SCENESETTER FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF T.

S E C R E T MUSCAT 000102 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS FOR GENERAL MOSELEY FROM AMBASSADOR GRAPPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KNNP MARR MASS MNUC MOPS OVIP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF T. MICHAEL MOSELEY'S VISIT TO OMAN Classified By: AMBASSADOR GARY A. GRAPPO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) General Moseley: Embassy Muscat and I warmly welcome your return to Oman. We have asked for meetings with the Commander of the Royal Air Force of Oman and Mohammed al-Rasbi, Under Secretary for Defense Affairs (Deputy Minister equivalent). Al-Rasbi has been actively engaged in the Shared Early Warning discussions at Joint Military Commission meetings, and participated in the most recent round of the U.S.-Oman Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD). As one of our oldest allies in the Middle East (the Omanis refer to their relationship with us as "strategic"),Oman remains a strong friend that has consistently allowed us use of its military bases. Regional threat issues remain a prominent concern for the Omani leadership; however, Oman's perspective on the threat posed by Iran differs from those of the USG and its GCC partners. The GSD has highlighted these differences, with Oman recognizing the instability created by Iran, but advocating direct talks with Tehran without preconditions or sanctions as the best way to mitigate Iranian threats. IRAQ and the Israel-Palestinian conflict are two other key regional concerns for Oman. ¶2. (S) Under the auspices of the GSD, Oman is not interested in Patriots, but is interested in Shared Early Warning as well as HIMARS/ATACMS, which the Omanis seek for its deterrent capability. Our engagement with Omani security forces continues with a number of successful projects (e.g., the Masirah Island fuel project and plans for movement to the new al-Musanah airbase) undertaken to enhance our future base access and contingency planning. However, the recent reduction in U.S. FMF funds could adversely impact opportunities for further military engagement and interoperability. On a new endeavor, I fully support the proposed establishment of the NESA Center Forward in Muscat. This proposal has previously been discussed informally with key Omanis. End Summary. Regional Security Concerns -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) While neither the political nor military leadership wants to describe Iran as a threat to Oman's security, Omani officials have indicated that they are very concerned with 
Iran's nuclear ambitions. In addition to the significantly increased instability a nuclear-capable Iran would mean for the region, Omanis are anxious about Iranian meddling and trouble-making in other states, particularly IRAQ and Lebanon. They also worry about the long-term consequences if this behavior is left unchecked. The January incident between IRGC and NAVCENT vessels in the Strait of Hormuz highlighted to Omani officials the vulnerability of this strategic chokepoint to unpredictable Iranian behavior. OMC is working to establish working group meetings between NAVCENT and Oman to ensure the Omanis understand their responsibilities under maritime law concerning the Strait, and to explore programs to assist Oman in monitoring and securing this vital waterway. ¶4. (S/NF) Oman retains a close, cordial but non-substantive relationship with Iran - which it uses to advocate for cooperation with the West - and is careful to avoid provoking Tehran. Moreover, Omani leaders have a unique view of potential Iranian military action in that they do not believe Iran would attack GCC countries with missiles in response to a military strike staged in the Gulf. Instead, they see asymmetrical, terrorist operations conducted by Iran against Gulf states, including U.S. targets in these states, as more likely. To this end, the Omanis are not keen on acquiring Patriot missiles, and are much more interested in Shared Early Warning (SEW) and HIMARS/ATACMS, which they view as the most credible deterrent option. ¶5. (S) The Omani leadership is deeply concerned with Iraq's future; they remain particularly concerned that extremist and sectarian violence in IRAQ could spill over into other states in the region. Though encouraged by the recent improvement in security in IRAQ brought on by the U.S. troop surge, Omani government officials harbor doubts about the reliability of Iraq's leadership and its inability to effectively control the country. They continue to assert that military force alone will not bring stability to Iraq. Senior Omanis also doubt that Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki is interested in, and/or capable of, pursuing reconciliation with Sunni leaders, which they see as critical to ending the insurgency. Omani officials may ask for your thoughts on Afghanistan/Pakistan, particularly given recent events in these countries. Foreign Policy Context -------------- ¶6. (C) Though not a major financial donor, Oman supports USG efforts to promote security and political stability in Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki visited Muscat in April 2007 for talks with the Sultan and senior officials. The Omani government forgave all Iraqi debt and has publicly condemned several high-profile terrorist attacks, while stressing religious tolerance at home. ¶7. (S) Oman maintains regular political and military ties with Iran, but its strategic relationship clearly lies with the United States (and the U.K.) and it regularly shares its insights and observations concerning Iran with us. Oman is disturbed by Iran's growing influence in the region and by its inability to come to terms with the U.S. and other P5 members over its nuclear program. Nevertheless, the Omani government strongly seeks to avoid military confrontation with Tehran and prefers dialogue and cooperation with Iran on mutual maritime security and other shared interests -- including possibly importing Iranian gas to fuel Oman's expanding industrial needs. Oman has used its ties with Tehran to urge the Iranians to adopt a more conciliatory approach in addressing Western concerns over its nuclear activities and its position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet senior Omani government officials repeatedly advise us that sanctions against Iran could prove counter-productive and may strengthen hard-line attitudes in Tehran. ¶8. (C) The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a matter of considerable interest, both within the leadership and among the Omani public. Oman closed the Israeli Trade Mission in Muscat in 2000 during the Second Intifada, but supports the Roadmap process and still maintains good (though non-public) communications with Israeli officials, including at the Foreign Minister level. The Omani government endorsed and participated at the ministerial level in the President's November 27, 2007 conference in Annapolis to promote Middle East peace. You can expect to hear that a lasting Israel-Palestinian peace will greatly enhance our efforts against TERRORISM and extremism in the region. ¶9. (SBU) While U.S. military engagement with Oman remains strong, there have been other important developments in the bilateral relationship. The U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement, signed by the President in September 2006, will take effect once all regulatory requirements are in place. As Oman drives toward industrialization and economic diversification, several billion dollars of U.S. investment have poured into the country. Oman has also been a partner in USG reform assistance efforts under the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which focuses on judicial, educational, economic and political reform, as well as women's empowerment. Furthermore, Oman is an active participant in two-port/cargo security programs sponsored by the USG: the Container Security Initiative (administered by the Department of Homeland Security),which pre-screens containerized cargo being shipped to the U.S.; and the Department of Energy's MegaPorts Initiative, which is working to install equipment at Omani ports to identify nuclear material. Finally, Oman, like several other Gulf countries, is in the throes of double-digit economic growth coupled with growing foreign and domestic investment. Domestic Counter-Terrorism (CT) Efforts -------------- ¶10. (S) Border control is one of Oman's top priorities. From May-July 2006, Omani forces conducted operations to round-up illegal aliens in the country. The Omanis were quickly surprised by the scope of the problem and arrested more than 7,500 persons, the vast majority of whom were economic migrants or workers with expired visas, along with some smugglers. The Royal Oman Police Coast Guard (ROPCG) regularly detains smugglers and illegal migrant workers, usually along Oman's northern coast between Muscat and Sohar, with some now coming from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. More Somalis are allegedly attempting to enter Oman via Yemen. One unofficial estimate placed the number of illegal immigrants apprehended in 2006 at over 25,000, although the numbers reportedly declined in 2007. ¶11. (S) OMC works with the various military and police services to enhance Oman's ability to both monitor and police its borders. During Ramadan (September-October) of 2007, a joint operation between the Royal Navy of Oman (RNO),the Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO),ROPCG and the UK's helicopter detachment in Muscat was successful in interdicting numerous boats used to smuggle people and drugs into the northern Batinah coast. After the first week of interdictions, the Omanis reported that the smugglers no longer were using their normal routes. Whether they avoided Omani waters or went inland elsewhere is unknown. ¶12. (S/NF) The Omani security and intelligence services are professional, reasonably well-funded and motivated. Oman is not a regional or offshore financial center and, accordingly, does not have a significant money laundering or terrorist financing problem. With its relatively open and welcoming society and increasing numbers of Western tourists, Oman remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Recently, Omani security forces have shown a heightened interest in greater CT training, and the Sultan's Special Force (SSF) is standing up a 3rd battalion, which will have urban CT as its sole mission. Overall Mil-Mil Programs -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) Operations and War Reserve Materials (WRM): Oman has fully supported virtually all access, basing and over-flight requests we have made. NAVCENT flies P-3 patrols from Masirah Island on an irregular single-ship deployment basis and the U.K. maintains a Nimrod detachment at Seeb airport, which operates as part of OEF. NAVCENT also uses the al-Qarin bombing range when U.S. aircraft carriers transit off the coast, and makes port visits to Muscat and Salalah. CENTAF's WRM sites at Seeb, Masirah and Thumrait -- which house almost USD 10 billion in WRM weapons, equipment and supplies -- are robust and active in support of current Middle East and South Asia military operations. The closure of the military portion of Seeb airport will be a phased reduction starting in 2010 and completed by 2012. Oman is constructing a new airbase at al-Masanah, close to the northern port of Sohar, and is keen to have U.S. Air Force presence at this base. CENTAF plans to begin construction of its WRM site at al-Masanah and held a planning meeting with RAFO in January 2008. ¶14. (S) Exercises: The exercise schedule for FY08 is robust, with one ground exercise, three JCETs, two air (one of which will be a combined Oman, U.S., U.K and French) and two EOD exercises. In addition, planning for a new amphibious exercise with Oman is underway. The objective of this exercise will be military assistance from the sea in response to a humanitarian disaster (i.e. typhoon, earthquake, etc.). ¶15. (U) IMET/CTFP/NESA: FY06 IMET program was USD 1.089M with Oman sending 27 students to the U.S.; five students were sent under the COUNTER TERRORISM Fellowship (CTF) Program. FY07 IMET was USD $1.089M and sent 28 Omani students to the U.S. The FY 08 budget for IMET and CT for Oman increased to, respectively, $1.5M and $100K. Currently, there are 57 Omani NESA alumni with two new participants preparing for travel. Foreign Military Sales -------------- ¶16. (C) FY06 and FY07 FMF was USD 13.86M, a marked decrease from FY05's USD 19.84M. The FY08 FMF budget request was first reduced to $10.10M, and then again to $4.65M. The Omanis have not yet been officially notified of this reduction and we anticipate a very negative reaction, as well as questioning by the Omanis whether this is intended as a political message. In addition to closing some engagement opportunities, the impact on Oman's five year military acquisition plan could be significant; undoubtedly some key acquisitions will not occur. Numerous FMF cases are in process, including NVDs, Naval and Coast Guard boats, M-16 rifles, Javelin (missiles should arrive in Mar 08) and TOW-IIB (missiles scheduled to return to manufacturer for repair (Feb 08). After the Joint Military Commission, the Omani Ministry of Defense indicated it would like to move HIMARS/ATACM (ENDP for ATACM should be completed in Feb 08) to the top of its priority list. However, funding for this system will be an issue and Oman would like to tie "creative financing" for this into the Gulf Security Dialogue. Key FMS cases are: a. (U) F-16s: Eleven of the 12 aircraft are in country, with the last aircraft (the test plane) now undergoing retrofitting. Overall, the case has been managed very well and the Omanis are proving very capable as pilots, maintainers and logisticians. Case value is USD 750M. b. (U) Tropospheric Scatter Network (Troposcatter) and 1kW HF Radios: Omani officials cite these cases when they complain about the slow nature of FMS. These systems will provide integrated national C2; they gained in priority after the Omani operation in 2006 to round-up illegal immigrants. Company design of system requirements and availability has taken two years. Delivery is scheduled for July 09 for 1kW and Nov 09 for Troposcatter. c. (C) COUNTER Narcotics/Counter Terrorism/Border Security: The Royal Oman Police, parent organization of the ROP Coast Guard, used Article 1004 funding to upgrade the command and control facility at ROP/HQ and to obtain secure HF radios for Coast Guard boats and stations. The radio upgrade was completed in Dec 06 and provided the ROP with the ability to intercept more illegal smugglers than did its old system of cell phones. ROP and OMC are working to obtain additional 1206, 1004 and 1033 money to institute further border control and COUNTER narcotic/terrorism programs. ¶17. (S/NF) Bilateral Intelligence Exchanges: Oman and the U.S. have an active intelligence exchange program (Sea Gull) that is now focused on Iranian military activity. USCENTCOM analysts are preparing for the next Sea Gull exchange on 1-5 March 2008. Oman is looking to acquire new ELINT/SIGINT equipment to replace the obsolete equipment acquired under CLUSTRUM SPECTRUM. The Royal Air Force Of Oman is the executive agent for CLUSTER SPECTRUM and has formally requested replacement; DIA and USCENTCOM are working packages to identify possible systems and seek funding. ¶18. (U) In conclusion, overall Oman-U.S. relations, as well as the military-to-military relationship, are solid. Our daily interaction with the Omani leadership and armed forces is candid, constructive and marked by a spirit of cooperation on both sides. We look to strengthen and expand these already excellent relations. GRAPPO