SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-OMAN GULF SECURITY DIALGOUE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MUSCAT 000361 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL PTER MASS MNUC MOPS KNNP MU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-OMAN GULF SECURITY DIALGOUE (MAY 27, 2008) REF: A. MUSCAT 317 ¶B. MUSCAT 313 ¶C. MUSCAT 308 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (U) In preparation for the next round of the U.S.-Oman Gulf Security Dialogue in Washington, D.C., Embassy Muscat provides the following updated information on the main subject areas scheduled for discussion. The final composition of the Omani delegation for the GSD has yet to be determined, but it will be led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Secretary General Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi who holds ministerial rank and has played the leading Omani role in previous GSD talks. Iran -------------- ¶2. (C) Oman continues to maintain close, cordial relations with Iran. Of late, it has proactively sought to strengthen this relationship both to stave off untoward intentions that Iran might have towards the Sultanate and also to address specific Omani priorities, especially acquisition of gas. Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin Alawi visits Iran on a semi-regular basis; a senior Omani delegation led by the Deputy Prime Minister traveled to Tehran in April 2008 to reciprocate the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Muscat in May 2007. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the Omani delegation in Tehran on the joint development of Iran's Kish gas field reflects Oman's "urgent" need for natural gas to fuel its ambitious industrial development plans. The MOU did not, however, signal the conclusion of a final deal, but was an agreement to continue negotiations on the terms of the proposed project (ref B). ¶3. (C) Until now, the Oman-Iran relationship has been largely non-substantive and there has been little in the way of meaningful cooperation (and only limited trade) between the two countries. Iran, however, is pushing to bolster the relationship through increased tourism, trade and investment and has even sought to raise the level of mil-mil cooperation. Oman's strategic relationship still clearly lies with the United States (and the U.K.),and it regularly shares its insights and observations concerning Iran with us. Omani officials also advocate in Tehran for a more conciliatory approach towards the West. ¶4. (C) Oman's leadership recognizes and shares U.S. concerns about Iran's nuclear activities and the significantly increased instability a nuclear-capable Iran would mean for the region. Omanis are also anxious about Tehran's meddling and trouble-making in other states and its opposition to efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, the January 2008 incident between Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and U.S. naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz highlighted to Omani officials the vulnerability of this strategic chokepoint to unpredictable Iranian behavior. ¶5. (C) Despite these shared concerns, Oman's views on how to respond to Iranian actions continue to diverge from our own. Senior Omani government officials repeat their advice that sanctions against Iran are counter-productive and may strengthen hard-line attitudes in Tehran. Accordingly, while Oman has pledged to uphold its obligations as a UN member in implementing UNSCR sanctions resolutions against Iran, it is very unlikely that the government will go beyond the letter of these resolutions. Omanis instead urge direct talks with Tehran without preconditions as the best way to mitigate Iranian threats. In general, leaders in Oman's military and security services take a more pragmatic view about the dangers posed by Iran than their civilian counterparts, who maintain that Iran is not a direct threat to Omani national interests. Iraq -------------- ¶6. (C) The Omani leadership remains concerned with Iraq's future and the possibility that extremist and sectarian violence in Iraq could spill over into other states in the region. Though encouraged by the improvement in security in Iraq brought on by the U.S. troop surge, Omani government officials continue to harbor doubts about the reliability of Iraq's leadership and whether it can effectively control the country. Senior Omanis also have continuing concerns about Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's interest in and capability of MUSCAT 00000361 002 OF 004 pursuing reconciliation with Sunni leaders, which they see as critical to ending the insurgency. ¶7. (S) Sultan Qaboos recently told the Ambassador that he recognizes Oman and other Arab states should "do more" to support the Iraqi government. While he declined to re-open Oman's embassy in Baghdad due to security concerns, he agreed to consider further action in support of Iraq (ref C). The Sultan and his senior military officers back a continued U.S. military presence in Iraq until security is established and Iraqi forces and police are able to preserve stability. Oman will likely not send a senior official to the International Compact on Iraq (ICI) Ministerial in Stockholm on May 29 due to schedule conflicts. Middle East Peace -------------- ¶8. (C) The Omani government remains a quiet supporter of efforts to peacefully resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the President's two-state vision. Oman endorsed and participated at the ministerial level in the November 2007 Annapolis Conference to promote Middle East peace. The government's enthusiasm had been dampened, however, by events in Gaza. Omani officials warn that the U.S. must increase pressure on Israel to take meaningful action on settlements and to offer genuine concessions if a peace deal is to be achieved by the end of this year. ¶9. (C) Both Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs bin Alawi and MFA Secretary General Sayyid Badr remain in periodic contact with Israeli officials. Bin Alawi met with Israeli Foreign Minister Livni in April in QATAR during the Doha Forum on Democracy, Development and Free Trade and was "impressed" by her briefing on the final status issues being discussed between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators (ref A). He questioned, however, whether the Palestinian side would agree with Livni's report and has sought the Palestinians' assessment. Bilateral Security Relationship -------------- ¶10. (C) U.S. security and military cooperation with Oman remains strong. The U.S.-Oman Base Access Agreement, first signed in 1980 and still a cornerstone of our bilateral security relationship, is up for renewal in 2010. The U.S. will ask to expand its scope to include the growing Port of Sohar in northern Oman, as well as the new al-Musanah airbase (close to Sohar) to help compensate for the phased closure of military facilities at Muscat International Airport (MIA). U.S. AFCENT hopes to build a new War Reserve Materiel (WRM) site at al-Musanah to house equipment currently at MIA. ¶11. (S/NF) Oman has supported virtually all access, basing and over-flight requests we have made. NAVCENT is dramatically increasing the number of port calls to the Sultanate, including liberty visits and logistical re-supply visits. However, Oman does not currently allow nuclear-powered warships to call at its ports. Earlier this year, the Ambassador informally approached Minister bin Alawi to request an exception to this policy in order to allow a nuclear-powered submarine to make a port call, which was denied. COMUSNAVCENT sees a submarine visit as a stepping-stone to ultimately opening the way for carriers to make port calls in Oman. ¶12. (S) The planned joint military exercise schedule for FY08 is robust, including one ground, two air (one of which will be a combined operation between Oman, the U.S., the U.K. and France),and two Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) exercises in addition to three Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs. Planning for a new amphibious exercise with Oman is underway, the objective of which will be the delivery of military assistance from the sea in response to a humanitarian disaster. Omani Defense Needs -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) Omani leaders remain persuaded that Iran would not attack GCC countries with missiles in response to a military strike staged in the Gulf. They see asymmetrical, terrorist operations conducted by Iran against Gulf states, including U.S. targets in these countries, as a greater danger. Consequently, the Omanis have little appetite for high price-tag Patriot missiles, but are interested in Shared Early Warning (SEW) and seek to modernize their capability - MUSCAT 00000361 003 OF 004 both defensive and deterrent - to help counter what they view as more likely threats. To this end, Oman has made ATACMS/HIMARS a top priority due to its strong deterrent capability. ¶14. (S) From a high of USD 24.85 million in FY04, the FY08 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) budget request for Oman was first reduced to USD 10.10 million, and then again to USD 4.4 million. Declining U.S. FMF poses a challenge for the modernization of Oman's military, as well as for the future of U.S. weapons sales to Oman. (Note: Oman's military budget is small compared to the rest of the GCC. End Note.) The Omanis will question whether the reduction for FY08 is intended as a political message. Availability and funding issues - Oman has expressed a need for "creative financing" - for Oman's proposed purchase of ATACMS are currently under review by the inter-agency process in Washington. ¶15. (S/NF) In addition to ATACMS/HIMARS, the following systems are of the most immediate importance to the Omani government and would enhance Oman's interoperability with U.S. and GCC systems in responding to regional security threats: -- SLAMRAAM (Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile) -- C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) -- AIM-9X Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile -- Maritime Surveillance Aircraft (both fixed and rotary) -- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) -- F-16 Fighter Aircraft Counter-Terrorism/Internal Security -------------- ¶16. (C) Oman's long coastline and relatively open borders in some inland areas remain vulnerable to smugglers, drug traffickers, and - potentially - terrorists. Border control accordingly continues to be one of Oman's top priorities and a major area of bilateral cooperation with the U.S. In 2007, for example, the USG provided the ROP with ground sensors to track movement of people and vehicles across its border with Yemen. The Royal Oman Police Coast Guard regularly detains smugglers and illegal migrant workers, usually along Oman's northern coast between Muscat and Sohar; more Somalis are allegedly attempting to enter Oman via Yemen. One unofficial estimate placed the number of illegal immigrants apprehended in 2006 at over 25,000, although the numbers reportedly declined in 2007. Counter-Proliferation -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The Embassy works closely with Oman to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their components. The Port of Salalah - one of the busiest transshipment ports in the world ) is participating in the Department of Energy's Megaports program and is a pilot port in the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). The Port of Salalah hosts three Customs and Border Protection (CBP) targeters who have been working closely with Royal Oman Police (ROP) Customs since 2005 under the auspices of the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Through ongoing technical and financial assistance from the U.S. Departments of Energy and Homeland Security, ROP Customs is able to scan targeted containers through an Integrated Container Inspection System (ICIS) lane utilizing both x-ray and radiation detection equipment. ¶18. (SBU) Oman also has received equipment and technical assistance to strengthen its export control regimes under the U.S. Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program. EXBS trainers conducted workshops to encourage policy makers to pass export control legislation and adopt an export control list for sensitive and dual-use items. Through EXBS, the Embassy also encourages Oman to fully meet its commitments under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent the proliferation of chemical, nuclear and biological weapons. ¶19. (C) Oman's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has been lukewarm. While it has sent representatives to PSI conferences, to date it has declined to participate in operational exercises, including those in the Gulf region. However, post hopes that the attendance of MFA Secretary General Sayyid Badr at the PSI senior-level event in Washington, D.C. on May 28 will be a catalyst for MUSCAT 00000361 004 OF 004 stepped-up Omani involvement in the PSI. Oman continues to "consider" participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, even though post has stressed this would not entail any significant new commitments on the part of the Omani government. We suspect that the Omanis, who are reluctant to take a regional lead on such initiatives, are waiting for more Arab - and particularly GCC ) countries to announce their membership. GRAPPO