FRIENDS OF BELARUS MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000070 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM BO SUBJECT: FRIENDS OF BELARUS MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE REF: MUNICH 52 Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Lithuania organized a meeting of the Friends of Belarus on the margins of the February 8-10 Munich Security Conference. The meeting was characterized by agreement that the U.S. and EU should maintain pressure on Belarus for the release of political prisoners, and by a commitment to U.S.-EU consultation on the way forward thereafter. The participants also briefly discussed the gas dispute between Gazprom and Ukraine. End summary. ¶2. (C) Lithuanian FM Vaitiekunas hosted a Friends of Belarus meeting February 10 on the margins of the Munich Security Conference. Representing the U.S. were EUR A/S Fried, Amb. Stewart and EUR DAS Kramer. Latvia (Klava) and Sweden (Lyrvall) were represented at the Political Director level, as was Germany (Stanzel). The EU Council's Helga Schmid also attended, and British Ambassador Arthur represented the UK. ¶3. (C) The Lithuanian FM began the meeting by giving a readout on his recent bilateral meeting with Belarus FM Martynov on the margins of the conference. Martynov said Belarus wanted to pursue better relations with both the U.S. and EU, but did not want to appear to be "giving in" to the U.S. or Europe. Martynov reportedly noted that Belarus had already released three political prisoners and, in accordance with Minsk's commitment, would follow through in releasing the rest. Asked specifically about Kozulin, Martynov did not want to talk about names, but reiterated the Belarusian commitment, and said that "six means six, not five." In return, Martynov said Belarus is seeking progress from the EU in three areas: 1) an end to the visa ban list; 2) EU cooperation on energy issues; and 3) an end to economic sanctions. Vaitiekunas shared his personal doubts about Martynov's trustworthiness, but said that it was important to keep pushing the regime to fulfill its commitments. ¶4. (C) A/S Fried and Ambassador Stewart pointed out that progress up to now was the result of U.S.-EU solidarity and that it was important to maintain this going forward. Fried said one had to be prepared for Martynov and Lukashenka to play games, such as releasing all the current political prisoners, but then arresting new ones. If Minsk released all the political prisoners unconditionally, the U.S. was ready to suspend the expansion of sanctions, send a delegation to Minsk (perhaps jointly with the EU) to engage with the government (while also meeting with the opposition), and consider revisiting parts of the travel ban and asset freeze (at least not expanding the sanctions). We would consult closely with EU partners. He noted that it was important to keep Belarus "in play" to maximize its degree of sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia. ¶5. (C) DAS Kramer pointed out that if Belarus drags the release of political prisoners out until June, the U.S. government might choose not to seek a waiver on Jackson-Vanik, which would have the effect of cutting off most U.S. trade with Belarus. It was important to maintain U.S.-EU leverage to gain the unconditional release of all political prisoners; it was also important to maintain leverage afterwards as well, because there were many other important goals beyond release of political prisoners. ¶6. (C) German PolDir Stanzel underscored the precarious situation Belarus was in, squeezed by both the West and Russia. He noted that MFA State Secretary Erler had also met Martynov on the margins of the conference. Erler reportedly had insisted on three preconditions for any movement by the EU: 1) no repression of political demonstrations; 2) release of all six political prisoners; and 3) a guarantee to hold free and fair parliamentary elections this fall with outside observers. ¶7. (C) Schmid said it was not in the West's interest to abandon Belarus to Russia, but stressed that all six prisoners had to be released before any concessions could be offered. That was the minimum pre-condition for engagement -- she thought Martynov and Lukashenka understood that. MUNICH 00000070 002 OF 002 Schmid noted that the EU visa ban list comes up for revision in March, an issue in which the Belarusian Ambassador in Brussels was keenly interested. The EU would also be watching whether the regime cracked down on the Feb. 18 entrepreneurs' demonstration. She noted that Belarus had already released a statement welcoming ODIHR sending election observers to the fall parliamentary vote -- this reportedly had really irritated the Russians. ¶8. (C) British Ambassador Arthur agreed that EU-U.S. unity had borne fruit and should be continued. The UK favored a joint EU/U.S. delegation to Minsk once all the political prisoners were released. Swedish Political Director Lyrvall said that within the EU framework, Stockholm was examining what it could do to reach out to Belarusian civil society at the grassroots level, including through student exchanges. It plans to upgrade its current "Embassy Office" into a full-fledged embassy in the coming months and increase aid to some 14 million Euros per year. ¶9. (C) Lithuanian MOD rep noted that the Lithuanian Embassy in Minsk is the NATO contact point embassy for Belarus. He suggested increased defense cooperation, including assistance with MOD reform, civilian control of the military, etc., as possible carrots for Belarus in return for releasing political prisoners. A/S Fried and DAS Kramer thought this could be a good idea, but that it should only be offered once all the political prisoners have been released. Kramer also noted that the U.S. would oppose an invitation to Bucharest for FM Martynov; attendance should be kept at the ambassador level. Gazprom's Threat to Cut off Gas to Ukraine -------------- ¶10. (C) At A/S Fried's suggestion, the group briefly discussed Gazprom's threat to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine because of alleged debts. Participants agreed with A/S Fried that it was best to be careful about being drawn directly into the details of this matter, given the complicated Ukrainian political landscape and murkiness of RosUkrEnergo's (RUE) ties both to Gazprom and to Ukrainian political figures. Schmid agreed that the rivalry between Ukrainian President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko over the fate of RUE was particularly complicated. Schmid reported that she had already told the Russian Ambassador in Brussels that the 2006 cut-off of gas supplies had damaged Russia's credibility and it might be a mistake to repeat that experience. A/S Fried said the episode pointed up the benefits of the proposed Nabucco gas project, which would make Western Europe less dependent on Russian-controlled gas supplies. ¶11. (U) DAS Kramer and Ambassador Stewart cleared this cable, which was coordinated with Embassy Berlin. ¶12. (U) For more information on the 44th Conference and past conferences, visit:"http://www.securityconference.de". ¶13. (U) Previous reporting from Munich is available on our SIPRNET website at www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/. NELSON