CODEL PRICE DISCUSSES TRADE SECURITY AND IRAN WITH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000041 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS USDOE/NNSA FOR WKILMARTIN, MBEDKE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR AWYSOCKI, THORTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD EWWT AMGT PTER MU SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE DISCUSSES TRADE SECURITY AND IRAN WITH POLICE, PORT OF SALALAH REF: A. 07 MUSCAT 900 ¶B. MUSCAT 36 ¶C. 07 MUSCAT 387 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A Congressional delegation (CODEL) led by Representative David Price of North Carolina -- Chairman of the House Appropriations Sub-Committee for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) -- visited Muscat and Salalah January 7-9 to assess DHS's Secure Freight Initiative (SFI)(ref A). The delegation met with the Inspector General (IG) of the Royal Oman Police (ROP),discussing Oman's participation in SFI as well as the January 6 confrontation between U.S. Navy vessels and Iranian boats in the Strait of Hormuz. The CODEL also toured the Port of Salalah, where the Port's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) briefed it on the difficulties of implementing the 9/11 Act's 100% scanning requirement in a transshipment port. The Members and port authorities discussed various ways to ensure the security of U.S.-bound cargo. (Note: Post reported septel on the CODEL's January 8 meeting with Oman's Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, which covered a broader range of bilateral and regional issues (ref B). End note.) End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ROP: Happy with Cooperation... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) On January 8, CODEL Price met with Malik bin Sulaiman al-Ma'mari, IG of the ROP, whose Directorate of Customs has been the USG's main partner in SFI. The Members thanked al-Ma'mari for the ROP's support to date, stating that the U.S. has received "no better cooperation (in implementing the initiative worldwide) than from Oman." Al-Ma'mari and his staff commented that preparations for SFI's implementation -- which is scheduled to begin scanning 100% of targeted U.S.-bound cargo at the Port of Salalah in early 2008 -- seemed to be progressing smoothly. They mentioned their concern, however, that in the event that scanning identifies dangerous radioactive material in a container, Oman does not yet have the resources or know-how to handle and contain it. The Director General of Customs stated that an interagency team including ROP Customs and Civil Defense, as well as the Omani Ministries of Energy and Transportation, is working with partners in the U.S. Departments of State, Energy and Homeland Security to develop an emergency response protocol for Oman. He added that the ROP needs continued technical assistance, as well as protective equipment and training for its frontline inspectors, in order to develop its capacity to deal with radiological threats (ref C). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ...But Avoiding Comment on Iran - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) In addition to discussing trade security, the CODEL pressed al-Ma'mari for his opinion on the January 6 confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz between U.S. naval vessels and Iranian fast boats. Al-Ma'mari was reticent to speak about the incident in any depth, often repeating that he did not yet have enough information to comment. At one point he asked the delegation to understand that Oman is in a "tough neighborhood," and that it has a long, shared history with Iran that it must consider before speaking too quickly about events in the region. He mentioned, however, that he had discussed the incident with the Iranian Commander of Police -- who was in Muscat with an official delegation at the same time as the CODEL -- and that his Iranian counterpart had confirmed press reports that the boats were under the command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IG stressed to the Members that tension in the region is high, and that "mistakes" by either side could lead to a quick escalation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Transshipment Presents Unique Challenges - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) On January 9, CODEL Price traveled from Muscat to Salalah for a tour of the Port and a briefing by the Port's CEO, Gary Lemke. Lemke argued that the nature of the transshipment business presents unique challenges to implementing SFI in Salalah. He stated, for instance, that feeder ships carrying cargo en route to the U.S. often do not unload all of their containers at the Port. Unless MUSCAT 00000041 002 OF 002 containers are scanned at the port of load, there could be instances in which U.S.-bound containers escape scanning before reaching the U.S. Lemke also showed members of the delegation a sample stowage plan of a ship carrying U.S.-bound containers. The containers were scattered throughout the ship, organized not by port of destination, but by a combination of factors including a container's weight, length and need for refrigeration. A transshipment port like Salalah faces a challenge, Lemke explained, in identifying U.S.-bound containers among the rest of the cargo in incoming ships, and then in off-loading those containers for scanning in a way that does not disrupt or slow down Port operations. ¶5. (SBU) Instead of mandated scanning at all ports, Lemke recommended that the USG focus resources on scanning containers at the port of load where containers first enter the international shipping stream. The costs of scanning U.S.-bound containers more than once at multiple ports of call outweigh whatever security benefits that might be gained, Lemke surmised. As long as transshipment ports comply with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and, like Salalah, have had their security measures assessed and approved by the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. can have a high level of confidence that the container will transit the port without being compromised. While Lemke admitted that a determined person or group could put something in a container while it is on board ship, the close proximity of the containers and the fact that they are loaded based on criteria other than port of destination would make it extremely difficult to target and access a U.S.-bound container. Finally, each container is equipped with a seal once it has been inspected and scanned, and in most cases, the next port of discharge would be able to determine if someone had broken the seal en route and opened the container. - - - - - - - - - - - - A Possible Alternative - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) The Members discussed with port authorities the feasibility of the 9/11 Act's 100% scanning mandate, especially in a transshipment port like Salalah. Their concern increased when the Integrated Container Inspection System (ICIS) lane that DHS and the U.S. Department of Energy had funded and helped install failed during a demonstration run, in part because the ROP inspector running the demonstration had not been trained on the equipment. The Members and port authorities talked about other ways to ensure container security, such as security devices that can detect if someone had tampered with or broken a container's seal. Lemke warned that seal technology remains experimental and expensive, and that no system can guarantee a container's security. The hope was expressed, however, that shippers' would see it in their financial interest, given the possibility of expedited access to U.S. markets, to invest in developing the technology. ¶7. (U) CODEL Price did not clear this message. GRAPPO