the GCC ministerial corroborated Sayyid Badr's message. Private English-language daily "Oman Tribune" carried an article from the Oman News Agency stating that Yusef bin Alawi, Oman's Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, and other GCC ministers had "condemned the false information" in the TIP report and "called upon the U.S. State Department to revise its unfriendly policies against GCC countries." "Al-Watan," the Arabic-language sister paper of the Oman Tribune, ran the same story, which also appeared on Al-Jazeera. Outside the media, news of the GCC ministers' statement on the TIP REPORT is already beginning to circulate among our local interlocutors. ¶3. (C) On June 10, the Ambassador spoke again with Sayyid Badr, whose strong feelings of resentment were still clearly evident, after he had briefed "core members" of the Council of Ministers on our TIP REPORT for Oman. (Note: Many ministers currently are outside of the country, including several who are with the Sultan in Europe. End note.) He informed the Ambassador that although the ministers had decided not to suspend consideration of the draft anti-TIP law, they firmly refused to speed up their action on the legislation to meet our 60-day timeline. In light of the local press reports from the GCC ministerial in Jeddah, the Ambassador counseled caution in airing this matter in the media. "It's too late," he replied. "You did this to us first." Sayyid Badr planned to meet with local journalists today to respond to the report's allegations. While he indicated he would not discuss the government's stated intention to re-appraise "all aspects" of our bilateral relationship unless we retracted the Tier 3 designation, he emphasized that Oman could not remain quiet and "had to defend itself." He also delivered a written rebuttal of claims in the TIP REPORT (see paragraph 6 below.) ¶4. (C) Comment: Oman appears to be following a prescribed strategy to confront us on TIP by staking a hard position against the REPORT and then using the media and its good relations with other states to rally support for its position within the GCC and broader Arab community. The image of Oman, a well-known close ally of ours, standing up to and leading a charge against the U.S., even on an issue not customarily given to media or public attention, could prove popular among local and regional audiences already harboring negative views of U.S. policies. In the event of press inquiry in Washington, we advise emphasizing: our long-standing, close and highly valued relationship with Oman; our high regard and respect for this Sultan and Oman's impressive record of progress, prosperity and stability under his leadership; our continuing dialogue with the Omani leadership on TIP and many other bilateral and regional issues; and our intention to work together to maintain the relationship as well as to address our shared interest in combating trafficking. ¶5. (C) Comment (continued): Sayyid Badr's response to Oman's Tier 3 ranking may stem in part from uncertainty over our motivations on this issue - a point that Sayyid Badr has raised with the Ambassador previously. He suspects a "hidden agenda" behind the TIP REPORT on Oman, despite our best efforts to disabuse him of this notion. Citing the absence of a significant TIP problem in Oman and the alleged failure of the U.S. to appreciate the steps it has taken to address TIP, he has said, "We can only conclude that there is something else (behind the tier ranking)." This perception likely will complicate our efforts to solve the current impasse. Post will provide recommendations septel for USG action to address this problem. End comment. MUSCAT 00000426 002 OF 003 ¶6. (SBU) Text of Sayyid Badr's "Further Points Concerning 2008 Trafficking in Persons Country Narrative - Oman" It is widely accepted (for example Global Peace Index, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008) that levels of crime in Oman, including trafficking, are very low indeed. It is contrary to natural justice to apply a set of yardsticks and norms to Oman that are relevant to circumstances elsewhere and not to circumstances in Oman. The United States offers as an explanation that it is under a legal obligation to REPORT on trafficking as it does. The United States law in this matter is inappropriate to Oman's circumstances, and the United States must accept political and moral responsibility for the consequences of that. Furthermore, Oman totally rejects the applicability of United States law to Oman. This reporting regime is said to be required where there are significant numbers of trafficking victims. There are not and never have been significant numbers of trafficking victims in Oman. Neither the United States nor any other party has produced evidence to suggest otherwise. This reporting regime is therefore not applicable. For further information, the following points are offered: ¶1. "Oman is a destination and transit country for men and women...some of them subsequently face conditions of involuntary servitude." The Omani government takes all practical measures to maintain security and prevent this practice. The numbers in Oman that may face conditions of involuntary servitude are very small indeed. ¶2. "Agencies...in South Asia and the United Arab Emirates may also coerce...workers...into accepting exploitative work...in Oman." Actions taken by other states under other jurisdictions are not Oman's responsibility. ¶3. "Recommendations...enact legal reforms to prohibit all forms of trafficking." Oman's response to the 2007 REPORT made it clear that a new law, specifically addressing the trafficking issue, is being drafted with the intention of having it enacted in the course of 2008. This work is now well in hand and the U.S. Embassy in Muscat is well briefed. In the absence of a satisfactory response from the United States to the wider issue this work may be put on hold. ¶4. "Recommendations...significantly increase investigations." Every single allegation of trafficking received by the authorities is fully investigated by the Omani authorities. It is logically impossible to increase an investigation level beyond 100%. Oman challenges the United States to offer one single instance of reported trafficking that has not been investigated. ¶5. "Oman failed to REPORT any progress in prosecuting or punishing trafficking." Oman does not accept that it is under any obligation whatsoever to REPORT these matters to the United States. ¶6. "The government...has taken no active measures to criminally investigate trafficking." This statement is untrue and Oman does not accept that it is under any obligation to REPORT steps taken to the United States. ¶7. "The Ministry of Manpower received 297 grievances from laborers...the Ministry negotiated all but 12 of these cases out of court." This outcome reflects Oman's non-adversarial culture, and is overwhelmingly in the interests of the workers concerned. The fact that only 12 cases went to court reflects the reality that in practice in Oman serious abuses of labor including trafficking are very rare indeed. It should also be noted here that Oman's Labor Law provides far more timely redress for workers in dispute with their employers than is generally the case elsewhere. ¶8. "The government did not take any known measures to...educate its citizens." This is untrue. The government has sponsored a key workshop (entitled: Public awareness in combating human trafficking and collective national responsibility) which was widely publicized to address these matters, including drafting of a brand new law, in which all the relevant government agencies and representatives of the private sector and NGOs participated, and on which the US Embassy Muscat has been briefed. MUSCAT 00000426 003 OF 003 ¶9. "Countries determined to have a significant number of trafficking victims are assigned to one of three tiers." Oman does not have a significant number of trafficking victims and neither the United States nor any other party has produced any evidence whatsoever to suggest otherwise. End text of document. GRAPPO